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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis follows and analyses the involvement of both social actors and the state 
in the industrial transformation of Mexico. While these actors have been key 
associates in the development of the Mexican economy for decades, with the 1982 
debt crisis, and especially after the promotion of a structural reform in 1986, the 
patterns of their involvement changed. However, this change was more limited than 
expected, and the state did not abandon its participation in some key industrial 
sectors. This thesis will demonstrate that the role of the state remained important 
during the process of change towards an Export-Oriented developmental paradigm, 
although the state continued to participate in fashioning social relations, it did so in 
new ways that can be termed “protective liberalization.”  
 
Key words: Mexico, petrochemical industry, developmental state, protective 
liberalization, state participation 
 
Cette thèse évalue et analyse la participation des acteurs sociaux et de l'État 
dans la transformation industrielle du Mexique. Alors que  durant plusieurs 
décennies ces acteurs on été des partenaires stratégiques dans le 
développement de l’économie mexicaine, avec la crise de la dette de 1982 et 
spécialement suite à la réforme structurelle de 1986, le modèle de leur 
participation a changé. Néanmoins, ce changement a été plus limité que 
prévu et l‘État n‘a pas abandonné sa participation dans certains  secteurs 
industrielles clés. Cette thèse démontre que le rôle de l’État n’a  pas 
perdu de son importance pendant le transfert vers un paradigme du 
développement orienté vers l’exportation et que même si l ́État a continué  à 
participer dans la structuration des relations sociales, cela c’est fait d’une 
nouvelle manière que l'on pourrait  dénommer “libéralisation protective”.  
  
Mots clés: Mexique, Industrie  pétrochimique, participation de l’État, 
libéralisation protective.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
This thesis follows and analyses the involvement of both social actors 
and the state in the industrial transformation of Mexico. While these actors 
have been key associates in the development of the Mexican economy for 
decades, with the 1982 debt crisis, and especially after Mexico joined the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1986, the patterns of their 
involvement changed. However, this change did not mean that during this 
process the state abandoned its efforts to shape the national economy and 
domestic society. Indeed, this thesis will demonstrate that the role of the state 
remained important during the process of change towards an Export-Oriented 
developmental paradigm. It will also show that during the policy paradigm 
transition the state continued to participate in fashioning social relations, 
although it did so in new ways, that can be termed “protective liberalization.”  
As the state gave greater space to private producers, its own role 
changed. This changement was not accompanied with the definition of proper 
regulations and reinforced private veto capacities. This limited the state’s 
manoeuvre possibilities for changing patterns in some strategic sectors that 
were closely related to the consolidation of the revolutionary state. 
Petrochemicals is one such sector. As a consequence, despite shifting the 
developmental paradigm, the state was unable to ensure the implementation 
of the structural reform strategy for the petrochemical industry and to define a 
coherent policy for the sector. Consequently, the industry shrank significantly 
in the second half of the 1980s and through the 1990s. The political 
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processes that hindered the state in finding a new and successful role are at 
the core of this thesis until 2000, which marked the year in which the PRI lost 
control of the Mexican Presidency. This event marked much more than a 
change in government. It was also an end of an era, and therefore this thesis 
ends at that point. 
Efforts to undertake structural reform of the petrochemical sector 
created a sort of cohabitation of two different development paradigms: the 
new neoliberal one and the former nationalist paradigm. This coexistence 
made the state unable to successfully reform a strategic sector, or define the 
state’s promotional role on this industry. This thesis will analyse the reasons 
the state became unable to define a coherent petrochemical policy to adapt 
the industry to the conditions of the new policy paradigm. 
 In order to explain why the Mexican state became incapable of defining 
a congruent policy for the petrochemical sector, this analysis takes its 
distance from two bodies of literature that have sought to understand the last 
decades of changes in the international political economy. First, it moves 
away from the traditional visions of Mexican political economy that focussed 
almost exclusively on corporatism or neo-corporatism. Such approaches have 
difficulty understanding the post-1986 changes in state-society relations, 
because of their tendency to consider any state action as a result of the 
interaction between authoritarian structures and its national-populist 
clienteles. Second, this analysis is also sceptical of many approaches in 
international and comparative political economy. These approaches, while 
recognizing the importance of international economic forces and even the role 
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of the state in preparing economic actors to participate in the new economy, 
put too much of an accent on the national-international connection, and lose 
sight of the–perhaps continuing–weight of domestic social relations. 
 Therefore, in order to provide a more nuanced understanding of the 
Mexican case, this thesis retains from the tradition of Mexican analysis a 
focus on national social relations and trajectories, but without seeing them 
exclusively through a corporatist lens. From the new international and 
comparative political economy literature, this thesis maintains attention to the 
developmental state. But it highlights the state’s shaping of the domestic 
market more than many studies do. In doing so, this analysis uncovers 
continuities in the state’s domestic development strategy, in particular its 
continuous support for the Mexican bourgeoisie.  
As it is well known, in Spanish, both the words “developmental” and 
“developmentalist” are translated as desarrollista. Developmentalist policies 
are associated in the Latin American tradition with the policies promoted by 
the United Nations’ Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) in the 
1950s and 1960s. They included a state-led development program that rested 
on a political agreement, creating the conditions for building a domestic path 
of development from some corporatist or nationalist-populist policies that 
were already being implemented in Mexico in the 1920s. We therefore use 
the word developmental intentionally to mark a difference with these policies. 
Our aim is to put an emphasis on the state’s transformative structures and the 
process of exchange established with the private sector, rather than on an 
authoritarian state structure and its national-populist clienteles. 
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Tracing the historical patterns followed by the Mexican state since the 
1950s (albeit with a brief examination of the genealogy of the revolutionary 
state), this thesis maps the state’s contribution to the transition from Import 
Substitution Industrialization (ISI) towards an Export-Oriented Industrialization 
(EOI) economy that is open to international trade. Contrary to the 
expectations of many analysts and observers this research finds that during 
the transition from ISI to EOI the Mexican state continued supporting and 
fostering the development of a national bourgeoisie, seeking to protect it from 
external determinants and influences. Mexican business has not been left 
solely to its own resources in facing the global economy. As in the past, we 
observe relations characterized more by what Peter Evans calls “embedded 
autonomy” than a totally “liberalized” economy.  
In order to understand the relationships between the state and civil 
society (that is, sectoral and industrial organizations of labour, and private 
actors) even after 1986, this thesis examines the contribution of the state to 
patterning market arrangements. Most other studies examining Mexican 
liberalization stress structural conditions, over-valuing the constraints on 
political action or business strategies.  Such analysis also tend to ignore the 
re-organization of the domestic market, concentrating almost exclusively on 
international markets and forces, in order to account for protected industries 
gaining competitive access to international markets.1 Therefore, they assume 
two things: domestic arrangements matter little, and nationalist and protective 
                                                             
1 See, for example, Evans, 1995; Riain, 2000. 
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visions of the domestic market have been eliminated in order for this 
transition to occur.  
In part, these assumptions follow from a re-making of the definition of 
“development”. In the past, development studies defined development as a 
local trajectory of transformation and change. However, more recently and 
especially in the work of Peter Evans, we find the notion that a developmental 
state will focus almost exclusively on the local economy’s insertion into the 
international economy. With this shift, the interest in the state’s involvement in 
domestic markets and the actors involved in them declined. 
In contrast, the chapters that follow will document two things. The first 
is that while it may have altered its ways of intervening, after 1986 the 
Mexican state remained an important partner with business not only in 
helping to thrust Mexican exports into the international market, but also in 
protecting old associates in shaping domestic markets and national 
champions through the 1980s and 1990s privatization processes. Moreover, it 
retained its longstanding goal of fostering or supporting the national 
bourgeoisie, and indeed sought to shelter it from international forces. There 
was less change in social relations than one might have expected, although 
there was a clear shift from an ISI to an EOI strategy.   
This observation was the initial puzzle of the thesis. Grappling with that 
puzzle led to the question of this thesis: what are the consequences if any, of 
using a strategy of protective liberalization during a paradigm shift?  The 
argument of this thesis, that answers this question, is that because the 
Mexican state engaged in protective liberalization, it ultimately failed in its 
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efforts to transform the petrochemical sector.  Drawing from two paradigms 
simultaneously in the definition of petrochemical policy, as the term protective 
liberalization suggests, ultimately hindered the state’s capacity to play its four 
developmental roles.  
 In order to make this argument, this thesis has two Parts. In the first we 
identify the construction of the structures of the developmental state and its 
embedded autonomy; in the second one, we track the ways in which the state 
performs four roles available to it –custodial, midwifery, husbandry, and 
demiurgic – in the promotion of a domestic petrochemical industry. These 
roles have been identified by Peter Evans in his classic book, Embedded 
Autonomy. States and Industrial Transformation (1995). 
However, despite employing Evan’s typology, it must be 
supplemented, in order to understand change in a more complete way. Evans 
has a limited definition of development. In the current context only states that 
promote integration into the international market qualify as developmental 
states. Those which hang back and insist on designing domestic relations are 
considered backward. Evans defines development  
“no longer as a local trajectory of transformation, (but) by the relation 
between local productive capacity and changing global array of 
sectors.  The countries that fill the most rewarding and dynamic niches 
are ‘developed’. Being relegated to niches that are less rewarding (…) 
reduces the prospect of progressive change” (Evans, 1995: 8). 
 
From this perspective, the Korean state is the ideal-typical 
developmental state because from the beginning, the Korean state promoted 
the country’s insertion into the international economy, via the promotion of 
Export-Oriented conglomerates. It never sought to improve domestic markets, 
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but only to be internationally competitive. Therefore, it never confronted the 
challenge of changing development paths to move from domestically 
focussed to Export-Oriented development (Kohli, 2004, Kohli, 1999: 93-137). 
 However, not all countries have been able to begin with a clean slate. 
Here Evans has less success in understanding how state strategy both 
changes and remains constant. In Latin American countries for example, the 
state sought to foster domestic market development in an autonomous way 
from the core countries, for decades. The state’s objective was to improve ISI 
and this dominated the political economy long before EOI was on the agenda. 
Evans does not help us understand the choices made when the economy 
began to open to international markets, whether under pressure from 
international or domestic forces. Will the state be able to identify a strategy 
that will foster adaptation to the new international conditions? Or, will it 
crumble in the face of the impossibility of continuing along the well-trodden 
paths? 
 At this point, it is necessary to consider arguments about change and 
to ask whether or not prior practices affect subsequent state-business 
relations. This leads to analyses that consider elements of path dependency 
even when the state undertakes a significant shift in its policy paradigm 
(Kohli, 1999 and Schwartz 1996).2 While recognizing the importance of the 
post-1986 shift from ISI to EOI–indeed describing this as what Peter A. Hall 
(1997: 90-113) calls a paradigm shift–, the thesis also identifies the 
                                                             
2 For general visions of path dependency see for example North, 1990; Pierson, 1994; 
Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth, 1997;  Streeck and Thelen (eds) 2005. 
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continuities underlying the choices. It finds that the strategy continues to be 
influenced by the goal of shaping domestic social forces, particularly the well 
being of the national bourgeoisie. However, despite the constancy of this 
goal, state actors undertake puzzling and powering in order to respond to new 
pressures and needs coming from within the domestic society as well as 
without. 
 Therefore, this thesis will argue that: 
1. The state’s contribution to transformation is the result of 
accumulated institutions and practices that remain relatively 
constant, even if the paths to development change. 
2. Both state interest and action are defined by paradigms that 
empower governments as a result of the bureaucracies’ capacity to 
offer policy options to face critical problems. When paradigms show 
limits, bureaucracies seek different frames of references to define 
policy and in doing so, they shape actions and social actors (Hall, 
1989; 1997). 
3. Even if the state aims to change a policy paradigm, the previous 
development paths can be so difficult to overcome that they will end 
up blocking policy options in sectors that are considered to be 
strategic in the economy.   
The challenging issue here is that even acting from a new ideological 
frame, the Mexican state’s promotional roles for development maintained a 
basic constancy, and at the same time they affected the developmental 
transition in Mexico. In other words, there was both a paradigm shift in policy 
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and a significant degree of path dependency in state-society relations. The 
Mexican state kept influencing the industrial landscape during the transition, 
for political reasons –gaining the support of the most important business 
groups in the country to assure the viability of the reform in the long-term – 
and for economic reasons, as businesses were made vulnerable by the 
reform, requiring state reinforcement to ensure their competitiveness. 
The basic argument is this. There is no question that a paradigm shift 
occurred regarding the developmental objective and therefore, Mexico’s 
location in the international economy. The state clearly shifted from ISI to 
EOI.  However, at the same time – and perhaps in order to do so – the 
domestic trajectory during the reform process remained almost unchanged. 
The relationship between the state and business remained similar to what it 
had been since the 1930s. The Mexican state continued to protect and 
promote a national bourgeoisie and national champions, despite the 
openness of the markets. As a consequence the government’s capacity to 
promote change and competitiveness was limited in the petrochemical sector, 
especially after the first push of reform lost strength, the political context 
changed, and political forces contesting structural reform reorganized. 
The evolution of the political economy of the Mexican petrochemical 
industry provides a fascinating case study of the transformations, continuities 
and limits of state-society relations. It also illustrates how historical 
circumstances in which the authority of the state was consolidated 
constrained state choices to pursue new transformative goals, making change 
difficult, perhaps impossible. 
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This stability amidst change is documented via a detailed analysis of 
the petrochemical industry. Firstly, this sector has been chosen because 
Mexico has both oil and gas, which gives it a structural advantage to develop 
petrochemicals. This has been a state interest since the oil nationalization in 
1938. Secondly, the petrochemical industry is particularly important to every 
industrial economy because it is a strategic propeller of industrial growth. 
Above all, basic petrochemical products are indispensable for more than 70 
manufacturing processes. Thirdly, as the production of petrochemicals is 
relatively new, both in Mexico and throughout the world, the case works as an 
excellent indication of how the Mexican state consolidated domestic 
producers instead of allowing the expansion of transnational corporations 
(TNCs) in Mexico. Once TNCs expressed their interest in controlling the 
development of this industry in the 1940s, the state targeted it for the new ISI 
development strategy. With the liberalization of the economy in the 1980s, the 
petrochemical industry lost importance even though the state was unable to 
make all the reforms it sought.  
The consolidation of a petroleum3 industry was also affected by the 
consolidation process of the Mexican Revolutionary State. As the oil 
industries were nationalized in 1938 after a long fight with international 
corporations unwilling to recognize the authority of Mexican institutions, the 
petrochemical industry was marked with a nationalist label. Along with this, 
the study of the Mexican petroleum industry led us to offer an analysis in 
                                                             
3 When mentioning petroleum, we are referring to crude oil, petrochemicals and natural gas 
industries. 
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which the state was connected to the society not only by capital but also by 
labour, in order to define and pursue collective goals in the country.  
This is an important difference from what Evans (1995: 231) claims 
regarding the Korean case in which “capital is connected, labor is excluded. 
The apparent connections [with labor] are more a means of repressive 
cooptation than channels for pursuing collective goals”. By contrast, in the 
Mexican petroleum industry, both capital and labour are connected with the 
state as a channel for pursuing collective goals. We thus offer a study that 
tests the viability of embedded autonomy in a tripartite context–labor, 
business, and the state. The three actors enjoyed spaces of embeddedness 
and autonomy to act in both economic and political arenas. 
The golden years of this association are illustrated by a long period of 
rapid growth with large profits, and increasing real wages from the end of the 
Second World War until the 1970s. This is also the period in which domestic 
petrochemical production began and the industry was consolidated. However, 
domestic pressures for political reform and international pressures for 
improving the performance of the economy altered this picture. The Mexican 
state tried both to sustain the model and to reform it during the 1970s, 
creating a political economic crisis that destabilized the country in 1986. Since 
1986, the state has tried to make necessary reforms in order to consolidate 
national petrochemical champions, capable of competing in international 
circuits. This action would have meant the modification of the old networks of 
embedded autonomy, the withdrawal of the state’s demiurgic role, and a 
continued protective pattern provided to private producers. Yet the reform 
  
19 
would have made the union’s role redundant. It was hardly surprising that the 
oil union contested the reform with the interest of maintaining the status quo. 
It vetoed effectively a significant part of the reform policy. The result was the 
state paralysis in this specific sector, and the increased dependence on 
imports marked the industry disintegration.  Ironically, then, the Mexican state 
found itself unable to carry through the reforms it initiated. 
The entire analysis proceeds in three time periods, describing each of 
the four state roles: 
• We found that for the first period (1957-1970) the state was able to 
implement an inclusive developmental agenda and to foster industry 
through an adequate blending of promotional roles. It was also capable 
of creating a national champions lead by Mexican business people.  
• The period going from 1970 to 1986 is one of conflict and 
collaboration. As the private sector gained experience and coherence, 
it contested most of the state’s regulation of the sector. At the same 
time, private-sector actors gained greater capacity to negotiate with 
Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) in the face of the scarcity that the 
international oil crisis of 1973 created in Mexico. The new environment 
consolidated embedded autonomy in this sector, making public and 
private actors work together. This helped to plan the structural reform 
of the sector during the oil boom of the 1970s. Along with the oil 
industry, the petrochemical industry gained world-competitiveness. 
• Since 1986, the state has reduced its demiurgic action, making itself 
unable to play any promotional role, and unable to adequately blend 
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midwifery, husbandry and custodial roles in an inclusive way. During 
this third stage, the main state actions focussed on private sector 
reinforcement and pushed for social adaptation to it. As a 
consequence, the state lost capacity to build consensus around the 
reform and to support the conditions for the petrochemical sector to 
prosper. 
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Chapter 2. Understanding states and development 
  
Why, despite shifting the developmental paradigm, was the state unable to 
implement fully the structural reform strategy for the petrochemical industry 
and to define a coherent policy for it? In order to build an answer to this 
question, this chapter reviews the available literature on state and industrial 
actors, and then proposes a choice, that is based on the categories 
developed by Peter Evans in Embedded Autonomy. States and Industrial 
Transformation. Despite using that book the chapter ends with some 
additions to Evans’ concepts that will provide a set of analytic tools for 
understanding the situation of states like the Mexican one, that have had a 
developmental strategy for many decades, and therefore do not start with a 
“clean slate” as did the Korean state which served as Evans exemplar. These 
tools are useful for understanding the limits faced by the Mexican state as it 
set out to change the policy paradigm in the era of liberalization. 
 
2.1. The state of the art 
The starting point of this thesis is that the relationship between the 
state and industrial actors is crucial to explain how some industrial sectors 
have been able to achieve comparative advantages that allow them to access 
the most rewarding niches of international markets without risking their 
positions domestically. Traditionally, research has explained the structural 
transformation of national economies emphasizing two theoretically opposed 
models: a market-pull or a state-directed one. This section provides an 
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introduction to both of these theoretical traditions, with a particular focus on 
studies of Mexico. 
 
2.1.1 Market-pull theoretical models 
Market-pull explanations are presented at either micro or macro levels.  
In the case of the first, basic premises of methodological individualism 
underpin the model. They assume that the economy is a zero-sum game and 
that individuals are acting rationally in order to achieve the maximization of 
their interest. Collective action is the result of aggregating choices of rent-
seeking individuals. In such a model, constructing a coalition with state 
officials, also looking out for their own advantages is a normal expectation 
(Olson, 1982).  In an early work, Raymond Vernon observed that Mexico 
followed a pattern similar to that of many other countries since the 1950s. A 
highly specialized group of economists took control of state’s financial 
agencies and pulled politicians towards economic policies they deemed 
“rational” (Vernon, 1963). 
The emphasis on the competition between tecnicos and politicos, 
however, has been generalized in the 1990s, especially as the liberalization 
process began to take hold. Economic reform is explained as the result of a 
collective action that has allowed the reforming policy-making and 
technocratic elite to reduce the number of the potential losers through the 
formation of distributional coalitions with potential winners. Highly-qualified 
economists, in control of key positions of economic ministries and the Central 
Bank, facilitated rent-seeking coalitions with business. Coalitions between a 
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technical and a business elite could aggregate enough interests in order to 
assure that the first group would continue in power and that the second would 
maximize its profits.  This notion of a cleavage between politicos and tecnicos 
has been used to differentiate structuralist from monetarist economists. The 
assumption is that the first group is more "sensitive" to social needs and 
nationalist-populist agendas than the second group (Schamis, 2002; 
Schamis, 1998; Centeno, 1997; Erfani, 1995; Hernández, 1994; Tello, 1979 
and 1982). 
 Some observers have taken the idea to an extreme. They even 
question if the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) had actually ruled 
the country, considering the fact that at least from the 1970s, until 2000 when 
PRI lost power, the President was nominated from among a group of cabinet 
members whose career has been within the bureaucracy and the 
government, rather than party officials. Many of these nominated presidents 
had no previous party career or electoral experience (Centeno, 1997). This 
argument neglects, however, the fact that while he perhaps started out in the 
public service, the President and cabinet members use the party structure to 
control policy-making and implementation. Therefore, the notion of 
maximizing competing elites in a conflicting market condition alone is too 
limited. This is true, even if as Thacker (2000) suggests, the state took the 
autonomous decision to push for a new commercial policy oriented to export. 
Afterwards, the state did seek to construct coalitions with business people 
that would support the long-term viability of the commercial policy.  
At a macro-sociological level, Haggard, Maxfield and Schneider 
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(1997:33-55) have characterized five leading theoretical approaches to the 
political economy of the state/business relationship in the form of market pull.  
Business can be conceptualized as capital, sectors, firms, associations or 
networks, all which may or may not constrain the state. 
Business analyzed as capital focuses on the structural constraints 
imposed by private control of physical and financial assets and capital 
mobility.  Private sector actors need to be neither organized nor engaged in 
explicit lobbying efforts in order to influence government behavior. A number 
of studies conclude that as governments seek to maximize growth or returns 
to particular constituencies, they are limited by capital’s ability to pull the 
government towards their own interest. They assume that liquid asset holders 
seek to maximize profits and favor strong property rights, low taxation, and 
favorable regulation (Maxfield, 1990; Schneider, 1997). 
We can illustrate this position with analysis of the 1982 bank 
nationalizations in Mexico. Sylvia Maxfield (1990) begins by accepting the 
idea that the state represents the interest of dominant classes. She argues 
that (Maxfield, 1990:3)  
"the influence of the Mexican bankers’ alliance, including large-scale 
capitalists, their allies in the state, and their increasingly influential 
international partners, hindered effective implementation of the 
nationalization decree.  The influence of the bankers’ alliance shaped 
crucial decisions made during the implementation stage of the bank 
nationalization. These decisions limited the extent to which the original 
goals of the nationalization could met."  
 
However, important institutional constraints are ignored in this work.  
The nationalization decree was send to Congress by President Lopez Portillo 
on September 1, 1982, just 90 days before he was to leave office. President-
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elect Miguel de la Madrid’s disagreement with the nationalization was well 
known. Therefore, it is hard to maintain the claim that only business 
opposition hindered the implementation stage. Secondly, businesses’ 
capacity to negotiate was also limited by the fact that many industries were 
bankrupt and dependent on state-financed rescue programs to alleviate their 
foreign indebtedness. Therefore, they were not in a strong position to impose 
their will on the government. Thirdly, the state, not business, had the capacity 
to reshape the landscape of Mexican ownership. The government held, along 
with the banks, control of the main industrial groups, so giving ownership of 
industry back to the former owners was a decision of the state, not of 
business. Finally, the analysis ignores the fact that Central Bank officials 
enjoyed a great deal of autonomy inside the Mexican bureaucracy, because 
the Bank is one of the only three institutions in Mexico whose officials are 
recruited by civil service examinations, as we will describe in chapter 4.4 In 
other words, it is an autonomous bureaucracy. Rather than being the 
relationship of one-way dominance that Maxfield suggests, this single detail 
suggests a relation that might be termed, following Peter Evans, one of 
embedded autonomy. 
More recently Puga (2004: 64) traced a change in the state and big 
business relationship going from a corporatist exchange based in conflict to a 
collaborative action based on co-responsibility, in which the state accepted to 
implement the private sector national project. The negotiation of NAFTA 
                                                             
4 The other two government institutions with similar recruitment practices are the diplomatic 
service and the Federal Electoral Institute (since the 1990s). 
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offered Puga (2004) a case study to explore this transition. As in the case of 
Maxfield, Puga’s analysis of co-responsibility seems to offer support to the 
idea of Embedded Autonomous action in which private and public actors 
acted together in the definition of policy.  
Haggard et al., also use a business-as-sector definition that draws 
distinctions among different types of economic activity, and emphasizes how 
the distribution of economic activity and different sector interests affect 
politics, policies, and growth.  Authors that follow this approach predict that 
sectors will try to pull the state towards them, but the private sector does not 
have homogeneous preferences. Therefore, economic policy is understood 
as the resultant of a vector of divergent and often contending business’ 
interests (Gourevitch 1986; on this approach in general see Milner, 1988; 
Rogowski, 1989; and Frieden, 1991).  
Milner and Kubota (2005) focus on the question, why did political 
leaders in many developing countries choose to lower their trade barriers? 
Abandoning the main explanations in recent political economy models 
(external pressures, political leaders and their ideas, and economic crisis), 
Milner et al.’s explanation strains the correlation between democratization and 
the embrace of free trade policies in less developed countries. Their research 
supports the idea that previously disenfranchised groups provide the support 
political leaders need to use trade barriers “as a strategy for garnering 
political support (…) Democratic political competition meant that leaders were 
likely to liberalize trade to appeal to these new groups to ensure their political 
survival” (Milner et al, 2005: 163) 
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These studies mainly focus on the characteristics of commercial policy. 
Two studies exemplify this focus. The first by Dale Story (1986), examines the 
growing influence of industrialists on commercial policy, particularly at the 
level of openness to the international economy. It is a case study primarily 
focused on the decision of President Lopez Portillo’s to reject Mexico’s entry 
into the GATT in 1979. Despite having promoted a major policy to foster the 
internationalization of some industrial sectors, opposition from industrialists 
led him to back off the accord that had been negotiated already. The intense 
debate and final decision are, for Story, a classic example of how the state 
ends up being constrained by the over-protected interests of the industrial 
sector.  
Flores Quiroga (1998) offers a very detailed study of the ups and 
downs of the Mexican commercial policy from the 1970s to the 1990s. Flores 
takes into account the state’s decision to promote a gradual opening of the 
economy beginning in the early 1970s. However, the interests of different 
industrial groups affected by the liberalization diverged. On one hand, the 
domestic and international conjunctures combined in order to allow those who 
still clung to protectionist positions to prevail; on the other, those who 
benefited from liberalization were still too weak to ensure that their position 
would triumph. However, in the mid-1980s, Flores Quiroga demonstrates that 
an Export-Oriented industrial policy both coincided with the state’s interest 
and responded to the international context. Therefore it would allow the 
Mexican economy to become one of the most open in the world.  
A similar idea is developed by Fairbrother (2007: 266-268) who adds 
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that the Mexican state used three strategies to construct politically crucial 
support for NAFTA on the part of domestic business: control over political 
representation, material concessions to potential critics, and careful strategic 
framing. However, these works are unable to explain how those Export-
Oriented interests were constituted and how the state contributed to creating 
and consolidating the Export-Oriented wing of national industry. 
In studying the definition of financial policy during the government of 
President Salinas (1982-1988), Kessler (1998:41) begins his analysis by 
assuming that the characteristically concentrated Mexican market, which is 
organized in business groups, complicates the analysis because it is based 
on a perspective of interest groups. He adds that… 
When banks and manufactures are linked by cross-ownership and even 
run by the same families, the interest of large industrial firms cannot be 
neatly separated from those of financial firms. Indeed, even the 
traditional struggles between domestic and international producers over 
exchange-rate valuation can become meaningless within an industrial 
structure in which the firms that sell the most abroad also buy the most 
foreign goods. In such an economy, when the interest group policy 
stimulates exports only at the expense of more costly imported inputs, 
an interest group policy preference is not obvious… 
 
Kessler (1998) offers an interest group model to explain the political 
motivations of policy-making decisions for pushing market reform. The 
specific political challenges facing the reforming bureaucracy and their need 
to increase support from financial groups, created a heavy bias in the 
decisions. For this reason, the financial reform ended up disturbing the 
general rationality of policy-making in this sector leading to the 1994 crisis. 
Even if Kessler’s focus is on the political motivations for the definition of 
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financial policy, his analysis assumes that the interests of the Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional and Salinas’ government in pursuing reform were 
one and the same. If economic interests can hardly be differentiated, as 
Kessler states, is it valid to assume that there is uniformity of political interests 
as he does? This question is relevant especially since we know that the most 
important opposition to the paradigm shift that initiated in 1986 was at the 
origin of the PRI schism in 1987, and that President Salinas was forced to 
negotiate support from Partido Accion Nacional to ensure that the principal 
reform would pass through Congress. 
In addition to commercial policy, business-as-sector has been 
presented by Toledo and Zapata (1999), who follow the development of the 
Mexican steel industry. In doing so, they uncover a lack of coordination 
between private enterprises and the state. This absence affected the 
development of the whole sector, which was unable to take advantage of the 
technological developments and it never achieved the full productive capacity 
of the steel industry. Most importantly, according to the authors, 
businesspeople and the state were unable to coordinate their actions and to 
define a long-term plan for the steel industry that would benefit the whole 
country, and not only the particular interests of companies and state officials. 
 Along with this, MacLeod (2004; 2005) questions state’s autonomy in 
Mexican case. In his argument 
“the privatization program provides little evidence to support the 
contention that the Mexican state was strengthened either in the 
implementation or as a consequence of privatization. Instead, the 
privatization program entailed a variety of important links between the 
private sector and reformers in government that facilitated reform 
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without strengthening the state’s bureaucratic capacity. Moreover, 
these reforms transferred substantial resources to the private sector 
without providing much compensation to the state” (MacLeod, 2005: 
11).  
 
 As a result, the Mexican state lost autonomy while transfering both 
incomes and power to business sectors acquiring state assests during the 
privatization process. 
In general, authors focusing on business-as-sector have found that 
there are problems with the notion of uniform sector interests. First, there is 
little evidence that all the actors in a sector have the same interests and will 
therefore engage in collective action. Why would sector interests be uniform if 
there is competition among firms and their organizations? (Milner, 1987; 
Milner, 1988). Therefore, there is little predictability in the ways sector 
interests are translated into policy outcomes. 
The business-as-firm approach examines the market-pull dimensions 
of corporate organization. It looks for the characteristics of corporate structure 
that seem to affect both business preferences and the leverage that firms 
have vis-à-vis government actors. Much emphasis is put on firms seeking to 
grow (Chandler, 1990, and Chandler et al, 1998). 
Studies of Mexican firms take two forms. Some focus only on business 
peoples’ strategies to internationalize their business. A second one describes 
firms seeking what Gereffi et al (1995) have called the integration of 
commodity chains in order to gain access to the international market. In the 
first case, Salas-Porras (2005) has identified at least five different strategies 
defined by Mexican firms as they internationalize. Business groups have 
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become transnational corporations by establishing subsidiaries in different 
countries around the world. With this, they support a second strategy, the 
establishment of distribution networks. Some others have established joint 
ventures in order to gain access to technology innovations, to gain niches in 
markets or to widen operations in different countries. Another important 
strategy is financing their growth through international capital markets. The 
fifth strategy is particularly relevant to our analysis. It includes efforts to 
compete internationally while defending a niche in the domestic market. The 
state is reduced to a witness of these private strategies, or eventually forced 
to create the conditions to assure the interests of business groups. 
For those authors who stress the importance of the creation of 
commodity chains in order to internationalize, big businesses are the key 
actors in the new economic context (Pozas, 2002; 1999). They are seen as 
recovering the economic space left vacant when the state moved to promote 
liberalization. As big businesses increase their international competitiveness 
through the creation and consolidation of commodity networks and the 
adaptation to new labour conditions, the model predicts the entrance of small 
and medium firms into international circuits, making them part of the 
commodity chain. Therefore, autonomy for big businesses makes the state 
redundant; it does the work that the state previously did.  
Within the business-as-firm approach there are also the studies made 
by researchers of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), who traced the behaviour of the 15 
most important business groups in Mexico. In a way, they found that the state 
  
32 
is victim of its own success. Having successfully promoted Import Substitution 
Industrialization (ISI) in order to encourage these firms to become 
internationally competitive, business can call the shots. Successful and 
integrated business groups direct the state and “some of the state’s 
liberalization policies to their own needs”; more recently the emphasis is on 
the definition and evaluation of industrial policies (Péres, 2006; Péres & 
Garrido, 1999; Péres and Garrido, 1998; Péres, 1997). 
All these studies centred on firms’ production clusters or/and 
managerial strategies. However, they neglect at their peril the fact that 
institutional arrangements, and particularly regulation, affect their capacity to 
consolidate the group. Moreover as we will see later, many conditions that 
induce business to make new investments are themselves the product of 
state regulations, not only a result of strategic decisions taken privately. We 
cannot assume that huge conglomerates will have a single “interest” towards 
which they seek to pull the state; they often are composed of subsidiaries that 
hold a variety of interests and make differentiated demands to the state. 
 
2.1.2 State and Market: Corporatism 
Work on what Haggard et al consider business-as-associations 
stresses the joint action to pull the state toward policies that favor business 
and labor’s preferences in a conflicting set of social relations. In particular, 
many authors have applied a neo-corporatist framework (Schmitter et al., 
1974) In this business-as-association model, the division of labor structures, 
society, and development is facilitated through the negotiation of policy 
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agreements among functional organizations representing labor and business 
as well as the state. These agreements are implemented by the collaborative 
interest organizations and their willingness and ability to secure the 
compliance of their members (Schmitter 1985:33). The state turns out to be 
only a mediator, which helps avoid blockages to the natural order of capitalist 
development.  In this sense, corporatism is used as a way to reduce social 
conflict. 
This vision of the functional representation of labor and business 
predicts a non-competitive and inclusive industrial policy that represents the 
second best choice for maximizing actors. This second choice allows an 
optimal realization of the interest of each class. In this sense, the construction 
of policy seems to resemble a synthesis of the interests of all society, reduced 
to its socio-economic conditions.  
Analyses using corporatism, drawing often in Ph. Schmitter’s work on 
neo-corporatism, are one of the main theoretical frames used to analyze the 
Mexican political system.  Corporatism is often confused with a state-led 
model because of the visibility of the state in the tripartite processes. David 
Collier (1995), for example, has used this concept to study Latin American 
politics corporatism is an umbrella concept, subsuming what many other 
authors call clientelism, concertation, consociationalism, unionism and 
syndicalism. 
David Collier (1995:135) explains the merging of corporatism and 
statism in Latin America as follows: 
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Beginning in the 1970s ‘corporatism’ came to be a major focus of 
attention in research on Latin America. Analysts employed the concept 
to refer both to a pattern of interest group politics that is monopolistic, 
hierarchically ordered and structured by the state, and to a broader 
cultural and ideological tradition of the region that they viewed as 
patrimonial and statist. 
 
 
Many observers find that corporatism has been functional for Mexican 
economic development, even if the system involves co-opting, controlling, or 
repressing opposition as necessary (González Casanova, 1965). A focus on 
corporatism has also been used to account for the role of popular alliances 
recognized, if not promoted, by the state in its efforts to maintain the state’s 
relative autonomy from the dominant classes and from the constraints that 
they have been able to apply (Hamilton, 1982).  
Even when Denise Dresser (1994) does not address the consolidation 
of the revolutionary Mexican state as Hamilton does, she uses a similar 
conceptual frame to explain President Salinas’ pretence of consolidating the 
structural reform of the revolutionary Mexican project. Dresser’s argument 
stresses the state’s promotion of institutional innovations and institutional 
dependency in order to make the economy shift to a more liberal 
environment. The main idea was that the center-right coalition created a 
‘modernized-authoritarian’ regime. Not unlike Cardenas’ reform in the 1930s, 
this hybrid statecraft offered ‘neo-populist solutions to neoliberal problems’ by 
constructing a new social–and eventually corporatist–basis for the Presidency 
in order to promote economic liberalization through social programs, such as 
the Programa Nacional de Solidaridad (PRONASOL).  In contrast with the 
previous state actions, the reforming clique fostered institutional innovation 
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and abandoned the closed-protectionist market in order to promote 
commercial accords such as the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), which would ensure long-term continuity of the reformist elite. 
Classical analyses of Mexican authoritarianism by Meyer and Reyna 
also see corporatism as leverage for that political regime. Meyer (1977) has 
suggested that the Mexican Revolution did not represent a negation of the 
authoritarian past but rather an impressive step forward in the modernization 
of the authoritarian state, when corporatism was consolidated in the 1940s. 
For Reyna (1977:161), Mexican development was also the result of what he 
calls a ‘populist corporatist apparatus’, whose objective was to demobilize 
and depolitize social groups "to smooth the way to capital accumulation." 
Given the fact that the state action was supported by a popular alliance 
of labor and peasant organizations, corporatism was also expected to be a 
pathway to socialism. Therefore, some authors have expressed their surprise 
to discover that the state’s real objective was actually to consolidate a 
capitalist class rather than to make a socialist state (Valdés, 1997; Tirado 
1998, for example). Analyses accept that the existence of state interests in 
order to foster some strategic sectors–such as in finance–nurtures conditions 
for private rent-seeking. For example, the state supports some specialized 
business groups in order to promote the development of the financial sector. 
Businesses, seeing state intervention as an opportunity for rent seeking, will 
end up hurting their own long-term interests and pushing the state to define 
policy in order to improve their short-term profits (Ceva, 1998).  
The structural reforms implemented since the mid-1980s have also 
  
36 
been presented as an intensification of corporatist relations in a transition 
period (Luna and Pozas 1992). Indeed, corporatism has been described as 
being reinforced by the privatization program and the negotiation of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (Quintana 1992). Similarly, Schneider 
(1997) has seen the ability of the Mexican state to engage with organized 
businesspeople. This is observed as the explanatory variable accounting for 
the wider scope of the liberalization process in Mexico, rather than in Brazil, 
whose state appears to be constrained by dominant class interests. 
 In a more recent work Schneider (2004) implies that Mexican 
voluntary business associations respond more to circumstances of 
cooperation, conflict, and exclusion from politics. Moreover, both the state 
and business are interested in exchanging information in order to sustain 
policy choices and business viability. However, it is not clear in Schneider’s 
argument whether business organizations respond to state interests or they 
are positively influenced by the state as in the corporatist argument. In a way, 
the state’s need to embed its actions in private organizations is the basis of 
the embedded autonomy approach, as we will see in the second part of our 
discussion.  
Heredia explains political stability and the continuity of the reform 
process (1994, 1995, 1997) as following from the fact that the reform was 
grounded in a structure of political authority based on hierarchical patronage 
and clientelist networks. Those networks granted the state officials 
considerable autonomy in the making of public policy. It is imperative to notice 
that unions play no functional role in these corporatist analyses. 
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A more original vision is offered by Richard Snyder’s analysis of the 
state’s reform of another important commodity sector in Mexico. Snyder 
(2001), found that, in reforming coffee production policies, local governments 
replaced the regulatory structure abandoned by the federal government’s 
neoliberal reforms. As a result, a diverse repertoire of state and society 
relationships was built-up at the local level–some of them retaking the 
clientelist structure created by the federal state. As a result, local authorities 
won control of social networks that had been used to promote coffee 
production, which were a social base for the PRI. Instead of the presumed 
route towards laissez-faire capitalism sought by the reformist state, coffee 
producers now have to face a wide subnational repertoire of regulations and 
political cooptation, which is far from a free and deregulated market.  
All approaches that treat business-as-association can be subjected to 
a similar set of criticisms. An initial set relates to the way that interests, 
conflict or consensuses are understood.  The emphasis on unanimity is too 
simplistic; social relations are often full of conflict. Two results can be 
imagined. The first result is that actors are unable to create unanimous 
policies responding to the increasingly differentiated organized interests that 
would become its co-governing associates. The second result is increasingly 
inconsistent policies. Both results create institutional blockage that will 
continue to exist until the state recognizes that unanimity cannot be fully 
achieved. Yet the literature on corporatism pays little attention to such factors, 
struggling instead to interpret the move to liberalization as just another event 
in corporatist history. 
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Another criticism relates to the way that such analyses treat the 
historical legacies of the system and the processes of change. Sclerotic 
associates that have vested interests in a specific conjuncture in the past but 
that remain powerful enough to impose a veto on reform, as it was actually 
the case in the failed reform of the petroleum industry, may paralyze the 
state. The affinities between economic actors and political institutions are 
shaped at a specific time; they are not necessarily appropriate for all 
economic and social circumstances. In transitional periods the state may be 
forced to appropriate enough power so as to redefine and empower its new 
corporate or other associates and weaken those that are out-dated. 
All these market-pull approaches accept the premise that the economy 
follows a natural order that forces the state to adapt. The state is neither the 
puppet of business interests, as in the case of business-as-capital analyses of 
banking nationalization, nor is it a reduction to a Weberian bureaucracy that 
does little more than assuring a permanent environment of rules and 
procedures that reassures trust and continuity to business people, as in the 
business-as-firm perspective. When the state is directly involved with social 
partners, as in corporatist analyses, state interests take a back seat to those 
of business, labor or others such as peasants. This form of political economy 
puts the accent on the economic structure, and makes the state interest and 
strategy secondary.  
 
2.2 State directed approaches and embedded autonomy 
In order to overcome some of the limits described here, others have 
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turned the argument on its head, and described the state as leading. State-
led theoretical models are somewhat less varied. Nonetheless, there is a long 
Gerschenkronian tradition of state-led analyses that conceive industrial 
transformation of “backward” economies as a process that is shaped through 
government action and is undertaken in order to create the environment that 
would let the industry develop autonomously (Gerschenkron, 1966). One of 
Gerschenkron’s principal assumptions was that the trajectories followed by 
the developed countries responded to their particular institutional situation 
and to the confluence of conditions that facilitated the first Industrial 
Revolution. Therefore, for late developers the state’s objective must be to 
repeat those conditions until the moment in which socio-economic actors can 
take off. 
For Hirschman (1966), who adopts and adapts Gerschekron, being a 
latecomer means that the country’s development requires more deliberate 
state action. In this sense, development is the conjugation of learning abilities 
that include sequences, processes, and planning that make it possible.  
Learning abilities are the products of envisioning elites that induce 
developmental projects in society.  Planning, in this sense, is one of the most 
important ingredients in Hirschman’s thinking. Therefore, the state’s 
persuasive capacity is more important than imitating the prerequisites of 
development that industrialized nations experienced, as Gerschenkron 
proposed. 
Hirschman argues that for state action to be effective, it must initiate 
growth through forward thrusts that are meant to create incentives and 
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pressures for further action. Hence the state officials must stand ready to 
react to, and to alleviate, these pressures in a variety of areas. This model 
depends on the identification of feedback activities that deliberately impel the 
institutionalization of development, and with it, the use of techniques, 
activities, culture, and values that sustain a modern industrialized society.  
The state has the responsibility to induce development. 
Other authors building on Hirschman have emphasized the 
collaborative relationship between states and private actors in order to 
promote development.  The studies on Japanese institutions (Johnson, 1982) 
and Newly Industrialized Countries (Amsden, 2004; 1989) followed this line. 
Johnson has created an ideal typical developmental state model to study 
MITI as the leading state actor transforming the Japanese economic 
structure. As Woo-Cumings (1997: 1) posits: 
 
Johnson (…) constructed a Weberian ideal type of an interventionist 
state that was neither socialist (described as a ‘plan-irrational’ state in 
which both ownership and management remained in the hands of the 
state, such as in the former USSR) nor free-market (no plan, and where 
private control coincided with private ownership) but something different: 
the plan-rational capitalist developmental state, conjoining private 
ownership with state guidance. 
 
In Johnson’s model, the state performs exclusive functions. The choice 
of functions helps to characterize different types of states. These functions 
also determine the different outputs of the state/business relationship. 
Amsden’s model continues this line of analysis, stressing the learning process 
followed by the Korean state. However, Amsden’s puts an accent on the 
learning process that facilitates the use of technology developed by other 
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countries in a much more literate society, as a peculiarity of latecomers. The 
state’s promotional activity seeks to direct the process to a more adaptive 
institutional apparatus and social groups whose goal is to achieve 
international competitiveness. The process depends on a strategic set of 
economic policies that result from an optimal management of wages, 
subsidies and productivity. The model is based on discipline and reciprocity 
towards the authoritative state’s decision to make industrials able to learn 
how to participate in market circuits developed by industrialized countries that 
arrived first. 
In developing his model, Peter Evans builds on these approaches 
while criticizing them. He takes from Johnson the idea that the planning 
capacities–the brains behind the institutions–are important. Johnson reveals 
the key role of a meritocratic bureaucracy able to act autonomously. For 
Evans, however, Johnson remains too close to traditional analyses of 
development by focusing on the domestic trajectory. As Johnson (1982: 15) 
writes: "Japan’s growth did not depend so much on exports as it did on the 
development of the domestic markets."  Therefore, when Evans redefines 
development, he moves away from both Johnson and any sustained attention 
to a domestic trajectory. As we will argue below, this swing away from 
attention to the domestic political economy may have been too dramatic. With 
this move to a new definition of development, the domestic political economy 
is taken as a given, or it is assumed to be automatically aligned to 
international forces. 
Evans continues the definition of the state’s role in inducing 
  
42 
transformation from Amsden. The state intervention gives place to social 
organization in which private organizations are urged to act in collaboration 
with the state. Amsden’s model rests strongly on the state’s concessions, 
discipline and reciprocity are expected in the part of private counterparts; 
these are the indispensable ingredients in the process of purposive 
transformation. Evans, in contrast, alters the extremely disciplined 
environment established by Amsden in order to achieve the objectives of 
public planning, giving a more autonomous role to the private sector.5 
In this sense Peter Evans' notion of Embedded Autonomy seeks to 
present a synthesis of this theoretical trajectory. His model looks for the 
affinities between the state bureaucracies and the industrial sectors and firms 
that able them to act in the most rewarding niches of the international 
markets. There are three points underlying this argument. First, the notion of 
development is reduced to a transformative function that results from a state 
promoting competitiveness in order to reach the international market circuits.  
Secondly, the state must act along with social networks in order to construct 
competitive advantages for some national industrial sectors. Third, the 
autonomous Weberian bureaucracy must pursue transformative goals 
through policy and institutional adaptation to the new international market 
conditions. 6 
                                                             
5 Measuring this reciprocity is, however, one of the most empirical questionable issues of this 
approach (Schneider, 1998). 
 
6 A very similar analysis–though less elaborated than Evans’–is work done by Arturo Borja 
(1995), which analyzed the contribution of the Mexican state to the development of the 
Informatics Technology in Mexico. Borja’s work offers a very detailed analysis on how state 
institutions affected the development of this industrial sector in the country.  
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The theoretical approach proposed by Peter Evans in Embedded 
Autonomy. States and Industrial Transformation describes the state as an 
autonomous actor whose actions are embedded in social networks. Evans 
has created two ideal types to distinguish a state that acts as an associate of 
society from one that extracts as much as it can from society. The first one is 
characterized as a developmental state, the second as a predatory state. The 
main characteristics that distinguish a developmental from a predatory state 
are the recruitment of public officials that could result in a rational 
bureaucracy, as defined by Max Weber, and the type of roles played by the 
state institutions in promoting national development. However, Evans (1992: 
148) emphasizes, "it is when transformation is on the agenda that the 
contrast between predatory and developmental states comes into sharpest 
relief."  
Evans (1995:12) has defined a developmental state as the equilibrium 
achieved between autonomy and embeddedness:  
 
A state that was only autonomous would lack both sources of 
intelligence and the ability to rely on decentralized private 
implementation (...) Dense connecting networks without a robust internal 
structure would leave the state incapable of resolving ´collective action´ 
problems of transcending the individual interests of its private 
counterparts (...) Only when embeddedness and autonomy are joined 
together can a state be called developmental.  
 
 
The state officials’ recruitment is fundamental in understanding 
institutional insulation, not isolation. State autonomy derives from the 
existence of a rational Weberian bureaucracy, which is formed through 
selective meritocratic recruitment and long-term career rewards rather than 
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personal ties. That process allows the state officials to insulate themselves 
from society to define policy and to create and model social networks when 
necessary in order to build social support for policy. This provides what Evans 
(1995:59) calls "the provision of institutionalized channels for the continual 
negotiation and renegotiating of goals and policies. That in fact means 
sources of intelligence that rely on decentralized private implementation."  
Evans’ model can be illustrated in the following table: 
 
  
Transformative 
Capacity 
 
Embeddedness 
 
Autonomy 
 
 
Predatory State 
 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Developmental 
State. Form 1 
 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Developmental 
State. Form 2 
 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Developmental 
State Ideal Type 
 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
The developmental state is composed of three variable capacities: 
industrial transformation, state autonomy, and social embeddedness. As it is 
possible to achieve social transformation inside imperfect embedded or 
autonomous structures, Evans (1992) has named them intermediary states 
able to achieve social goals even if they stand on imperfect structures. The 
state’s autonomy is defined in direct relation to the composition of civil 
servants recruitment. State autonomy is important in order to understand a 
self organizing bureaucracy acting in the name of any group, being able to 
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pursue collective goals, and to foster social organization (Evans, 1995: 45-
50). Embeddedness is the other indispensable ingredient. It is explained as 
dense social networks existent or formed by the state’s action, defined as 
"networks with a robust internal structure." (Evans, 1995:12).7 
Instead of asking how much state is needed to promote industrial 
transformation, Evans asks a clever question: What kind of state is necessary 
to get it?  In that sense, he proposes four roles that distinguish a 
developmental state: 
 
State roles 
Custodial 
regulatory activities that can be 
permissive or restrictive to private 
participation 
Demiurge 
State production through public 
enterprises 
Midwifery 
state induction of private participation 
and further nurturing of private firms 
Husbandry 
state promotion of private firms in the 
international arena 
 
 
The most efficient state action relies on the exact combination of the 
state’s roles in direct correspondence with particular sectoral needs related to 
their international structure. In reaching a liberalized economy, Embedded 
                                                             
 
7 Evans has tested the thesis of synergetic relationships that can give the state the capacity 
of constituting what Robert Putnam has called social capital (Evans, 1997: 47; Putnam, 
1993). Seeming to improve the embeddedness variable, the proposition considers that the 
state becomes diffuse, as it is part of the social networks it works with.  Evans seems to 
consider the state as one-single issue actor, whether the state was not forced to act within a 
diversified agenda, or associated with a diversified set of social actors. 
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Autonomy relies on the midwifery and husbandry promotional activities, which 
would allow the effectiveness or failure of the domestic industry to be inserted 
in international markets. 
We followed Evans’ (1995: 79-82) operationalisation of variables as 
follows: 
• The custodial role is defined as the state’s regulative function. 
Performing this role, states can provide protection, prevent proscribed 
behavior or establish a frame that guides state/society actions. It can 
be either preventive, to avoid private capital (national or international) 
from engaging in undesirable or inappropriate activities, or stimulating 
so as to spur private capital to engage in transforming activities. The 
most usual regulating activities can be policies granting fiscal 
regulations, protectionist laws that would sustain the performance of 
midwifery activities for the establishment of greenhouses in the 
protection of the nascent industry, restricting foreign capital investment 
to benefit local producers, etc. The limitation of this role is that it is not 
a transformative tool. It does, however, articulate the rules of the 
game, and help to structure economic sectors. 
• The demiurgic role is performed when the state takes the role of 
producer, and thus takes direct responsibility for delivering certain 
types of goods in the market and becomes an individual agent of 
accumulation. The classical demiurgic role is performed by the state’s 
provision of infrastructure or the elaboration of public goods. However, 
the state can also create a ‘conspiracy’ to develop new industrial 
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sectors. In this case, the state becomes directly involved in productive 
activities to: complement private production or replace or compete with 
private producers. Taking this role is the only way to move industrial 
development forward and induce subsequent linkage effects. The 
creation of state owned enterprises (SOEs) is important in order to 
stimulate industrial growth in other sectors. The limits of this role are 
that SOEs tend to grow and diversify. A firm created to initiate 
endeavors beyond the capacity of local capital may end up competing 
in sectors where no such rationale applies. Finally, this role ends up 
creating conflicts with the private sector to defend the market share, 
making this role politically risky. 
• The midwifery role is performed by the state in order to assist the 
emergence of new entrepreneurial groups and to induce existing 
entrepreneurs to take up more challenging endeavors. It is performed 
by the state when seeking to induce private decision-making in 
following specific goals. The state also seeks to reduce the risk and 
uncertainty entailed in initiating new ventures. The state limits the 
number of players acting in an industrial sector. The main policy 
following the performance of a midwifery role is to incubate nascent 
industries, practicing the protectionist regulations. The midwifery role 
includes: prohibiting imports, restricting foreign investment, distributing 
subsidies and incentives, and face-to-face exchanges with private 
actors to signal the importance of the state in developing a new sector. 
The limit of this role is that it lets the state become dependent on 
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adequate private responses to state initiatives; it can also give rise to 
rent seeking. 
• The husbandry role exists in order to assist the emergence of national 
champions. It involves a combination of prodding and support. The 
state performs this role by offering state support for firms that venture 
into more challenging areas of the sector. It may involve, for example, 
setting up enterprises to take over riskier complementary tasks (like 
Research and Development) without which, private enterprises cannot 
industrialize. The limitation of this role is the existence of a directly 
interested private actor, which increases the risk of capturing the state. 
 Most of this hypothesis have been tested and supported by Alejandro 
Portes et al (2008).  They analysis examined most of Evans variables in the 
operation of institutions such as stock exchanges, post offices and airports in 
Mexico, Colombia, and Chile, even though they are strategic sectors for every 
economy, they do not represent state influence on industrial development. 
 Works applying the Embedded Autonomy concept to the Irish state 
recognize two different types of globalization pursued by the state: a first one 
driven by foreign investment partially embedded in the domestic market; a 
second one driven by the increasingly successful integration of local networks 
or indigenous firms into global business and technology networks. For 
understanding these two different levels of state action, Riain has 
differentiated the bureaucratic developmental state, as defined and applied by 
Evans, from the flexible developmental state (Riain, 2000). 
This more flexible state apparatus for Riain (2000:158) “is defined by 
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its ability to nurture post-fordist networks of production and innovation, to 
attract international investment and to link these local and global technology 
and business networks together in ways that promote development.” The 
main problem Riain found with the notion of Embedded Autonomy was 
dealing with ‘local’ and ‘global’ perspectives on industrial development. His 
solution is to flexibilize the developmental state ideal type on order to let the 
state embed its actions in multiple arenas going from domestic professional-
led networks to international capital. 
Following upon these insights of Riain, this thesis raises two different 
concerns with Embedded Autonomy. The first one has to do with the 
definition of development itself. The definition of development and the ideal 
typical developmental state (Korea) leads Evans to ignore, or to insufficiently 
understand, the on-going attention to domestic markets and to the social 
relations embedded in an earlier development strategy which set some 
constraints on state action. This perspective takes attention from 
understanding the shift and the state’s capacity to maintain support of 
domestic actors while promoting change. How does the state deal with 
general objectives and particular policies during the transformation? 
This question takes us to the literature that analyses path-dependency. 
The assumption is that previous actions affect present decisions. As posited 
by Weir (1997:192): “Decisions at one point in time can restrict future 
possibilities by sending policy off onto particular tracks, along with which 
ideas and interests develop and institutions and strategies adapt.” 
This discussion has taken at least two different, yet complementary, 
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routes in current discussion. Firstly, Athul Kohli (2004) designed three 
different state’s ideal type to explain different routes to development: the 
cohesive-capitalist state, the fragmented-multiclass state, and the 
neopatrimonial state. Most of these ideal types follow Evans (1995) in the 
integration of trained and professional bureaucracies to push forward a 
development and a national development ideology. However, in order to 
explain variations on why are some states more efficient than others, Kohli 
emphasizes on how state’s institutions consolidated and specially those 
institutions created a sort of path dependency that sustained more efficiently 
developmental results. 
Secondly, Rueschmeyer and Lange (2005) share the idea of state-
building process as a key variable to stand development. Rueschmeyer 
(2005: 19) argues “both the internal development of state machineries and 
the development of synergistic interactions between state and society takes 
time”. However, the idea can be discouraging on the time taken by successful 
states in order to accomplish developmental success, the accent put on 
history and institutional building effects on development is an important 
departing point to think about state-structures influencing development 
process. 
  These two positions agree that statebuilding is a long-term process 
that could take years to consolidate. The most important contribution of this 
process is training capable bureaucracy able to push a rational development 
project. Timing on consolidations seem to be a crucial variable, and questions 
the idea that rapid development is possible, yet the studies show that old 
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countries succeed on leading development over newer institutions. 8 However 
consensus on policy paradigm is wide ignored in these studies.  
 The second main problem with Embedded Autonomy has to do with 
the notion of change. Given the fact that the developmental state ideal type is 
Korea, the dimension of change is underplayed. In effect, moving from ISI to 
EOI in economies that were already organized–economically, socially, and 
politically–by an ISI strategy, will have to make a paradigm change, often in 
opposition to vested interest supporting the ISI model. The state may do this 
unilaterally or in partnership. In the former, the state had to manage the 
transition itself and ensure stability. In the second, the state must work on its 
relationship with social forces (especially business) in order to guide the 
transition to a liberalized context. 
While the second (partnership) falls in part within the categories of 
Evans’ developmental state’s main focus on society-bureaucratic relations, 
the other dimensions of development have to be taken into account. For 
these reasons, it is important to acknowledge that the Mexican state faced 
what Peter A. Hall calls a paradigm shift (Hall, 1997: 91). The old economic 
policy stood on a different sort of paradigm. A new set of principles and 
policies was needed in order to allow the state to handle the crisis. 
In this context, the Mexican economy has used a different repertory of 
policy definition and instrumentation since 1985. This new repertory has 
dramatically transformed the structure of the economy. It began when 
                                                             
8 For a full debate on the subject see the symposium discussing the subject on State and 
Development see Contemporary Sociology 36 No 3 pp. 309-321 
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Mexican institutions faced a Keynesian blockage in the 1982 crisis. This 
collapse of the old paradigm opened the space for the monetarist group to 
implement a new policy agenda. While doing that, state officials undertook 
several actions. First, they established a very coherent government that 
pushed forward the exchanges with critical actors, such as the business 
community. Second, they created a new sort of analysis and policy answers 
to the crisis situation. Third, they encouraged alliances in Congress that 
facilitated the definition of the new custodial actions taking place, in 
association with opposition parties. Fourth, they continued controlling the 
media in order to push the new model’s ideological background, letting public 
opinion and intellectuals get used to these new ideas. The new political 
economists supporting the new paradigm forced, at the same time, the 
democratization of the country. This is an unattended outcome that resulted 
from their necessity to challenge vested interests created since the 1920s. 
In this sense, the connection between the state and the organized 
labor was an important part of the success of Mexican embedded autonomy 
in the post 1945 period. Also, the rigidity of the accord became one of the 
state’s most important constraints for it to reform key sectors of the economy. 
Both the literature on path dependency and that on paradigm shift 
teaches us the importance of analyzing the state as a flexible actor that has 
complicated relations with civil society, and of understanding development as 
a social learning process, which is not stable. Therefore, this thesis will 
examine the role of the developmental state, making three additions to the 
Evans argument: We will pay attention to domestic market rearrangements in 
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order to reach the liberalization; we will observe the state’s relationship with 
social forces, which include both businesses and unions; and we will consider 
development as a historical process. 
 
2.3 Protective Liberalization 
Without accepting a determinist version of these visions, we propose to 
distinguish between the general objectives of the state while pursuing 
development and the particular policies defined by the state apparatus in 
order to implement this transformation in one industrial sector. Our 
assumption is that the state’s transition from promoting development as a 
local trajectory towards promoting access to International market circuits 
implies adjustments in the mix of state roles, and particularly in the actions of 
bureaucrats who are so important in the context of the developmental state. 
The transition from an economy organized around Import Substitution 
Industrialization to an open one involves a new policy paradigm, and would 
imply, as argued by Hall (1997), the construction of new consensus. This 
consensus should exist both at the general level of the state’s development 
strategy and within key sectors. 
In the case of the paradigm change that was analysed by Peter Hall, 
the consensus-building was triggered, carried out and consolidated by 
processes linked to ideology and partisan politics.  This meant, among other 
things, a change in personnel within the government and policy-making 
bodies such as think tanks. In the context of a developmental state like that of 
Mexico the social relations embedded in state-society relations as well as the 
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role of the state apparatus are not the same as in a situation of party 
competition. There are few moments of political personnel change 
comparable to the arrival of Thatcher’s Conservatives in Britain.  
Therefore, to understand the story of the petrochemical sector and the 
difficulties encountered in its transformation, it is necessary to ask whether a 
new consensus was created in the industry the Mexican state announced its 
commitment to the liberal paradigm. To achieve consensus it would have 
been necessary for actors, who had worked within same clientelistic 
structures and institutions for decades, to adapt their responses and their 
actions to the new circumstances.  The rest of this thesis examines this 
process of transformation in the institutions of embedded autonomy and the 
particularly the responses of these actors facing profoundly different 
economic and political conditions. 
 Chapter 3 makes two points. The first is that state officials, just as 
Evans’ approach predicts, formed a developmental bureaucracy. There was 
little turnover in the 1950s when ISI was being put into place in key 
developmental institutions. In the 1980s, however, the political personnel 
changed, to become the promoters of protective liberalization as a response 
to structural reform. What we mean by protective liberalization is the 
following.  It is protective in the sense that it supports the industry and firms 
within it in order to achieve the consolidation of national champions. It is 
liberalization because the route to this consolidation involves public 
corporations and withdrawing the state’s participation. In these actions, we 
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see promotion of neoliberal policies such as EOI, NAFTA, privatization, and 
so on.  
If protective liberalization is the direction of change, Evans’ approach is 
insufficient without some adjustment. First, Evans does not consider a 
paradigm transition in his approach; this is reason we have turned to Riain. 
Second, in the situation of Mexico, Evans’ model could only suggest that the 
Mexican bureaucracy lost coherence in pushing industrial transformation in 
Mexico, because a combinatory strategy such as protective liberalization is 
not analyzed by him.  This why it is necessary to turn to Hall and the 
paradigm shift and path dependency in order to better understand the 
Mexican case.  
 Thus, the argument made here is that both the developmental 
bureaucracy and industrial actors would have to embrace the new paradigm. 
One way to encourage such an embrace, and the acceptance of the costly 
consequences of the structural change implied, would be  for state officials 
has to protect key actors.  But beyond that, actors - firms both public and 
private and officials - who had engaged in a set of industrial practices for 
years would have to learn how to perform differently.  And, there would be 
winners and losers.  Path dependency in ideas, practices and power relations 
might very well hinder a successful implementation of the paradigm shift in all 
sectors, especially one like petrochemicals that was so much emblematic of 
the previous nationalist paradigm. 
Since the 1920s, the development of the Mexican economy has rested 
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on protectionism. This has meant both nurturing a domestic bourgeoisie in 
order to foster a domestic market and sheltering it in order to assure an 
autonomous trajectory from international pressure. The state’s main tool in 
the past to reach this objective was the promotion of an Import Substitution 
Industrialization (ISI) program. Within this main frame, the state’s contribution 
was the engineering of the domestic market, supporting private domestic 
businesses, and providing access to union organizations. The combination of 
custodial, demiurgic, and midwife roles structured a relationship in which both 
the private sector and organized labor counted on a risk-reduced 
environment. Most importantly, the demiurgic role was mainly considered as a 
complement to private actions. 
The Mexican state has faced the necessity of reforming development 
strategy since the early 1970s.  Policy seeking to increase the husbandry role 
and to foster a more Export-Oriented industry was implemented both in 1973 
and in 1979. Yet, the lack of congruence between government officials and 
planning institutions resulted in both moments in a market that was more 
protected than before liberalization was tried. The demiurgic role increased, 
seeking to foster state autonomy vis-à-vis private actors who had been 
empowered as result of the industrial policy. Despite the macroeconomic 
misbalances caused by this erratic policy, important investments were 
realized in order to increase the Export-Oriented infrastructure of the industry. 
The 1982 crisis unveiled the paradigm competition that existed among 
government agencies to define an adequate policy to face the crisis. The 
Keynesian group offer showed to be exhausted. When they were unable to 
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offer alternative policies to cope with the plunge of oil prices in 1985, the 
conditions for a paradigm shift were acknowledged. The government was 
reorganized between 1985 and 1986. The country joined the GATT and the 
decisions to open the market went even further than those demanded by 
international organizations. Under these conditions, embedding the 
liberalization of the economy on private domestic networks was a sine qua 
non condition to assure the long-term viability of the new Export-Oriented 
development strategy. 
However, reforming the economy has not meant that the state 
abandoned its protectionist goals. This aim became even more important 
when the state was withdrawing its demiurgic role and providing freer 
conditions of access to foreign companies in the domestic market. Mexican 
big businesses were not left to their own resources to face the global 
economy. On the contrary, the state took advantage of its own reform to re-
engineer internationally competitive big businesses. The reinforcement of 
domestic business groups would assure the support and viability of the reform 
project, and they would also facilitate the state negotiators’ abilities to push 
forward the re-structuring of the economy. 
The state created the conditions necessary to reduce the threat that an 
open market would have on domestic actors. The first step was the 
reinforcement of state embeddedness within private networks, in order to 
assure the long-term viability of the process and the gradual implementation 
of the new policy. It has been widely stated that during the crisis and the 
reform process, the Mexican state intentionally sought to reinforce, if not 
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reconstruct its links with the private sector. The second step was re-
engineering the domestic business groups through the privatization program. 
Informing business people about the conditions of privatization before 
announcing the public auctions of public industries facilitated that already 
established industrials won the auctions knowing the conditions of the 
companies they were bidding for. This also created quasi monopoly 
conditions for domestic business groups. Big businesses did not risk their 
market from a variety of newcomer firms. This decision also reinforced the 
concentration of the market in domestic hands. The former allowed the state 
to count on strategic domestic support in order to implement the reform. This 
way, it assured its long-term viability and reduced the foreign influence on the 
scope or timing that the structural change of the Mexican economy would 
reach. State Autonomy was assured with the support of a local bourgeoisie 
that was encouraged to act towards the new national goals defined by 
authoritarian state officials. 
The third step involved the change of the collective agreements, which 
used to grant huge advantages to small groups of workers–almost always 
organized in key industrial sectors and affiliated to the PRI’s corporatist 
structure. Unions supported wage constraint in times of crisis, which allowed 
the state to enjoy maneuverability while taking drastic measures to improve 
the economy. However, once privatization was announced to the key 
industries related to energy and petroleum, unions vetoed the state’s plan. 
These sectors were strategic for the economy. This fact improved the union’s 
leverage for contesting the plan.  
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Given this stance, the ideas we intend to advance are:  
Hypothesis 1 - The Mexican state is a developmental state. It has a 
regulated and autonomous bureaucracy that is capable of defining policy and 
using a different blend of the four roles identified by Evans (1995). In order to 
conduct itself as a developmental state, it had to continue shaping domestic 
actors to facilitate their access to international markets in both of the 
paradigms that have marked different moments of Mexico’s development. 9 
Hypothesis 2 – The Mexican state brought about a paradigm shift in a 
gradualist way, by altering the economic model while maintaining its 
commitment to protect a national bourgeoisie. As a result, there are sectors in 
which the state has been unable to define a coherent policy following the new 
paradigm lines, expressed on the co-habitation of two development visions for 
strategic industries. 
 
2.4 Outline 
In order to demonstrate these hypotheses, we have identified three 
different periods followed by the Mexican state to promote development 
starting in 1958 and finishing in 2000 when PRI lost the control of the 
Presidency. During each one of these periods, we identify the blend of the 
four roles–custodial, demiurgic, midwife and husbandry–played by the state in 
the promotion of the petrochemical industry. 
                                                             
9 Etchemendy (2004) made a very similar statement while analyzing the protection granted by 
Spanish leftist government to the most important businesspeople during Spanish economic 
liberalization process in the 1980s and 1990s, granting special protection to the automobile 
industry and the consolidation of SEAT as a national champion. 
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The first period was from 1950 to 1970, when the Stabilized 
Development model –Desarrollo Estabilizador–was implemented with a 
strong emphasis on ISI. This period–also known as the Mexican Miracle–
provided the country with significant growth and economic stability.  
In the second period that goes from 1970 to 1985, the Shared 
Development model–Desarrollo Compartido–, the state increased is 
demiurgic participation, action that unbalanced the macro-economic 
variables. However, high oil prices during the period from 1976 to 1982 
resulted in large public and private investment in industrial infrastructure, 
which improved the international competitiveness of the industry. In part, this 
international competitiveness resulted from the fact that the state used the 
opportunity presented by the extraordinary oil revenues to perform its 
husbandry promotional role. 
The last period from 1986 to 2000, followed a paradigm shift that took 
place in 1986. We consider that Mexico’s decision to join GATT that year was 
the watershed of the Mexican development strategy. During those years, 
state officials not only withdrew from the demiurgic role, thus increasing the 
concentration of the domestic market in private hands, but they also altered 
the definition of custodial, midwifery and husbandry, in order to push the 
economic transition from ISI to an EOI strategy. 
The thesis is divided into two major parts. First, in chapter three, we  
support the hypothesis that led us to affirm that Mexico has counted on 
structures that are equivalent to those found in developmental state ideals 
since 1920s. However, those regulations applied only to a few state 
  
61 
institutions and not to the whole state administrative apparatus. We have 
classified Mexico as a developmental state–form 2, according to Table 1 
above. 
The rest of the thesis shows the state in action. Chapter 4 provides a 
brief historical analysis that helps explain both the consolidation of the 
Mexican state and the key role played by the nationalization of oil in the 
definition of oil policy during XX Century. The main idea is to offer evidence 
on how the nationalist paradigm structured specific state actions that were 
performed in order to reduce foreign participation in the development of a 
national petrochemical industry. This way it would be possible to foster an 
industry owned by a national bourgeoisie instead. The promotional roles 
played by the state and the redefinition of the content on those roles have 
varied through time. Variation is explained in direct relation to the different 
paradigms used by the state during the 50 years included in this analysis. 
However, changing the state’s policy paradigm has not meant altering the 
pattern of protecting the domestic industry and bourgeoisie in any 
circumstance. 
The fifth chapter shows the state fostering a national petrochemical 
industry for the country. The first plans framed the stabilizing development 
period so as to consolidate a national project for the industry. 
The sixth chapter depicts the state and private sector acting together in 
the conditions created by the oil boom in order to consolidate the country’s 
autonomy through the construction of a self-reliant industry, the structural 
reform of the petroleum industry and the impressive growth of the 
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petrochemical one. It also describes the solutions exposed by the different 
ministries in order to solve the conditions of the debt crisis in 1982. 
The seventh and the eighth chapter concentrate on the paradigm shift 
and the policies deployed to alter the status quo in the petrochemical industry 
in order to update its relation to market conditions. These chapters will also 
emphasize the political constraints that made the state fail in the 
reorganization of the industry. Chapter ninth reviews the political conditions, 
which had facilitated the push towards the structural reform of the economy, 
were altered after the 1994 crisis. This crisis reinforced nationalist groups, 
allowing them to veto the completion of the reform in the petrochemical 
sector. Even if this action had caused an important crisis to the petrochemical 
sector, the PRI and the oil union ensured the long-term permanence of 
protective liberalization. 
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Chapter 3. Institutionalizing public/private relations: Preparing the 
Mexican developmental state 
 
The authority of the Mexican state was built up by relying on two main 
structures: a rational bureaucracy and a corporatist-clientelistic organization. 
The first structure was formed in the 1920s, when the winning branch of the 
revolution (1910-1917) consolidated its power and continued performing the 
liberal state actions meant for promoting development that were used during 
the ancien régime. At this time, the state established and regulated a civil 
service career for the bureaucracy that would manage the state apparatus. In 
1929 the economics program of the National Autonomous University of 
Mexico (UNAM) was created in order to educate and recruit bureaucrats.  
 For its part, the National Revolutionary Party (PNR) was meant to 
organize political factions into one single organization. When doing so, the 
party would still enjoy enough regional control in its structure to challenge the 
centralized state apparatus and the legitimate use of violence. President 
Cardenas annulled the regulations that had been defined for the recruitment 
of bureaucrats and, instead, forced these to unionize and affiliate to the newly 
created Popular Sector of the Mexican Revolution Party (Partido de la 
Revolucion Mexicana PRM). The reorganization of the Revolutionary Party 
influenced key social sectors that then settled the transition from Partido 
Nacional Revolucionario (PNR) to PRM in 1938, giving the party a corporatist 
structure that would integrate social, labor, and peasant organizations, as well 
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as the army.10 The cancellation of bureaucratic regulations was enacted for 
the entire bureaucracy, with the exception of two institutions: the Bank of 
Mexico (Central Bank) and the diplomatic service. 
 This chapter discusses the pattern followed by the Mexican 
developmental institutions that generated a situation of embedded autonomy. 
It follows the history of the Mexican developmental bureaucracy from its 
beginnings in the 1920s and 1930s until the 1986 paradigm shift. According 
to Peter Evans, a developmental state has to have both embeddedness and 
autonomy. This means a state’s agenda depends on the capacity of a 
meritocratic civil service to insulate itself from societal demands. State 
officials can set out goals and plans for the industrial transformation of the 
country, but the state must rely on private organizations in order to ensure the 
implementation of its goals and plans either by or with the private sector. The 
flexibility of this public/private association increases the chance of success of 
state promotional actions and its transformative capacity. Thus, the success 
of state promotional actions is based on an adequate and flexible association 
with the society (Evans, 1995: 45-50). For Evans (1995: 47), the internal 
structure of the state apparatus is “the main clue” to ascertaining whether 
state autonomy exists or not. Autonomy depends upon a technical corps 
whose recruitment is regulated in order to reduce clientelism and other non-
meritocratic forms of authority. 
                                                             
10 A new reform, which excluded the army from its structure, was enacted in 1946 when the 
PRM shifted into the PRI.  
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This chapter makes three arguments in order to demonstrate that 
Mexico meets the conditions to be a developmental state and, therefore, to 
confirm our first hypothesis. First, Mexico has nurtured and relied on a 
meritocratic bureaucracy since the formation of the revolutionary state in the 
early 1920s. We find that Mexico has also depended upon a technical corps 
built in the financial branch of the government, which is centered on the 
central bank civil career service and its program of “personnel loan”. This 
latter program has worked to increase the circulation of officials to other less 
regulated institutions such as the finance, commerce and industry ministries.  
This structure of the Mexican developmental state, as we will show, 
stands on four main pillars: i) a recruitment relationship that links the Bank of 
Mexico with elite universities and institutes; ii) a system of scholarships 
destined to send officials abroad to study; iii) an independent rule-based 
recruitment; iv) circulation of officials recruited in the Bank to other branches 
of the government.  
The second argument in this chapter relates to the influence that this 
specialized bureaucracy has had on policy-making. We will document that the 
bureaucracy’s control over industrial policy has not been consistent over time. 
Between 1970 and 1985, the state began to experiment with different routes 
to promote development, which encouraged the influence of non-traditional 
institutions. This experience had two results. On the one hand, coherence in 
the definition of policies was lost, while more actors became involved via the 
introduction of theoretical competition with the perspective of the Bank in 
policy making. On the other hand, new institutions and recruitment patterns 
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had the unattended effect of creating conditions that would bring about a 
paradigm shift at the end of the 1980s. These are the conditions Peter A. Hall 
(1997: 90-113) identified as important to account for a paradigm shift. 
The third argument in this chapter is that after 1985, the effort to 
reconstruct the Mexican economy depended on a reorganization of the 
developmental bureaucracy and a new paradigm of an Export-Oriented 
Industrialization (EOI) strategy.  We will demonstrate that despite these 
important changes, the state its maintained the old clientelistic-populistic 
alliances, and as a consequence it did not alter the relationship of embedded 
autonomy fundamentally. The state withdrew its economic involvement, and 
in doing so, state officials assured that the benefits of this withdrawl went to 
domestic economic actors. The privatization program meant the consolidation 
of a monopolist situation for private producers, in order to consolidate national 
champions. However, the state’s dependence on old political agreements 
along with its economic withdrawal reached its limits when policy was defined 
on the new policy paradigm at the same time old political structures contested 
it. The cohabitation of policy paradigms made the state lose coherence in 
pushing petrochemical industry transformation into the new development 
scheme. 
The final section of this chapter will briefly describe the structure of the 
private sector, focusing mainly on the institutional exchanges established 
between the developmental bureaucracy and domestic entrepreneurship. 
Particularly and as a consequence of the economic bureaucracy’s autonomy, 
the establishment of a close relationship between the public and private 
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spheres has been an important characteristic of the Mexican state. This 
relationship has already been documented in studies of Mexican financial 
elites.11 As Kessler (1998) states, it is necessary to include these groups in 
any discussion of the definition of development policy, because the Mexican 
private sector includes strong industrial-financial groups. 
These links between industrial-financial and governmental elites were 
first structured in the 1920s, bringing together the industries that survived the 
Revolution and built the new revolutionary state. While the relationship has 
not always been free of conflict, it remains being a key factor in understanding 
the Mexican political economy. 
 
3.1 The developmental bureaucracy 
 A corpus of technicians has been intimately involved in setting and 
adjusting industrial and economic policy in Mexico. Along with its rationalized 
bureaucracy, the state had several different specialized institutions for the 
promotion of industry and the planning of different stages of industrial 
transformation. According to Vernon (1963: 136) “the most important 
characteristic of these technical planners was the flexibility with which the 
policies were adjusted to deal with the specific necessities and evolution of 
particular industries and sectors.” 
                                                             
11 For financial private sector exchanges see Maxfield’s (1990) study of the 1982 Bank 
Nationalization, Hamilton’s (1982) study of the autonomy of the state, Babb’s (2001) study of 
Bank of Mexico’s exchanges with universities in the definition of economics programs.  
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The structuring of state institutions and the training of the technocrats 
began in the 1920s and 1930s.12 The most important developmental 
institutions in Mexico are: the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Industry and 
Commerce, and the central bank, the Bank of Mexico, created in 1925. 
Between 1976 and 1992, there was also a short-lived Ministry of Budget and 
Planning. They have always been dominated by what Sarah Babb (1998) 
calls “inflation-conscious developmentalists.” All of these bodies have been 
termed conservative institutions because of their ideas about economic 
policies.   
These planning institutions have depended on a set of financial 
institutions that were also created to support both the transformation of 
industry and the construction of infrastructure. The most important, in addition 
to the Bank of Mexico, were:  the Agricultural Credit Bank (created in 1926), 
the National Urban Mortgage and Public Works Bank (created in 1933), the 
industrial development bank (Nacional Financiera or NAFINSA, created in 
1934), the Ejidal Credit Bank (created in 1935), and the Foreign Commerce 
Bank (created in 1937). 
                                                             
12 The group of “seven sages” influenced this period in a major way. One of the seven was 
Manuel Gomez Morin, one of the last economic advisors of President Plutarco Elias Calles 
(1924-1928). He was Deputy Ministry of Finance at the time and he designed the structure of 
the Bank of Mexico, writing its first organic law in 1924. He also designed most of the 
promotional and financial institutions created in this period. During the 1930s he had an 
important influence on new generations of economists while he was rector of UNAM. 
However, he was almost erased from official history when he opposed the corporatist and 
authoritarian structures President Cardenas introduced and then founded the PAN, which 
became the main opposition party from 1939 to 2000 when it won the presidency (Krause, 
1968; Camp, 1989; Loaeza, 1999: chapter 2-3). 
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At the same time, there was a re-organization of the private financial 
system, including private banks and the establishment of the Asociacion 
Mexicana de Bancos (Mexican Association of Banks). The latter became an 
important point of contact between the banks and the Finance Ministry. 
 While there has been disagreement over how to use macroeconomic 
tools such as inflation or budget deficits, all these financial institutions that 
traversed the private and public sectors shared a commitment to the 
development of the country. They all acted within the same developmental 
paradigm, albeit with differing goals in the definition of policy. They pursued: 
a) different frameworks of policies; b) the definition of the main development 
plans; c) the rational functioning of the economy (Babb, 1998; 2001: 180). 
 Other Mexican institutions also shaped the role of the developmental 
bureaucracy. The political apparatus is founded on three pillars, namely: the 
principle of non re-election, an inadequate career civil service, and a high 
level of turnover at the mid and upper levels of the bureaucracy (Cosio 
Villegas, 1973; Smith, 1979; Heredia, 1995).  
Peter Smith (1979: 166) has documented that over an 18-year period, 
almost 90 percent of the bureaucracy changed jobs at least once and often 
much more than that.13  In addition, his work also documented a pattern that 
had been in place since the 1920s, which were the years of the construction 
of the Mexican state. The first significant public-private connection began with 
                                                             
13 However, Camp (1975) also found that there were differences among ministries in terms of 
recruitment and turnover. 
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the relations between the Finance Ministry and the financial-industrial private 
sector, which established patterns that persisted for decades.14 
 In the early 1930s, Mexico established a merit-based civil-service 
system to regulate the recruitment of public officials.15 However, the system 
lasted only a few years. President Lazaro Cardenas changed the rules, when 
he imposed the unionization of the lower levels of bureaucracy and their 
affiliation with the popular sector of the Revolutionary Party (Teichman, 1996: 
3).16 This decision enhanced the president’s control over the bureaucracy and 
gave the party political control over the employment of bureaucrats. It also 
marked the replacement of an autonomous and meritocratic civil service in 
the country with a clientelistic-corporatist structure for the lower-levels of the 
bureaucracy. This was a significant departure from the initial design.  
These rules did not apply universally. Cardenas respected the 
regulations that had been established since 1925 for the recruitment of the 
Bank of Mexico’s officials and the diplomatic service. The state then made a 
commitment to create universities and other advanced studies institutions in 
                                                             
14 For the studies on Mexican elites see Smith, (1979); Camp, (1972, 1975); for the making of 
the state and its relationship with industrials see Hamilton, (1982). 
 
15 The Civil Service Law passed in 1931, and the Administrative Accord to regulate the 
Organization and Duties of the Civil Service Law passed in 1934 (Ponce, 2003: 2; Ortiz 
Mena, 1998: 15). 
 
16 The bureaucracy is unionized in the Federation of Unions of State Workers (FSTSE), which 
is part of the National Confederation of Popular Sectors of the PRI. ”The administration of 
Lazaro Cardenas forced them, through government legislation to join the popular sector. 
Shortly thereafter, a government decree dictated that only one organization, the FSTSE, 
could bring together all public sector unions (…) Legislation passed in 1963 prohibited the 
FSTSE from affiliating outside the PRI.” (Teichman, 1996:3) Part B of Article 123 of the 
Constitution also establishes special work conditions for the bureaucracy (prohibiting 
collective agreements, restricting the right to strike, and permitting the state to unilaterally 
dictate salaries. See http://www.cddhcu.gob.mx/leyinfo/pdf/1.pdf consulted 11 November 
2003)  
 
  
71 
order to train higher-level technocrats and civil servants. As Camp 
discovered, these students and bureaucrats enjoyed a more autonomous 
career and career path in the government bureaucracy (Camp, 1972). Thus, 
there were two parallel routes to a career in the Mexican bureaucracy: one 
determined by political relations and another that was quite autonomous. The 
institutionalization of a clientelistic-bureaucratic structure for some officials, 
and greater autonomy for the better trained, allowed the emergence of a 
developmental bureaucracy, similar in many aspects to the Japanese MITI 
described by Johnson (1982). 
 
3.1.1 The institutionalization of a developmental bureaucracy 
 The institutionalization of the Mexican developmental bureaucracy took 
place both informally and formally. Informally, the técnicos (technicians, 
people having at least a university’s bachelor degree, later called technocrats 
referring to people having post-graduate studies) achieving high positions in 
different ministries were recruited by their professors in the economics 
programs at the National University of Mexico (UNAM). This created the first 
contact within camarillas for the technicians inside the Mexican bureaucracy. 
According to Camp, a camarilla is a political network based in friendship. It 
was formed as the first contact created by generational access of young 
graduates to the government structures (Camp, 1984). This process was 
created according to Babb (2001: 34) “as a point of contact between the old 
generation of public servants and the new generation of students aspiring to 
work in the government.” 
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The origin of the camarilla system has to do with the organization of 
the economics program at the UNAM. Its organization, as we will see, stood 
on what Babb (2001) calls “the taxi professor system”. A taxi professor was 
usually a top full-time public sector employee who taught a class in the 
morning or evening at the university (UNAM). From those courses, a public 
official was able to attract promising students to different governmental 
offices. Camp (1980) has posited that most generations of public servants 
were first socialized at the university. This fact created a network of political 
affinities and long-term loyalties once they became public servants. This 
networking practice enabled new and old recruits to pursue their political 
interests once they became government officials (Babb, 2001: 34). 
 In a study published in the early 1970s, Camp also found that during 
the 1960s, almost all deputy ministers in ministries such as Finance, Industry 
and Commerce, Hydraulic Resources, and the Presidency (that became 
Budget and Planning in 1976) were men with similar training who began their 
careers as middle-level technicians. They made their way up through the 
government structure as career bureaucrats thanks to their long technical 
experience and advanced education (Camp, 1972: 572).17 “Data from my 
study of cabinet and cabinet-level ministers in Mexico since 1935 have been 
included because over two-thirds of the ministers since 1952 have at one 
time been middle-level technicians (tecnicos)” (Camp, 1972: 573). 
                                                             
17 Camp also talks of special cases in the Foreign Relations Ministry and the Bank of Mexico, 
whose civil-service recruitment was not modified in the 1930s and regulated their recruitment 
of officials ever since 1931, making these ministries exceptions to the rule. Along with the 
Federal Institute of Elections created in the 1990s, they are the only 3 institutions in Mexico 
enjoying a regulated civil career service in order to assure their long-term autonomy.  
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 An important issue discovered by Camp was that the more 
responsibilities the ministries had at the technocratic level, the more stable 
were the official positions in those ministries.  Camp (1972: 576) found that:  
The increasing stability in the top levels of ministries which have the 
main responsibility for economic policies is evidenced by the many 
directors and ministers who have remained for more than two 
administrations, and by the several sub-secretaries [deputy ministers] 
who have shifted horizontally to other departments. An examination of 
the personnel of the Bank of Mexico, the Nacional Financiera, the 
National Bank of Foreign Commerce, the Ministry of Finance, and the 
Ministry of Industry and Commerce during the last two administrations 
shows evidence of this trend.  
 
The most notorious cases Camp noted coincided with the maturity of 
the institutions that had been structured one or two generations before. In 
fact, this period also coincides with our first stage of analysis of the Mexican 
developmental state (1958-1970) in which men such as Antonio Ortiz Mena 
(Finance Minister, 1958-1970), Rodrigo Gomez (Director, Bank of Mexico, 
1952-1970), Jose Hernandez Delgado (Director, Nacional Financiera, 1952-
1970), and Ricardo Jose Zevada (Director, Foreign Commerce Bank, 1952-
1964)18 created the core of the Stabilizing Development Program (Camp, 
1972:576-78). It is important to note that Antonio Ortiz Mena and Rodrigo 
Gomez were the architects of the Stabilizing Development Program, while 
                                                             
 
18 At the sub-secretary level, Camp (1972: 576-578) underlines the careers of men like 
Placido Garcia Reynoso and Ernesto Fernandez Hurtado at the Bank of Mexico; Octaviano 
Campos Salas in the Ministry of Industry and Commerce and Alfredo Navarrete at the 
National Financier. All these people are part of what we call developmental institutions during 
the stabilizing development period. Most ministers and vice ministers in President Diaz Ordaz 
government (1964-1970) began their careers as middle-level tecnicos and are examples of 
technically skilled employees working their way up through the ranks.  
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Ortiz Mena (due to his position as Finance Minister) was the program’s formal 
head and brain during this period. 
 The formal route of bureaucratic institutionalization had to do with the 
strictly regulated system established by the Bank of Mexico for recruiting its 
officials and placing them in different ministries. The taxi professorship, along 
with the regulated civil-career service, allowed the Bank to become the most 
important “centre of talent” in the Mexican bureaucracy (Babb, 2001:89). The 
Bank of Mexico has been counting on regulated civil-career service for the 
recruitment and advancement procedures of its officials since its foundation in 
1925. As Babb, (2001: 88) states: 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Its entrance examinations included both psychological and aptitude 
testing, and the Banco’s renowned Department of Economic Studies 
had its own test for recruiting economists beginning in the 1960s. In 
contrast to the functionaries of other public bureaucracies, able Banco 
de Mexico employees could start in low-level positions and spend their 
entire careers working their way to the top. 
 
 
Babb also states that the Bank ensures that its officials who are moved 
to different ministries maintain their positions and benefits. The most 
important exchanges are done within the Presidency–which, as we mentioned 
earlier, became Budget and Planning in 1976–as well as the Finance, 
Industry and Commerce Ministries. The Personnel Loan Program grants bank 
officials more autonomy while acting in other ministries because as Babb 
(2001: 89) notes they “are not dependent on their superiors within other 
bureaucracies for their positions; they could, in other words, be relied on to 
present objective analyses without regard for internal political considerations.” 
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In some cases, specific plans are later granted with special funding from the 
Bank’s trustees. The Ministry involved and the Bank must jointly administer 
this funding, in order to implement specific development programs in the 
areas of agriculture, industry, infrastructure, etc. This program intends to 
reduce corruption and the clientelist use of public resources. 
However, the Bank had limited autonomy,19 given the fact that the final 
decision could come from the Finance Ministry, which acted as the formal 
head of the financial branch of the government.20  Babb (2001: 42) states 
that:  
Many authors have identified the Finance Ministry as the heart and 
brain of the Mexican economic policymaking bureaucracy (...) Not only 
did the finance minister have a say in the policies of the Banco de 
Mexico and Nacional Financiera; he also intervened in policies that 
technically fell under the purview of the Industry and Commerce 
Ministry, such as the Law of New and Necessary Industries.  
 
The interactions between the Bank of Mexico and the Finance Ministry 
enabled them to manage the embedded and autonomous Mexican state. 
They had a fundamental voice in defining the developmental role of the state 
when it is pursuing the industrialization of the country.21  
 
3.1.2 The officials’ education 
                                                             
19 The Bank of Mexico gained full autonomy from the government in 1993. 
 
20 In salaries levels too, the Finance Ministry is the best-paid ministry of the Mexican 
bureaucracy. 
  
21 The government played an almost unique role in the definition of the custodial role. It is 
possible to state that Congress did not have a say in laws that were passed on those years. 
This imbalance between powers began to change at the end of the 1980s (Lomeli and 
Zebadua 1998).  
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 In the 1920s, the state addressed the issue of its officials’ formal 
education. Therefore, in 1929 it created the first economics program at the 
National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM). The objective was to 
educate people at a technical level to work for the government. Babb’s work 
on the degree in economics in Mexico found a correlation between the state’s 
involvement in the economy and the state’s fostering of its own technicians. 
She (Babb, 2001:28) argues, “Mexican economics was essentially “invented” 
by a group of post revolutionary state-builders.” 
The first economics program was offered at the Law School of the 
National Autonomous University of Mexico in 1929.  It was later transferred to 
the School of Economics in 193522 where it was designed to train the public 
sector officials. It was created with a “government-centered vision (…) from 
the very beginning, Mexican economics was a statist profession, and it was 
able to thrive and expand because of the state’s growing involvement in the 
Mexican economy” (Babb, 2001: 28). 
During its first decades, mainly public officials who acted as taxi 
professors composed the professorship.23 They created a system to attract 
their most talented students into public work.  
 
The taxi professor phenomenon was advantageous for the 
consolidation of the economics profession within the public sector, for 
                                                             
 
22 The School later evolved into a Faculty when they created the first PhD program there in 
the middle of the 1950’s. 
 
23 Babb defines taxi professor as those teachers by subject that actually made their living 
from sources other than teaching. They are usually public officials that teach a subject before 
or after going to their offices. 
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professors with degrees in law or engineering pulled young economists 
into their respective government ministries. Once economists had 
entered a given ministry, those who managed to move up the 
administrative ladder could use their position to pull in more economics 
students in turn (Babb, 2001: 35). 
  
As time passed, they established an autonomous technical corps, which 
enabled them to embed their actions in private industrial organizations. 
In addition to this program, the Bank of Mexico introduced other 
programs at different universities in Mexico. In 1958, Rodrigo Gomez sent a 
central bank official to reorganize the program offered at the University of 
Nuevo Leon, with the Bank providing financial and infrastructure resources. In 
1946, the Bank, which was associated with private industries, founded the 
economics program at the Technological Institute of Mexico, which then 
became the Autonomous Technological Institute of Mexico or ITAM.  Since 
the 1980s, the state began to attract technicians from this institute (Babb, 
2001: 91 and 69-73).  
The Bank also organized a scholarship program to encourage people 
to pursue graduate studies abroad. From the 1930s to the mid 1960s, the 
Bank of Mexico sponsored a scholarship program to encourage its own 
employees to study abroad, not only in economics programs but also in 
different technical specialties (Camp, 1975).  The Bank also initiated graduate 
study programs in Mexico.  
 
The original idea of creating Mexico’s first postgraduate program in 
economics at the [El] Colegio de Mexico in 1964 was conceived 
among a group of Banco de Mexico functionaries and ex-functionaries. 
The program was intended to respond to the failure of many Banco de 
Mexico scholarship recipients to complete their studies abroad 
because of deficient skills in English, mathematics and neoclassical 
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economics; it was believed that the college program would be a 
cheaper alternative than studying abroad, and would compensate for 
deficiencies in the training received by UNAM graduates. The 
economics program at the Colegio was partly designed according to 
the recommendations report authored by the director of the Banco’s 
department of economic studies Leopoldo Solis (Babb, 2001: 92). 
 
Quoting Douglas Bennet and Kenneth Sharpe, Camp (1990) 
concludes that “these students [trained by the first generations of 
revolutionary public officials] were educated in an environment in which 
economic independence from the US, the promotion of industrialization, the 
development of a middle class, the pivotal role of the private sector, and the 
need of a vigorous state action for nurturing a strong domestic private 
sector”24 followed Mexico’s developmental agenda. 
 As the new generation reached the top of the decision-making 
developmental ministries, they continued to promote the nationalism and self-
determination that was supported in the 1930s. The success of the Stabilizing 
Development Program, which was defined by the Bank of Mexico (1958-
1970), can be explained by previous state investment in educating its 
bureaucracy and by meritocratic recruiting.  The system allowed them to act 
homogeneously, to share–and reproduce–the nationalist ideology, and to 
redefine a more rational developmental agenda for the country.  
 
3.2 The adjustment of the state action and its technical education 
                                                             
24 Douglas Bennet and Kenneth Sharp, quoted in Camp (1990: 173). 
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 Alan Knight (2001) has noted the Stabilizing Development period as 
the golden years of the PRIista politics, measuring it in terms of the realization 
of state objectives. It was also a period in which any manifestation of 
disagreement was co-opted by the PRI structure or repressed by the 
government without substantially questioning the legitimacy of the system. As 
almost all over the world, by the end of the 1960s, student movements 
questioned the authoritarian nature of political systems increasingly. In 
Mexico, the army repressed a student manifestation in October 2, 1968. 
Beginning in 1970, the government tried to reduce the impact of this political 
crisis by expanding the economy. They changed the state’s custodial and 
demiurgic roles, increasing regulations and participating more openly in the 
ownership of industries in order to push the growth of the economy. At the 
same time, the government tried to improve the domestic and the 
international competitiveness of industry by initiating some husbandry and 
midwifery actions. Most authors have signaled that the 1970s represented a 
turning point of Mexican politics, establishing a new basis for political 
economic reform. The reforms initiated by the state fostered what Erfani 
(1995: 91) calls “organizational state strength”.  
The new Shared Development plan (1970-1985) was based on 
expansion of the public sector. In the view of the new president’s aides, using 
public enterprise for promoting private investment directly was foolish. In 
order to increase the demiurgic role played by the state, the strong control of 
the Finance Ministry and the Bank of Mexico had to be reduced, liberalizing 
the spending structure to allow increased growth. New spending would be 
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financed by a tax reform. After a private sector veto, the state chose to use 
foreign indebtedness instead to bankroll the increased public investment. 
However, the financial branch of the government came into conflict with the 
macroeconomic strategy proposed by the president, this way, forcing 
institutional realignment within the government. 
By the 1970s President Echeverria implemented new institutions that 
would manage the reforms that he had proposed. While Bailey (1980: 30) 
holds that Echeverria had destroyed an old order without constructing a new 
one. As such, we propose that with these reforms, Echeverria constructed a 
parallel structure inside the state: the old pattern of relationships with the 
private sector–organized in the Bank of Mexico and Finance Ministry–and the 
new institutions organized in the Presidency and Patrimony ministries.  This 
dualist structure was constructed in order to administer and compel a faster 
growing economy, as we will see on chapter 6. These features resulted in 
both the disjunction of the coherent policies the government had been 
promoting since the 1950s, and the disequilibrium of state promotional roles. 
The growth in the number of state owned enterprises created mistrust for 
some private industrials. The meticulous consensus achieved during Ortiz 
Mena’s leadership was broken when the private sector openly opposed 
Echeverria’s government policies. The lack of consensus on which role the 
state must play to foster development, has been the constant until today. 
 
3.2.1 Institutional re-arrangements 
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The mushrooming of state-owned enterprises25 during the terms of the 
Presidents Echeverria and Lopez Portillo demanded a different approach to 
state action. The discussion that followed created a cleavage between the 
ones that privileged a more centralized state planning and those that favored 
market oriented actions. These different positions did not seek a paradigm 
shift yet. The dominant vision was still focused on improving ISI in what Babb 
(2001) calls the “developmentalist vision”.  
However, conflict was present. As the autonomy of the Finance-Bank 
of Mexico branch of the government was questioned, the officials who 
asserted their reluctance to cooperate with the new development plan reacted 
by blocking information to the president’s office.26  The incapacity of the 
President to keep a fluid relation with the financial bureaucracy is reflected in 
the constant change of Finance Ministers during Echeverria and Lopez 
Portillo’s terms. Babb (2001: 127) goes on to describe the conflict between 
the executive and the financial branch: 
  
The powerful Finance Ministry, always toward the right of the political 
spectrum within Mexican public administration, was not in agreement 
with many of Echeverria’s policies, which often challenged the 
ministry’s autonomy and authority; Echeverria became famous for 
declaring that economic policy was ‘made in Los Pinos’ 27 (…) During 
                                                             
25 Bailey (1980: 41) notes that during Echeverria tenure, the national government 
mushroomed from 782 agencies to 1019; the federal workforce grew about 60 percent in five 
years; and the public sector share of GDP was increased from 26.8 to 39.6 percent. 
However, administrative coherence greatly suffered. By 1982, there were approximately 
1,150 public agencies.  
 
26 See Castaneda, 1999. 
 
27 Los Pinos is the colloquial name for the Mexican Presidential residency as are 24 Sussex 
Drive for Canada or the White House for the United States. 
  
82 
the administrations of Echeverria and Lopez Portillo,28 there would be 
six different ministers of finance (compared to a single finance minister 
for the previous two presidential administrations), a clear sign of the 
unwillingness of the executive to delegate economic policymaking 
authority.  
 
As a result of the conflict, the state’s solution was trying to centralize 
the planning of the long-term goals and the improvement of state industrial 
management. The government was reorganized and new institutions were 
created. The state had already tried to reduce Finance’s power and autonomy 
throughout the 1960s. President Echeverria reinforced the power of the 
previously created Secretary of National Patrimony (SEPANAL), and the 
Secretary of the Presidency was created. The first Secretary centralized the 
administration of public owned enterprises; the second was put in charge of 
defining policy and of setting the budget for the state apparatus. 
Officials espousing populist attitudes rather than fiscal discipline 
administered the SEPANAL and the Presidency. These ministries won 
influence on policy-making over the 1970s because they were controlled by 
the kind of people President Echeverria and Lopez Portillo needed, in order to 
push rapid growth programs. They were the kind of developmentalists that 
tended to think that growth and inflation would be possible, even 
recommendable (Babb 2001: Chapter 5). This approach clashed with the 
adoption of orthodox policies adopted by the Bank of Mexico and the Finance 
Ministry. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
28 During Lopez Portillo’s government (1976-1982), the Bank of Mexico had three different 
directors (Gustavo Romero Kolbeck, Miguel Mancera, and Carlos Tello), compared to 
Rodrigo Gomez who was in office for 18 years (1952-1970). 
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President Lopez Portillo’s analysis was less controversial. He thought 
that the state must increased its control over budgeting, planning and policy-
making process. A Presidential decree creating the Ministry of Planning and 
Budget (SPP) was published in December 1976. The goal was not only to 
overcome the blockage by the financial institutions to the President’s will, but 
also to follow a more rational control in budgeting efficiency through the 
establishment of clear objectives in policies. The new ministry took control of 
all the budgeting and planning activities that were previously responsibilities 
of the Finance Ministry. The last had its duties reduced to the collection of 
taxes. The Finance Ministry also lost all control over public spending, which in 
fact altered the complete scenario of growth promotion within the 
macroeconomic balance of the previous years. 
According to John Bailey (1980), prior to 1976 public planning in 
Mexico was largely decentralized in secretariats and agencies. Budgeting 
was the dominant process for pursuing policy goals. However, policy 
evaluation in terms of assessing results against goals had been neglected 
until then. The control exerted by the Finance Ministry came partly from the 
institutional weakness of the Judiciary and Legislative powers. It also came 
from the highest rates of personnel continuity in the Finance Ministry and the 
Bank of Mexico. This fact gave the Finance Ministry “broad legal powers, 
capable leadership, and extensive, continuous representation on the web of 
juntas and commissions that integrated the public sector” (Bailey, 1980: 35).   
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President Lopez Portillo decreed the creation of the Planning and 
Budget Ministry in 1976 in order to rationalize the wider state-centered action. 
According to Bailey (1980: 43) the administrative reform sought the: 
“1) reorganization of the line secretariats; 2) sectorization of the nearly 
nine hundred parastatals under the coordination of secretariats 
designated as “sector heads”; and 3) implementation of program 
budgeting. The working logic was to formulate a multi-year public 
sector plan; derived annual programs from the plan, translate the 
programs into operating budgets, and implement them through the 
restructured bureaucracy. The attempt to move away from traditional, 
resource-based budgeting (Treasury’s style) toward goal-based 
budgeting grounded in medium-range planning is clearly reflected in 
the logic.” 
 
An unattended result of this reform was that the Budget and Planning 
structure helped the Minister create his own political networks, which granted 
him with his own political basis as well as with wide and autonomous action. 
This autonomy increased in 1979 when the team controlling the ministry 
widely recruited its most important officials out of the traditional structure of 
the financial bureaucracy.29 
 The new ministry created a legal separation of the planning, budgeting 
and financing of state actions in the policymaking process. According to the 
decree, the Planning Ministry was able to formulate the budget of income and 
expenditures, supervise implementation of policy, and prepare an audit 
system based on agency accounts.30 In fact this new agency demanded a 
close cooperation and coordination with Finance and forced the old 
                                                             
29 For a complete analysis of the 15 years of SPP see Torres Espinosa (1999). 
 
30 The process of institutionalization was quite conflictive in its first 2 years as Lopez Portillo 
appointed 3 different ministries of Planning and budget: Carlos Tello 1977, Ricardo Garcia 
Sainz 1977-1979 and Miguel de la Madrid 1979-1981; once de la Madrid was nominated PRI 
presidential candidate in 1981, he was replaced by Ramon Aguirre. 
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establishment to pursue new state action, thinking and defining of state’s 
goals. The economic cabinet scheduled regular meetings at Los Pinos to 
decide the main lines of policy with the President. This became a routine 
(Bailey, 1980; Torres Espinosa, 1999).  
The creation of a more sophisticated planning agency created 
unintended results. The institutionalization of the new Ministry not only 
represented the institutionalization of a new technocratization of economic 
decision-making (Erfani, 1995: 140). It also had three different effects: it 
modified state interaction with society, it made a change on the sources and 
socialization of officials, and it supported the paradigm shift in state 
development strategies in the mid-1980s. 
In terms of the increasing state interaction with society, state agencies 
acted with some autonomy in the administration of the budget they received 
in order to perform their policy actions until 1976. As a result of this 
administrative reform, the state agency became “a coordinator of the plans of 
the various sectors instead of the mechanism of central decision-making” 
(Erfani, 1995: 141). In fact, policy planning and implementing processes 
became centralized in specialized inter-ministerial committees that supervised 
the appropriate development of planning and the attainment of goals. This 
way, the exchanges those ministries had with society under the previous 
arrangement was altered.  
As planning implied the coordination of regional and sector programs 
at different levels of the government, the new ministry managed direct 
relationships with governors and municipalities and at the same time, it would 
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coordinate relationships with private industrials or any other social group. In a 
way, this challenged the traditional corporative scheme of mediating interest; 
therefore the Budget Minister was able to deal with those social networks 
directly, without passing through the structure of the PRI.31  
In conclusion, during the 1970s the government attempted to create 
new institutions (such as SEPANAL) and to reinforce the old ones in order to 
weaken and eventually displace the power of the most autonomous 
bureaucracy in Mexico. Because of this, the continuity of the old pattern that 
was centered on the midwifery actions of promoting private industry, 
overlapped with the reinforcement of a new promotion centered in demiurgic 
actions. The convergence of these two different kinds of bureaucracies 
weakened the autonomy and the embeddedness of the state.  
The demiurgic vision produced incoherent actions during the 1970s 
and until the present day. Even if the populist vision won influence during the 
1970s, the officials defending this vision never managed to control the 
developmental agencies, such as the Finance Ministry, the Bank of Mexico 
and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry; except from Carlos Tello who 
spent 90 days as director of the Bank of Mexico after the bank nationalization 
of September 1982 (Babb, 1998). 
                                                             
31 From 1980s, the state abandoned global development plans for the definition of sector 
plans. State action then, transformed its promotional roles to a more targeted policy-making 
process and, as a consequence, its relations with society changed in order to attend to 
specific social needs. The definition of state priorities had been altered according to this new 
rationality, which also led the SPP to concentrate the information related to the evolution of 
social needs in the public and private domains (Erfani, 1995).  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The power that officials in the Finance Ministry and Bank of Mexico 
had, derived from the autonomy of these institutions, which was due to the 
recruitment practices and job security. This autonomy gave officials the 
capacity to insulate their activities from Presidential discretional powers and 
even to exert a sort of veto over some of his policies. The creation of a 
Budget and Planning mechanism reduced the breadth of power the Finance 
Ministry had exercised. But as officials coming into the new ministry were 
recruited from the educational establishment of the Bank of Mexico, the 
Planning Ministry ended up pushing the neoliberal reforms in the 1980s, 
instead of increasing state control of the economy. Even if the Presidents’ 
goal was to weaken the Finance Ministry, their actions empowered the new 
Budget and Planning Ministry because they did not take into account the 
structure of this circuit of recruitment, as we will see in the next section.  
 
3.2.2 Broadening elite recruitment 
The recruitment of officials became a different sort of problem during 
the institutionalization of the Planning Ministry. Babb (2001) found that 
graduates of the National School of Economics tended to concentrate in the 
Ministry of Industry and Commerce in addition to the Ministry of Finance. As 
such, the financial branch of the government became the most important 
space of socialization and integration of “political teams”. However, Babb 
(2001: 169) has found that the camarilla system was altered during the 
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1980s. The new Ministry of Budget and Planning supplanted the generational 
convergence of economics students who became officials.32  
In light of these tendencies in Mexican political recruitment, the 
colonization of economic policy ministries by the ITAM and other 
private schools seems less surprising. During earlier decades, when 
political networking was carried out primarily at the UNAM and 
primarily through the political channels of the state bureaucracy, ITAM 
graduates were excluded from the highest levels of power. But in an 
emerging system in which the most important site of political 
networking was increasingly the planning and banking bureaucracies, 
ITAM graduates could become more influential. 
 
Here, it is important to dissect the evolution of the UNAM economics 
program and that of the ITAM. The Bank of Mexico supported both programs, 
yet the universities environment followed different routes after the 1970s. 
As a result of the 1968 student movement, Echeverria’s government let 
the activists take control over the National Autonomous University of Mexico 
(UNAM). As a result, the UNAM economics program became radicalized and 
ideological, as Babb (2001: 152) notes: 
Echeverria’s administration may even have deliberately used the 
UNAM as a safety valve for political discontent, allowing students to 
take over UNAM programs like that of the School of Economics was a 
less costly alternative to having them demonstrating in the streets or 
organizing guerrilla movements in the country (…). The political climate 
of the UNAM was the most important reason for its failure to stay in 
line with international methodological trends in economics. 
 
 
Along with this presidential decision, the Mexican state began the 
promotion of what was later called centros de investigacion de excelencia (or 
elite social research centers) financed by the recently created National 
Council of Science and Technology (Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y 
                                                             
32 Also see Hernandez Rodriguez, 1987; Camp, 1980; and Centeno, 1997 
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Tecnología or CONACYT).33 Among these institutions, the government 
created the Economic Research and Teaching Centre (Centro de 
Investigacion y Docencia Económica or CIDE) to continue the high-quality 
education officials for the government, along with the 1965 economics 
programs at the El Colegio de Mexico. 
During the 1970s, the ITAM replaced the UNAM as the main source of 
talents in the Bank of Mexico. It followed a very similar pattern to the one 
established previously by the UNAM:  
Three ITAM graduates who were able to enter the Banco de Mexico 
early on were Gustavo Petricioli,34 Miguel Mancera,35 and Francisco 
Gill Diaz.36 Through teaching part-time classes at their alma mater, 
these ITAM graduates were able to help new generations into public-
sector careers. Government officials who had graduated from the 
UNAM, but whose distaste for the radicalization of the UNAM program 
drove them to give part-time classes at more congenial institutions also 
helped ITAM graduates into the financial bureaucracy. A particularly 
important ITAM recruiter was Leopoldo Solis, an UNAM graduate who 
subsequently studied economics at Yale and became director of the 
Banco de Mexico’s Department of Economic Studies. ITAM graduates 
mentored by Solis included Pedro Aspe37 and Francisco Gil Diaz. As a 
result, during the 1970s (as UNAM was losing ground) ITAM graduates 
were able to acquire a firm foothold in the Mexican government (Babb, 
2001: 169).  
 
                                                             
 
33 President Echeverria also created the Universidad Autonoma Metropolitana (UAM) and 
fostered the development of regional universities throughout the country. Lopez Portillo 
followed this policy. It is important to say that this was the last decade in which the state had 
widely invested in the promotion of infrastructure or education in Mexico.  
 
34 Finance Minister of President Miguel de la Madrid’s government from 1986-1988.  
 
35 Bank of Mexico Director from 1982-1997. He renounced after Lopez Portillo decreed the 
Bank Nationalization of 1982 as a protest, and he was replaced by Carlos Tello for 90 days. 
He reassumed his position in December 1982. 
 
36 He was Finance Minister of President Vicente Fox’ government from 2000 to 2006. 
 
37 He was Finance Minister of President Carlos Salinas’ government from 1988 to 1994. 
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According to Babb (1998) the Bank of Mexico was involved in the 
development of the ITAM economics program. The Bank participated and 
funded the creation of the institute, which was created by major Mexico City’s 
business groups that were unhappy with the governmental vision of UNAM 
economics. As it turned out, Bank of Mexico officials promoted essentially 
what Babb (1998) labels “an American-style program” to gain future 
generations of foreign-trained technocrats that would then direct the key 
developmental institutions in Mexico–including the Ministry of Budget and 
Planning (SPP)–in the 1980s and 1990s.  
“The role of the Mexican central bank in the internationalization of the 
ITAM economics program constitutes powerful evidence of the domestic 
legitimacy of international standards of economic expertise in Mexico at 
least within the “organizational field” of central banking” (Babb, 1998: 14). 
 
 
These new officials pushed a sort of generational leap. They were all 
men who had arrived in senior positions in the late 1980s, particularly during 
the term of President Carlos Salinas (1988-1994) in their late 30 and early 40 
years of age. This fact contrasted the norm of previous governments that 
stated that officials would reach these positions by their late 50s or early 60s. 
The foreign-trained technocrats displaced a complete generation of officials 
by the late 1980s. Although this new generation of officials having been 
politically socialized in the traditional developmental institutions of the 
government, and took power in the mid-1980s, displacing the more 
developmentalist, “old-fashioned” men.  
 
3.3 About Embeddedness 
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One of the difficulties of the current explanations of state/business 
relations is that governments and government officials have constitutional 
terms, or at least follow some particular rules for administrative renewal. In 
contrast, economic elites tend to keep their positions for longer periods of 
time, and their renewal is regulated internally. Families usually control 
businesses and these follow some different patterns of change. While 
governments exist for short periods of time, business people may hold 
positions for unspecified periods. This temporal dimension is a key point of 
embededdness, because state and businesspeople must coincide in dealing 
with different time frames in the realization of common objectives. 
During the 20th century, the Monterrey Group for example–one of the 
most important Mexican business groups–followed two different stages. The 
first was their inception and consolidation during the Diaz dictatorship at the 
beginning of the century. Their first leadership renovation in the 1930s also 
coincided with the transformation of the development strategy during the 
Cardenas government. In fact, it was a period of confrontation in the 
relationships between those business elites and the government (Saragoza, 
1988). The second renovation took place in the 1970s. This was an extremely 
confrontational period of the relationship with the state (Heredia, 1992; 
Hernandez Rodriguez, 1988; Arriola; 1988).  
Major business reorganization came about in 1973, leading to a 
questioning of the leadership of the Monterrey Group’s as the commanding 
clan over the business community of that city. This was solved during the 
structural reform of the economy in the 1980s, when the state suggested that 
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the number of families in the Monterrey Group be widened in order to include 
the ten most important businesses of the region, thus making them valid 
interlocutors of the state (Vila, 1994). The three different periods of deep 
confrontation between the Monterrey Group and the state have always been 
explained by the reforming policies implemented by Cardenas, Echeverria, 
and Miguel de la Madrid. Indeed, we identified that conflicts might have come 
from the rupture of institutional exchanges, which had derived from the 
generational turnover in the control of the Monterrey Group. This fact seems 
to be misperceived in the current explanations of the most conflictive periods 
in the relationship between this business group and the state. The state was 
in fact lacking embeddedness with a key economic actor in the industrial 
scene. At the same time this turnover was an opportunity to reestablish it. 
Analyses of corporatism in Mexico emphasize that businesspeople 
have been banned from politics because they have not been part of the 
corporatist structure of the PRI.38 However, as we have illustrated in this 
chapter, the Mexican state created a structure to institutionalize its exchanges 
with businesspeople through developmental institutions such as the Bank of 
Mexico, Finance and Industry Ministries.39 Maxfield (1990) and Babb (2001) 
have found evidence underlining the close interaction between the financial 
bureaucracy and the business community. Some other authors have also 
                                                             
38 Luna, 1991; Luna, Tirado and Valdes, 1987; Maxfield and Anzaldua, 1987; Kaufman, 1988; 
Heredia, 1992; 1994; 1995. 
 
39 As a result of the 1977 political reform, businesspeople have enjoyed some quotas in the 
PRI, which has postulated at least 5 businesspeople to Congress since 1979. 
Businesspeople have also participated openly in PAN since 1977. 
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found close links between financial and industrial families and their business 
groups. “In fact, the owners of the banks and the factories were often one and 
the same group” (Haber and Razo, 1998:fn35; Heredia, 1992; Pozas, 1999). 
We use this evidence to describe state embeddedness on private industrial 
actors in the definition of industrial policy, as Kessler (1998: 41) notes: 
When banks and manufactures are linked by cross-ownership and are 
even run by the same families, the interest of large industrial firms 
cannot be neatly separated from those of financial firms. Indeed, even 
the traditional struggles between domestic and international producers 
over exchange-rate valuation can become meaningless within an 
industrial structure in which the firms that sell the most abroad also buy 
the most foreign goods. In such an economy, when interest group 
policy stimulates exports only at the expense of more costly imported 
inputs, an interest group policy preference is not obvious. 
 
 
In our explanation of the relationship between the state structure and 
the private sector, we found it important to ask which actors affected these 
changes.  Our analysis demonstrates that big conglomerates have dominated 
the Mexican market. Most of them were created during the dictatorship years 
and survived the revolution. Complete industrial sectors such as steel, 
cement, paper, glass, textile, beer, soap and glycerin, tobacco products, as 
well as dynamite and explosives were and remain to be among the most 
important industrial groups.  
 
“If we extend the analysis to the top ten firms and check their identity, 
we find that it was the same group of people who had been there prior 
to, during, and after the revolution. In other words the revolution was 
not very revolutionary in this respect, since ownership remained 
concentrated in the hands of the very elite that it meant to dissolve” 40 
(Haber and Razo, 1998: 116) 41  
                                                             
40 Even if “the revolution of 1910-1920 did not destroy the landed class, it decisively 
weakened this class and set in train a process of official reform and–no less important–
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Both the revolutionary state and the old business families were forced 
to work together in the new institutional context created after the revolution. 
The state did not begin with a clean slate to promote industrialization; it had to 
embed its actions on already established industries. Some of these old 
groups learned to work together with new businesses that had been 
developed from the 1940s onward. They grew in the market niches that had 
not been already occupied by old businesses.42 The growth and consolidation 
of these new conglomerates resulted from a state policy that pushed the rapid 
industrialization of the country (Heredia, 1992). 
 The most important organizations that the business community settled 
to formalize exchanges among them and with the state have been 
established through specialized chambers, most of them founded in 1917. In 
that year, the confederation of industrial chambers, the association of 
Mexican bankers and the confederation of commercial chambers were 
created and became the valid interlocutors of the state. However, the 
industrial, financial and commercial organizations were controlled by the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
unofficial social change, both of which undermined landlord dominance” (Knight, 2001:1986). 
Is this a page number? If not, you need one. 
 
41 This hypothesis was advanced in Cardenas, 1984; and Womack, 1991, as well as by 
Heredia, (1992). 
 
42 Haber et al (2002: 25-74) have developed a particular idea of backward and forward 
political integration between the state and business. Backward political integration is defined 
as institutional exchanges with private sector industrials and industrial organizations. Forward 
political integrations links politicians who, supported by state institutions, become 
entrepreneurs. This process, in their opinion, took place during the reconstruction of the 
revolutionary Mexican state in the 1920s. In fact, the development of this process of political 
integration easily matches with how the new revolutionary state embedded its actions with 
the private sector–particularly the finance and industry groups and families. 
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bigger–and usually interrelated–businesses in each sector, as Heredia (1992: 
286) posits: 
 
“The huge economic power of large-scale businessmen, along with 
their privileged ties with the commanding heights of the executive 
branch allowed them to control the bulk of the interaction between the 
Mexican business community and the state directly. The vast mass of 
small firms whose emergence was largely made possible by a 
favorable investment climate depended on the arrangements worked 
out by big business and the government”.  
 
 Big businesses have controlled the representative structure of the 
private sector and the state. They won a fundamental role on the influence, 
definition and implementation of policy due to the high concentration of the 
market. They have effectively pushed small and medium industries to follow 
their developmental guidelines inside the frame of their own exchanges with 
the state. In a way, this created a pattern in which mainly the interests of big 
business had dominated state embeddedness. This pattern was not 
fundamentally affected in any of the three periods treated in our study. The 
most important decisions made by the state in the promotion of industry were 
negotiated with those sector leaders and transformed into policies for those 
specific sectors. Gaining the support of these groups to redirect the economy 
towards favorable development goals was enough for the state. Big 
businesses would therefore be able to pull small and medium enterprises 
towards a new industrialization strategy. 
 The dominant role enjoyed by big businesses can be explained by the 
autonomy these in turn enjoyed from small and medium industries. In a 
sense, Mexican big businesses have always been highly vertically and 
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horizontally integrated, and they have also been inextricably related with the 
private financial institutions. These characteristics assured them a relatively 
cheap flow of capital and reduced their dependence on actors outside their 
businesses, affording them a very advantageous position in the domestic 
market (Pozas, 2002; 1999; Maxfield, 1990; Heredia, 1992). The reform of the 
state reinforced business autonomy, as state withdrew its participation, 
conceding its place to private producers, without imposing enough 
regulations. In the middle of a political transition, this made the government 
end up trapped and having a very limited capacity to act, as we will show in 
this thesis. The result is a pattern of interaction in which new actors–such as 
political parties and Congress–affect policymaking in an incoherent way.  
 In conclusion, the involvement of the state varied according to the 
policy paradigm that the state was using to foster development. While these 
policy-transitions took place in an authoritarian state apparatus, contestation 
came from different agencies of the government. When the political system 
began to liberalize, the government found difficulty for reaching consensus 
among different socio-political actors, that will be described in the next 
chapter. The second part of this thesis will also document the state’s 
continual attempt to protect the domestic business groups as the source of 
domestic capital. The evolution of state/private sector relationships in the 
petroleum industry was affected by decisions and political institutions 
constructed in order to sustain the state’s authority, splicing together two 
policy paradigms. In the second part of this thesis, we will offer evidence for 
this argument and we will reinforce the idea that the state was trapped in 
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protecting domestic private capital above any other competing local or foreign 
interest, independently of the paradigm shift.  
By the mid-century, the state consolidated a developmental 
bureaucracy, and with it, the state began the ISI in order to concentrate state 
efforts in the consolidation of a domestic trajectory for development. Such a 
trajectory would be sustained on domestic demand and producers. The 
policy’s objective was to foster both a national bourgeoisie and a market that 
would sustain the sovereignty of the country. In order to embed transnational 
investment in the Mexican market, ISI policies offered equal protection to 
local and foreign capital. In the 1960s the state offered preference to Mexican 
capital over transnational sources. A law forcing the association of foreign 
and Mexican businesspeople and making the domestic control of any venture 
mandatory was passed in 1963. With it, the state concentrated protectionist 
policies from industries to local businesspeople. 
However, the state recognized the need to enhance the development 
model, increasing competitiveness to the over-protected industry in the 
1970s. The goal became searching for self-sufficiency. By reinforcing the 
local trajectory of development, the state plan was to perform a blending of 
midwifery and husbandry roles that would foster an exporting capacity. The 
first definition of this new policy took hold in the Industrial Development 
National Plan (PNDI, Spanish acronym) of 1979, thus leading industry to 
invest in EOI production. The new revenues coming from export would let 
domestic industry finance its future growth autonomously. This would have 
required a gradual shift in commercial policy, which did not arrive. The main 
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policy agencies began to ping-pong from protection to liberalization. Gradual 
liberalization was negotiated in 1970s but it was never realized. Mainly due to 
two economic crises in 1976 and 1982, the market was even more protected 
than before the attempted policy reforms. In the meantime, the external 
indebtedness that served as a financial source for the construction of 
exporting facilities became unmanageable. By 1982, the Mexican economy 
was highly indebted and the state found itself unable to offer adequate 
answers to the problem. 
The consolidation of a coherent bureaucracy that controlled key 
positions in the government marked the end of the blockage in 1986. Relying 
on a new paradigm for policy-making, the state was able to offer both a new 
reading of the problem and ad-hoc policy solutions to the crisis. The Mexican 
economy shifted to an EOI, which implied the reinforcement of the midwifery 
and husbandry roles in order to increase the international competitive 
advantage for the industry. Both state officials and domestic industrial groups 
reinforced their ties, in order to adapt to the new circumstances. However, 
while the state was withdrawing from the demiurgic role–pushing an 
aggressive privatization program–state officials gave priority to national 
business groups to acquire public enterprises. In doing so, the state facilitated 
the reorganization of the domestic market and consolidated national 
champions. Those business groups would enjoy conditions for quasi-
monopoly control of the domestic market, which the state used for protecting 
them from incoming competitors. Furthermore, the consolidation of national 
champions would also ensure business international competitiveness.  
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Indeed, the state did not alter the pattern of embedding its actions in 
the consolidation of a national bourgeoisie. It guaranteed protection from 
international competition to domestic producers once again, even while it 
liberalized the market. The implementation of the EOI strategy was 
undertaken, thus emphasizing the capacity of the Mexican state in providing 
private industrials with the possibility of maximizing their presence in domestic 
and international markets. In a similar way, the state came back to the EOI 
policy from which it had departed decades ago. 
 
3.4 The years of the paradigm shift 
The shift of the state development strategy in the mid-1980s was a 
result of the convergence of different trajectories of domestic transformation. 
Most of them took the state as the agent of change. In fact, this has been 
explained as a coincidence of different processes that began at roughly the 
same time and that evolved along a similar route. First, the old paradigm had 
a lack of answers to the problems of 1982 debt crisis that had become 
evident in 1986. This resulted in the search for an alternative solution that 
was slowly consolidated as a new policy paradigm (Thorp, 1998). Second, the 
consolidation of the power of a new generation of policy-making officials 
occurred. They were recruited and socialized in government agencies but 
trained in different domestic and international academic backgrounds instead 
of the UNAM (Babb, 2001). Third and finally, as the state chose a new 
commercial policy oriented to export, it pushed for the formation of coalitions 
that would support the long-term viability of its projects (Thacker, 2000).  
  
100 
The developmental-rational bureaucracy took control not only of the 
development agencies but also of the most important positions in Mexican 
politics during the 1980s and 1990s. This fact created a paradox: even if the 
state used a different paradigm to define policy, it kept following the same 
pattern of interaction with the private sector. This fact would ensure big 
businesses both the capacity to enjoy enough competitiveness to become 
players in the new export-oriented strategy, and enough protection from the 
risks associated with existing domestic conditions.  
One interesting question posed by Babb (2001: 127) is: why has the 
authoritarian Mexican state let such an autonomous bureaucracy–as the one 
of the Bank of Mexico–develop itself? Her answer deals with two possibilities: 
the first one follows Sylvia Maxfield (1990), who argues that the overwhelming 
power of the private financial sector to guide state actions explains its 
influence on policies of the Bank of Mexico. Another alternative Babb gives is 
that the lack of control that the state has to impose strong financial controls 
on the economy is due to the fact that Mexico shares a border of two 
thousand miles with the US: it is difficult to establish real control on capital 
flight. Babb (2001: 128) affirms that, “in lieu of being able to implement 
exchange controls (as the devaluation of 1954 had shown), it made sense for 
the Mexican government to do whatever it could to prevent inflation and 
devaluation, including granting policy autonomy to the central bank.” 
However, these theses ignore that by the mid-1950s, the central bank 
autonomous bureaucracy was at least 25 years old. 
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In contrast, the questions of this work deal with how this process of 
embedded autonomy took place. Instead of identifying which interests the 
state was following in its motivations, as elaborated by Maxfield among other 
authors, we have found that the Mexican state has shared a good deal of 
affinity with the private sector in the transformation of the country. The state 
has counted on an autonomous bureaucracy capable of insulating itself from 
society, and to define a national developmental agenda. Furthermore, this 
autonomous bureaucracy has always developed a permanent exchange with 
the private sector to execute a decentralized application of this agenda. 
Indeed, it was a coincidence of interests that transformed Mexico. This makes 
any question that asks in whose interest the state action is defined or whether 
the state is autonomous from the private sector, redundant. The state-
business exchanges have been more characterized by collaboration than by 
conflict, especially when the institutions that had been created between 1920 
and 1940, gained maturity during the 1960s.43 
Our question thus follows: Does state autonomy and state 
embeddedness explain the paradigm shift? And how did that transformation 
process take place?  
As it had done in the past, the state followed a very similar pattern to 
push the transition from ISI to EOI. In the 1980s, its first actions were to 
establish new legal frames to state action. A constitutional amendment in fact 
                                                             
43 When we think about the question from whom is the Mexican state autonomous in a 
reforming period? The question can be tricky because interests vested in the state in 
previous historical moments would be able to veto or affect future state decisions. In this 
case, those ‘reactionary’ interests are not always economic or related to business; they can 
also be political or ideological. 
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created a new project for the state to give new rhetorical basis to the 
structural reform and justifying the state’s decision to change, while keeping 
its predominant role in the direction of the economy.44 The second stage was 
the establishment of a coherent government, which ended with a shift in the 
recruitment of officials (Babb, 2001). In fact, De la Madrid’s government 
established a coherent government structure predominantly dominated by 
officials whose backgrounds came from the Bank of Mexico-Finance Ministry 
career paths. This change has been widely recognized by Camp, (1972, 
1975, 1990) and Robert Kaufman, (1988). This phenomenon let the state 
return to the old pattern of coordination and control over policy-making and to 
reestablish its long-term relationship with societal groups. As SPP Ministers 
became Presidents from 1982 to 1994, the same technocratic teams kept 
control of key ministries in three consecutive terms, thus consolidating their 
paradigm vision (Torres Espinosa 1999). 
The most important changes to policy began in the mid-1980s. The 
first change took place at the end of 1985 when Mexico formally submitted a 
bid to join the GATT. The second change came in 1987 when the 
liberalization of commerce became the basis of a wider economic policy 
intended to control inflation via the Pacto policy. The third stage of policy 
changes had to do with the privatization program within which the state 
redefined its demiurgic role. The withdrawal of demiurgic actions implied an 
extended program of privatization of public enterprises. This favored two 
                                                             
44 We have already said that the constitution in Mexico represents the political agenda of the 
PRI rather than a legal constraint for state action (Zapata, 1990). 
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things: the reinforcement of domestic integration of business groups 
economically, and the attainment of political support from the private sector. 
The reshaping of the most important domestic business groups facilitated the 
husbandry role when the state began to reinforce Mexican international 
competitiveness. In fact, the whole reform process was assured because 
these actions allowed the state to continue the traditional protection it had 
granted to domestic business groups.  
How was it possible that the state was able to promote internationally 
competitive private industries in the middle of a crisis and in such a short 
period of time? The years of the oil-boom have normally been presented as a 
waste of resources on the part of the state. The influx of capital in the 
Mexican economy came from external debt, and this was widely accepted. 
This period was the last in which the state made important investments in 
infrastructure. However, along with the mushrooming of state-owned 
enterprises, the state wrote plans to let private industrialists build exporting 
facilities. These exporting facilities laid the foundation of the future export-
oriented model.  
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Chapter 4. The petroleum industry in Mexican history and politics 
 
One of the most important sources of conflict during the consolidation 
of the Mexican Revolutionary State was the public challenge from the 
transnational corporations (TNC) already exploiting oil production in Mexico. 
The TNCs did not recognize the authority of the state’s institutions, and they 
were unwilling to accept the new definitions of national ownership of sub-soil 
resources in the fourth paragraph of Article 27 in the new Constitution. The 
conflict lasted 20 years until President Lazaro Cardenas unilaterally decided 
to nationalize the oil industry in 1938. Petrochemical production, as a sector 
of the petroleum industry, inherited this history. 
 In the Mexican developmental tradition, state-owned enterprises, such 
as Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), were used to attract and promote the 
development of entire industrial sectors, such as the petrochemical one. In 
Mexico, being a latecomer to the production of petrochemicals, the state 
fostered an integration strategy in which it played a demiurgic role while 
substituting itself for the private sector in the first production stages of the 
petrochemical chain.45 Within this sector, the nationalized oil industry played 
a pivotal role when channelling significant resources to foster expansion. As 
the embedded autonomy approach would predict, the state concentrated on 
producing the basic raw materials, encouraging private industry to become 
                                                             
 
45 According to Chapman (1991: 40) first-comer petrochemical industries, as a contrast, 
developed the know-how and in some cases the opportunistic use of oil as a raw material to 
pull a forward integration of the petrochemical market. 
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involved in production later along the production chain. The state thereby 
structured a domestic petrochemical sector. 
 This chapter’s objective is to trace the emergence of Mexico’s 
petrochemical industry from the nationalized oil industry in ways fostered of a 
mixed private/public petrochemical industry marked by nationalist policies. 
 
4.1 Petrochemicals Origin  
 Petrochemicals are a branch of the chemical industry. Its distinction – 
and hence its name – is its dependence upon petroleum-based raw materials 
(including natural gas). Petrochemicals are involved in the production of many 
final products and therefore, must be identified by the initial rather than the 
final product. For this reason, this is considered a strategic industry in most 
countries. 
The petrochemical industry resulted from the development of organic 
chemistry in Germany, and most of its basic uses were developed during the 
19th century. Coal was the most common raw material rather than oil. Its 
massive expansion is accounted for by the switch from coal to oil and natural 
gas as the basic raw materials during and after World War II (Chapman, 
1991: 14). 
 Petrochemicals often appear to be an “invisible industry”, because 
most of them are marketed within the chemical sector itself and they belong 
to different industrial chains as well. As a consequence, they cannot be 
measured at the final household consumer level, as computers or cars. 
Rather, it is necessary to estimate the proportion of the output of various 
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sectors derived from petroleum in industrial classification schemes. This is 
relatively easy to do in the plastic or synthetic fibres sector, but quite difficult 
in the automobile industry, for example (Chapman, 1991: 34; Mattar, 1994). In 
1987, the US International Trade Commission estimated that approximately 
14,000 different petrochemicals had achieved commercial status (Chapman, 
1991: 23). 
 Most petrochemical products are derived from a few building blocks. 
Approximately 85 per cent are ultimately derived from just two groups of basic 
petrochemicals–the olefins and the aromatics. The olefins include ethylene, 
propylene, butylenes, and butadiene; the major aromatics are benzene, 
toluene and xylenes. The operations of the industry involve linked and 
sequential processes. These make it possible to distinguish among primary or 
basic petrochemicals, petrochemical intermediates, and final petrochemical 
products. The manufacture of base chemicals is the first stage in the 
conversion of raw materials into petrochemical products (Chapman, 1991: 
23).  
 The commercial structure of the world petrochemical market is highly 
concentrated. Integration began in Germany, the United Kingdom and 
France, when coal was still the major raw material. The names of three of the 
major German firms making up the IG Farben Cartel (Badische Anilin und 
Sodafabrik, Farbewerke Hoechst and Farbenfabriken Bayer) are associated 
with the birth of the industry. They manufactured synthetic dyestuffs. As 
Hohenberg (1967: 58) states:  
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“While many countries were still using the various gaseous and liquid 
products of coke oven operations as fuel for their iron and steel 
industries or in street lamps, German chemists were already well along 
in converting coke oven by-products into chemicals of various kinds. 
One result was the structuring of a highly concentrated world market 
based not only on size, but also on the concentration of technology 
and know-how”  
 
Expansion of the chemical industry relied mainly on technological 
developments, capital mobility and integration. The custodial role played by 
the state was fundamental in the development of this industry. However, all 
countries did not play that role in the same way and with the same success. 
For example, Hohenberg’s (1967) comparative study of the first years of the 
industry shows how the custodial role played by French state affected 
negatively the development of its industry. Patent law and restrictions on 
university research led the most important industrial chemists to leave the 
country and head to Switzerland and Germany.  
In contrast, Germany’s domination of the international chemical 
industry until 1914 can be attributed to more state involvement with the 
private sector and the promotion of scientific research, at least in part. This 
fostered the innovation, which was so fundamental to the expansion of the 
sector. The talent of individual scientists, such as Justus von Liebig and Fritz 
Haber also played a part, but as Chapman (1991: 41) emphasises: 
“the pre-eminence of the chemical industry of the newly unified 
German state was not a result of a fortuitous concentration of scientific 
talent, but rather a consequence of deliberate policies designed to 
foster and exploit such talent. These included state support for higher 
education and the creation of a social climate sympathetic to industrial 
and applied research. This research took place in both academic 
institutions and the laboratories established by the German dye 
companies in the 1870s and 1880s. These laboratories were the 
forerunners of the research and development centres, which have 
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become a standard feature of the organization of contemporary 
industrial research. It was in such laboratories that the next series of 
technical advances relevant to an understanding of the origins of the 
petrochemical industry” 
 
The petrochemical industry was among the first, perhaps the first to 
develop knowledge-centred firms. Indeed, the entrepreneurial factor was 
secondary in the development of the nascent industry, although it evolved 
later into a manager-corporate form of organization while the scientific 
leadership was displaced. However, the state played a pivotal role in fostering 
scientific research and connecting it with industrial development all the way 
through. First in Germany, and later in the Americans’ war effort of the 1940s, 
states supported the development of basic technical capacities for producing 
high-level knowledge to meet the needs of the firms. It was the combination of 
an expansive custodial role and the support of scientific research, which 
explains the advantage gained by Germany (Hohenberg, 1967: 65; 
Chapman, 1991; Spitz, 1988). 
During the first decade of the 20th century, American companies began 
to explore the production of chemical products derived from crude oil.  The 
United States developed the most important petrochemical industries during 
the interwar period. The change from coal to oil reduced raw material prices 
dramatically and led to an integrated and strong American industry.46 
Counting on its own research teams–most of them educated in German 
                                                             
46 This was also facilitated because once the Germans lost the Second World War; 
Americans led specialized groups to investigate all the scientific research used by Germans. 
Actually that gave them access to all technological innovations of the industry and facilitated 
their technical and scientific lead in the development of the American industry. 
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universities–the American industry’s access to technology and integrated 
production contributed to the concentration of petrochemicals worldwide. 
 
4.2 The Mexican oil industry 
Oil exploitation in Mexico began in 1901 during the dictatorship of 
Porfirio Diaz (1876-1911). Transnational corporations from abroad, mainly to 
export oil from Mexico, developed the industry. In order to foster its 
development, the President allowed all kinds of duty free imports on 
machinery and equipment, taxing the companies only with a stamp tax of 
about 10 percent on exports. Further than that, during the dictatorship the 
mining law was transformed. After its independence in 1810, Mexico 
continued the colonial tradition that granted the ownership of the subsoil first 
to the Sovereign and later to the nation. Colonial mining regulations had given 
concessions to private parties to exploit the surface territory, but it never 
allowed a concessionary to own the subsoil. This tradition continued until 
President Porfirio Diaz dictated the first mineral law of independent Mexico in 
1884. This legislation allowed the state to grant the ownership of the subsoil 
to concessionaries so as to exploit minerals and oil. Then the Petroleum Law 
of 1901 enabled the government to concede public lands to operators of oil 
fields. The 1909 mining law reaffirmed the right to the subsoil to those 
concessionaries (Silva Herzog, 1963; Meyer, 1972: chapter 1; Grayson, 1980: 
9). 
This way, the President granted a huge degree of autonomy to foreign 
companies in order to develop the sector. The exploitation of this natural 
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resource took the structure of an enclave, and the only benefit Mexico 
received was the salaries and taxes. The permissive stance taken during the 
dictatorship resulted in the export of almost 90 per cent of oil production in 
1916.  
However, such favourable conditions did not last. According to 
Womack (1991), the pressure for political reform intensified in the first decade 
of the 20th century. The power invested in the person of President Diaz had 
sustained his government for 30 years, but he was already over 80 years old. 
After his re-election in 1910, an insurrection exploded in the country on 
November 20th. Diaz left Mexico seven months later, leaving a provisional 
government in place. New elections were called; Francisco I. Madero was 
elected.  
 However, neither oil companies nor some foreign governments were 
particularly satisfied with the result of this process even though the removal of 
the dictator implied opening the country’s affairs sufficiently to let them gain 
influence in the definition of policy that worked in their favour. Madero’s 
government did not represent an important shift of the previous conditions, 
nor better opportunities for new political or economic actors. In addition, the 
new government was unable to keep the tight political control of previous 
years, thus increasing competition between competing interests that were 
trying to influence the government in their favour. “The most troublesome 
conflict was over oil, American, British, German, French, and Mexican rivals 
and customers lobbied almost as roughly against each other” (Womack, 
1991: 130).  
  
111 
After a couple of years of unstable government under Madero, the US 
ambassador in Mexico, Henry Lane Wilson, promoted a coup d’État. The new 
president and vice president were assassinated and Wilson signed the so-
called “Pact of the Embassy” in which the US recognized (and installed) 
Victoriano Huerta as President. US Marines guarded both the Mexican Coast 
and its main ports during these years. They even landed in Veracruz and 
Tampico (the two most important ports in the Gulf of Mexico at the time) in 
order to protect American oil interests. Oil companies financed local 
insurrections and paramilitary organizations on their own, in order to protect 
their installations (Womack, 1991). Eventually in 1917, the revolution came to 
an end, when the fighting factions agreed the Constitution of 1917.  
Of the main groups fighting among them to win control of the country 
(Zapatistas, Villistas, Carrancistas, Obregoncistas, Huertistas, and 
Maderistas), the north-western one known as “Sonora branch” led by Alvaro 
Obregon, won and took control of the state, forming a nationalist elite and 
promoting autonomous Mexican development. The oil industry quickly 
encountered problems with this new elite, whose developmental agenda was 
designed to reduce dependency on the foreign direct investment favoured by 
the ancien régime. This government would target domestic capital as the 
engine for the development of the country and would force the transnational 
corporations exploiting oil to recognize the nation’s rights over sub-soil, 
overturning the permissive concessions given under the long dictatorship. 
The immediate result was conflict over mineral rights (Meyer, 1973: chapters 
3-4; Knight 1991). 
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Conflict between oil firms and the state began as soon as the new elite 
took power, and the Constitution was passed on February 24, 1917. The 4th 
paragraph of the 27th article reiterated the nation’s right to sub-soil property. 
Indeed, it subordinated the interests of private property to those of the 
national interest. The rejection of the Anglo-Saxon tradition of private property 
allowed the Mexican state to claim both the representation of the nation and 
the definition of the public interest.  According to its own conception, the state 
was the only one capable of expressing the will of the community.  
The regulations forced oil companies owners to accept four principles: 
the authority of the Mexican state to define property rights; the state’s 
authority to proclaim policies for exploitation, commercialization, exploration 
and drilling of oil; the need to subordinate their private interests to those of the 
Mexican nation; and finally, what they had previously considered to be their 
property, was in fact only a concession. 
In an industry dominated by foreign companies, such an emphasis on 
the national interest was unlikely to be accepted easily. The foreign 
companies deemed the retroactive application of new regulations as an issue 
of no consideration. At the end of 1924, the capital invested in the oil industry 
was estimated at 800 million pesos; 57.5 percent of it was American, 26.2 
percent English, 11.4 percent Dutch, and only 3 percent Mexican (Meyer, J, 
1991: 225).  
These political changes certainly had consequences for the Mexican 
oil sector. According to Jean Meyer, in 1921 Mexico was second in world 
production and oil represented 76 percent of its exports. From 1921 to 1927, 
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production and exports fell by 72 percent, which included a drop of no less 
than 42 percent in the last year (Meyer, J, 1991: 204-206). However, it would 
be a mistake to attribute this entire decline to a boycott of the new state, as 
the Mexican government itself did. There were several technical and 
economic as well as political reasons for this contraction. During the civil war, 
foreign companies had ruthlessly exploited the wells to the full extent of their 
capacity, sometimes even destroying them. The new borings were less 
profitable and the companies, who were also angered by state policy towards 
them, transferred their investments to Venezuela, which by 1927 actually 
surpassed Mexico in output.  
The companies also refused to adapt production to the domestic 
market, as the Mexican government pushed them to do. A major structural 
change was underway: nearly 35 percent of the 1937 production was 
domestically consumed, contrasting the 10 percent that this aspect 
represented only 20 years before. Of course, oil exploitation and use figured 
in the government development strategy.  
“The six year plan, [elaborated for the presidential campaign in 1934] 
envisaged the creation of a state oil company, PEMEX and the 
exploitation of new fields, which the oil companies seemed reluctant to 
undertake. Such moderately dirigiste intentions were entirely 
consonant with post-revolutionary policy, which had generated 
successive confrontations–and compromises–between the government 
and the oil companies” (Knight 1991: 279). 
 
 After two decades of conflict, a labour problem gave the state an 
excuse to nationalize the industry. Oil workers had begun organizing unions 
at the beginning of the 20th century. In 1935, workers – with the support of the 
government – moved to create a unified, industry-wide union and to negotiate 
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a single collective agreement that would give Mexican workers the same 
rights and advantages which foreign workers in the oil industry already 
enjoyed. This mobilization created an in crescendo conflict that finished with a 
Supreme Court intervention.  
Faced with the Court’s judgment in favour of equal treatment of 
Mexican workers, the oil companies called on their own governments to 
intervene militarily. Such actions forced President Lazaro Cardenas to issue 
an ultimatum. The companies must respect the Court’s decision. When the 
companies rejected this ultimatum, Cardenas decreed oil nationalization on 
18 March 1938, proclaiming that: “We would burn the oil-fields to the ground 
rather than sacrifice our honour (…) the ambition of the foreigner is at an end” 
(Knight: 1991: 282). 
Indeed, Cardenas decision involved not only the nation’s right to its 
natural resources, but also to defend Mexican institutions and workers’ 
organizations confronted by any reactionary interest. This struggle marking 
the birth and subsequent establishment of the public company made the oil 
industry an icon of Mexican nationalism and sovereignty. The oil union gained 
a special status, not only because it represents a strategic sector but also 
because it became a special associate to the state in the management of the 
industry, as we will see later. 
 
4.3 The American factor and the reinforcement of nationalism in the oil 
industry 
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In the 1930s, the domestic chemical industry in Mexico was almost 
non-existent. Mexico has had some foreign and domestic chemical industries 
since the beginning of the 20th century. Firms such as La Luz, La Corona, 
Beick-Felix-Stein, and Química Michoacana along with Colgate Palmolive, IG 
Farber, Bayer, and Celanese have been involved in the production of soap, 
paper, artificial resins, textile fibers, pharmaceuticals, pesticides, and 
explosives (Bucay, 2003: 29). Most of these products were marketed by 
foreign corporations and were mainly imported from the United States, 
Germany, and Britain involving little domestic manufacturing before being 
sold in Mexico.  
While American and British interests dominated in the oil industry, 
Germans controlled the pharmaceutical, textile, and fertilizer production. 
During the first decades of the 20th century, German companies controlled 
the chemical and pharmaceutical markets of Latin America.47 Bayer and 
Schering were established in Mexico in 1914 for the distribution of a wide 
range of products. Since 1926, IG Faberindustrie–the world leader of the 
chemical market at the time–integrated Bayer into its conglomerate, and 
established cartel rules with local producers, thus controlling markets and 
affiliates on the American continent. IG Farben alone held over 50 percent of 
the prewar chemical and pharmaceutical market (Taylor, 1984: 148). They 
had an interest, of course, in reducing the United States’ pressure on Latin 
                                                             
47 By 1913, Germany accounted for 88 percent of the world production of dyestuff and was 
far ahead of its rivals in synthetic drugs, flavors, and fine chemicals: a situation that was not 
very different once the Second World War began in 1939 (Chapman, 1991: 40). 
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American states to nationalize their industries as much as possible.  The 
Second World War changed this situation. 
According to Taylor (1984) and Schuler (1989), as soon as the Second 
World War erupted, the United States began to put pressure on Mexico and 
Latin America’s governments in order to gain control of the chemical industry 
in the region. It was an overt aim of the United States to reduce the power of 
Axis interests in the hemisphere. The United States influenced industries and 
companies in Latin America to include them in the Proclaimed Lists, and to 
force their nationalization.  
The Proclaimed Lists began as a United States initiative to force the 
nationalization of German interests acting in the American market. However, 
the United States also called upon Latin American governments to do the 
same in order to acquire German interests throughout the hemisphere. After 
the nationalization of German industries, the United States wanted Latin 
Americans either to destroy or auction them in the public market–along with 
their patents and technology–ensuring that American corporations could 
appropriate them. Americans gained both access to highly demanded raw 
materials in time of war, and the technological know-how developed by 
Germany, which had been the world leader in the production of chemicals to 
that point. 
As a reaction to American actions, Germany pushed Mexico to protect 
its factories and distribution assets. Germany was the only country that did 
not join the boycott initiated by Great Britain and the United States, providing 
  
117 
the technological support in developing the Mexican oil industry.48 For these 
reasons, the first action Mexican authorities took was to accept the transfer of 
assets to German entrepreneurs already naturalized as Mexican citizens such 
as Felix Stein, who acted as the de jure owner of the main German 
enterprises. For example, according to Schuler (1989), IG Farben used this 
strategy to avoid nationalization as Farben was recognized as a Mexican 
business.  
The second action Mexico took was the nationalization of the rest of 
the chemical industry in 1941. Schuler (1989) assured that if the Mexican 
state had acted according to the American plan, Mexico would have had to 
opt for either destroying the physical installations or auctioning them in the 
public market along with the German patents and technology already 
registered for German use. Instead, Mexican officials decided to keep them 
as part of the nationalized chemical facilities, giving Mexico full control of the 
companies and their technology.  
“By an accident and avoiding an unnecessary conflict with the German 
government, the Mexican state got control of a vital industrial sector. 
Indeed, when the Mexican government continued the operation of the 
IG Farben subsidiaries under Mexican direction, it assured itself the 
control of that sector keeping the United States out of the business” 
(Schuler, 1989: 59).  
 
With the exception of Mexico and as a result of the American’s Axis 
Replacement Program, American companies took control of almost all the 
                                                             
48 The Mexican government increased its sales to Germany, Italy and Japan substantially in 
1938 and 1939. A year after Mexico’s oil nationalization, the Axis countries purchased 65 
percent of all Mexican oil exports. Silva Herzog (1941, quoted in Barbosa, 1992: 192 and FN 
8) contributes that transactions established with Germany, Italy and Japan “did not consist 
merely of exchange but also included deals for boat building, and, within a few months hard 
currency.” 
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chemical and petrochemical markets in Latin America after the Second World 
War (Taylor, 1984; Schuler, 1989).  
 The Mexican government gave a big push to develop a national 
chemical industry counting on German technology and patents; PEMEX 
managed the nationalized part of these industries, as established in the first 
chemical law in Mexico. However, as a consequence of both conflicts – one 
that was derived from an American boycott of Mexico during the oil 
nationalization of 1938, and the other that resulted of the Axis Replacement 
Program in Mexico – Mexico and the United States have forged good reasons 
to mistrust each other in issues related to the petroleum industry. 
 As a corollary of these two conflicts, the Mexican state has performed 
a restrictive custodial role in the petroleum industry, extending it to the 
chemical and petrochemical sectors. Accordingly, the 1941 Chemical Law 
constrained private actors from participation in the industry. As the 
technological shift from carbon to oil gave rise to the petrochemical industry 
all over the western hemisphere, which had appropriated German technology, 
the Mexican state had no choice but to increase demiurgic actions in order to 
encourage a national petrochemical industry. PEMEX played a double role: a 
state-owned strategic industry and an agency that was meant to support the 
growth of the petrochemical sector. PEMEX double function reduced foreign 
private influence, especially coming from the United States, in 
petrochemicals, in a moment when the government’s goal in Mexico was to 
increase the ISI and to reinforce a domestic trajectory of development. 
 
  
119 
4.4 The petrochemical sector before 1958 – rising out nationalism and 
corporatism 
 The oil industry became one of the most important of the nationalist 
icons. For the same reasons, the state had to grant a great deal of influence 
to the Sindicato de Trabajadores Petroleros de la Republica Mexicana 
(STPRM, or the Oil-Workers Union of the Mexican Republic) in the 
administration of the sector. The union leadership has enjoyed this influence 
on any state policy related to oil production or manufacturing, even if the 
union position was subordinated to the state’s decision. Private actors needed 
time to gain negotiation capacity. 
 According to Alan Knight (1992: 106-114) the expropriation of oil was 
more an emotional matter than a purely economic one. First, it guaranteed–
both internally and externally–that Mexico and its institutions were 
independent from any external power. Second, it granted the presidency, the 
charismatic leadership that it needed in order to defend the Mexican nation 
and its sovereignty. Third, it gave the state a new capacity to mobilize 
massive support against any form of “imperialist” influence in Mexican affairs. 
Finally, it represented a political doctrine of national unity that went beyond 
the politics of local factionalism, which was a dominant characteristic of the 
political landscape at the time. For many years, the legitimacy of the state has 
relied on this symbolism. Part of the oil union’s power comes from this 
imagery;49 the other part is the control over workers in a strategic industry. 
                                                             
49 Even today, positions vis a vis any reform possibility in the petroleum industry stresses 
nationalist sentiments over the economic reasons that would justify a more rational 
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Concurrently, the union also enjoys practical and material sources of 
influence that allow it to affect the state decisions over the definition of 
petroleum policy. PEMEX has been the most important taxpayer in the 
country since the end of the Second World War,50 the provider of highly 
subsidized energy throughout the country, and a corporate contributor to both 
human and financial resources for the PRI. Since its beginning, the union has 
also been a nation-wide industrial entity that assembles the exclusive 
affiliation of the totality of PEMEX’s labor force, basing its political power on 
the number of members and on the geographical areas it represents.51  
The union has also been a member of the Council of Administration of 
PEMEX since the company’s creation in 1939. Situated at the origin of the 
conflict that led to the oil nationalization in 1938, the union’s influence on the 
administration of PEMEX has been profound. As Adler (1992: 129-153) has 
studied, the local councils of the union administered the 17 different 
companies that had been nationalized, until the government decided to 
establish a central administration for the industry and to consolidate one 
                                                                                                                                                                             
exploitation of the sector. On the side of those who oppose to changing the status quo, the 
emotional part of the story–related to nationalism, sovereignty and anti-imperialism–is 
stressed, while reformists stress mainly the rationality of this measure.. 
 
50 Morales (1992: 218) notes that, “taxes and transfers to the government also represented a 
significant percentage of company expenditure, and PEMEX thus became the country’s 
leading taxpayer. Between 1947 and 1957, PEMEX paid 5.2 billion pesos in taxes and other 
payments, which amounts to roughly a fourth of the total government income for that period. 
The transfer of “petropesos” to the state became a strategic item in the financing of public 
expenditure.”  
 
51 From 1938 to 1971, the oil union represented the rank and file personnel of PEMEX. 
During the Echeverria government (1970-1976), the President agreed that most 
professionals, technicians, and other white-collar employees should join the STPRM. The 
influence of the union in the running of the oil industry grew even stronger as these 
individuals advanced to important managerial positions (Grayson, 1980: 51). 
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single company. After the decision to create PEMEX in July 1939, the state 
granted the union with four out of nine places in the administrative council of 
the new company.52 
The autonomy enjoyed by the union began to fade in 1940. Adler 
(1992: 147) posits that in the difficult negotiation of a collective agreement in 
1940. 
“…the federal commission for Conciliation and Arbitration suit against 
the union, marking a fundamental change in the relations between the 
government and the union, and signified the end of any real worker 
participation in the administration of the nationalized oil properties (…) 
The union emerged from the conflict without a collective contract and 
without the possibility of modifying the existing administrative or legal 
structure of the industry (…) By the end of 1940, the workers had no 
further possibility of increasing the union’s participation or creating a 
labor administration in the petroleum industry”. 
 
Morales (1992: 226) adds that the year 1946 marked the end of the 
union’s autonomy (along with the consolidation of an authoritarian state and 
almost autocratic presidency). 
  
“The biannual revision of the collective labor contract became a 
barometer of the relative strength of company and union, a question 
that was more clearly defined at the beginning of the administration of 
Miguel Aleman in 1946. In view of the tough negotiations–which were 
postponed because of the presidential changeover–over the collective 
contract in the summer of 1946, the union called a strike in December, 
to put pressure on the newly established government. The response of 
the new president was blunt: military intervention in oil installations, 
and the dismissal and replacement of union leaders. The blow to the 
                                                             
52 From 1938 to 1971, the six governmental appointees would be made as follows: two would 
come from the Finance and Public Credit Ministry; three from the National Economy Ministry; 
and one from the National Petroleum Board. Under the reform of the PEMEX’s organic law in 
1971, naming of the members of the board of directors was the President’s discretional 
decision (Morales, 1992: 231 and fn 49). The four union appointees would be chosen form 
each of the three main petroleum zones, while the leader of the union, which had rotated 
among the zones, would represent the fourth. The union counselors would hold a three-year 
term and would be elected from delegates accredited to ordinary conventions (Grayson, 
1980: 87)  
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union was indicative of labor policy throughout the administration of 
President Aleman.53 For the oil workers, these drastic measures were 
the culmination of a policy that had begun in the Cardenas’ 
government, and that aimed at counteracting the power and militancy 
of the union”. 
 
In spite of the state’s intervention in union affairs, a collective contract 
between PEMEX and its workers was finally established in 1946, thus 
increasing the managerial capabilities of PEMEX. The administration gained 
the right to reduce personnel, transfer workers more freely, and sign contracts 
with private firms for projects unsuitable for union labor. In exchange, the 
union kept the right to organize cooperatives that would serve as contractors 
for pipelines, refineries, offshore drilling, roads, schools, or any other project 
which PEMEX itself elected to avoid. Additionally, under this agreement, any 
private company working for PEMEX was forced to hire unionized members. 
(Grayson, 1980: 25). Morales (1992: 226) adds that,  
 
“The powers conferred to the union proved to be functional to the 
objectives set by the state: to control and discipline the labor force, to 
contain their wage claims, and to turn the union into a vehicle for 
advancing, rather than obstructing the integration and development of 
the industry”. 
 
Morales (1992) goes further as to assert that the managerial capability 
of the general director of PEMEX draws from his relationship with the 
President. However, it also derives from the skills of each individual, his 
                                                             
53 During Aleman’s presidency, the state won control of unions through the imposition of 
sympathetic leaderships in the most important union organizations. The most authoritarian 
state structure took hold by the end of the 1940s. It does not mean that the union lost 
influence on the future definition of energy policy, but the influence of the state became more 
important inside the organization itself (Knight, 1991). 
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contacts and support, within and outside the company. The exchanges 
established with the STPRM (the oil union) are vital.  
 After the 1950s, PEMEX held a low profile in political terms. According 
to Philip (1999: 38),  
“Directors-General were given significant autonomy in managing the 
agency but kept out of other political roles. Between 1946 and 1976 
not one Director General failed to complete his full term, and only one 
(Reyes Heroles who was not significantly eligible to be president of 
Mexico due to his foreign parentage) moved on from the Directorship 
of PEMEX to top political appointments elsewhere. Even then, his 
promotion to cabinet was not immediate. The technical and economic 
record of PEMEX was mixed. The company was efficient enough to 
avoid disaster or major scandal, but it operated as a largely closed 
community with self-imposed limitations”. 
 
 
 In conclusion, during President Aleman’s government (1946-1952), the 
state was in full control of PEMEX, consolidating PEMEX as an industrial 
actor. Even if the oil union is a very powerful political actor until today, most of 
the leadership controls on workers–from clerical to professional levels–were 
dependent on the PRI and the President. PEMEX’s directorate was not used 
as a political career self-promotion either. By the mid-1950s, PEMEX was 
ready to play a role as a state agency in order to support the industrialization 
plan of the government. 
 
4.5 State organization of the oil industry 
Beyond the political institutions of corporatism, to understand the role 
of the Mexican state, and particularly the ways in which it has ensured its 
relative autonomy vis à vis internal as well as external social forces, it is 
necessary to understand the importance of the nationalization of the oil 
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industry. This nationalization is much more than a simple question of 
ownership; it is also a source of national identity and therefore a key state 
resource.  
As we have seen, the nationalization of oil set up a new company, 
which changed the direction of the pipelines, redirecting them away from the 
coast to the main cities and permitting an aggressive promotion of private 
industry. Nationalization also aroused nationalist sentiments and ideologies 
against any form of foreign intervention in the management of Mexican 
natural resources, institutions and social organizations.54 Perhaps, the most 
important result was that it patterned the consolidation of the nationalist 
paradigm, whose main goal was to create an autonomous and prosperous 
economy, and it situated the state as the instrument to do so.  
It took 20 years to gather the 17 private companies that were 
nationalized into PEMEX. During that time, the nationalized oil sector was 
used to solve short-term problems. As PEMEX had to outline the new 
management of the company, the demand of educated professionals and 
technicians that were able to manage petroleum technology increased. The 
first years after the nationalization were full of desperation because there was 
inexperience in managing the industry, joined with the scarcity created by the 
American-British boycott, the international war environment and the challenge 
to integrate different companies into one single conglomerate. Most 
importantly, the public oil industry had to be at the center of the state 
                                                             
 
54 For the implications on oil nationalization see: Knight and Brown (1992); Morales, (1988); 
Grayson, (1984); Meyer (1973). 
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promotional policy in order to support the government’s industrial 
transformation plans. PEMEX played a mayor role in Mexican industrialization 
and in the creation of specialized research centers to manage the company.55 
The goal was to guarantee access to cheap energy supplies, and 
Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) became the cornerstone of industrial 
development. The state’s commitment was to build a single company that 
would follow social objectives rather than speculative ends, and in doing so, 
an unwieldy labour-management structure was created.56 
                                                             
55 The world chemical industry consolidated with a unified vision gained with the creation of 
chemical engineering schools, a fact that was also influencing for the Mexican Industry. 
According to Bucay (2003: 28), in 1913 Juan Salvador Agraz asked President Francisco 
Madero for support to establish the first National School of Chemical Industry. As the 
revolution exploded, the school was finally established on September, 1916 with the support 
of President Carranza. It offered careers such as industrial chemistry, and industrial practices 
with specialities like textile dyeing, essential oils, plastic resins, food and sugar. The new 
technicians found it difficult to find jobs in the small Mexican market, which was used to 
engage technicians, formed “empirically” from their practical work in Europe. In 1926, the 
school had specialized laboratories and produced ether and soap. The school was 
consolidated in 1927, when Etanislao Ramirez joined the directive board, restructured the 
career plans to offer industrial chemistry, chemical engineering, pharmacy-biologist chemistry 
and metallurgic chemistry, and engaged professors as Alberto Urbina, Antonio Guerrero, 
Jorge Martinez, Pascual Larraza, and Alfonso Graff, creating research areas lead by Ernesto 
Rios, Fernando Orozco, Manuel Lombera, Rafael Illezcas and Ricardo Caturegli in the field of 
synthetic hormones letting Mexico to lead the world’s market until 1970. This educational 
structure took 25 years to be consolidated, and coincided with the rapid industrialization of 
the late 1940s and 50s. Bucay (2003: 29) goes on as to assure that “the crucial element of 
fostering process [chemical] industries was the oil expropriation. Yet petrochemical industry 
would not begin until 1960s. The necessity to operate the refineries abandoned by foreign 
technicians and the need of raw materials for the industry, Mexico could no longer get due to 
the international boycott, which forced young Mexican new-trained technicians to make a 
great effort to dominate the productive process and reduce Mexican dependence from 
foreigners”. The period in which the chemical school reached its consolidation coincided with 
the push the state gave to ISI policies.  
 
56 Instead of making PEMEX a worker-run company, President Cardenas granted the union 
four of nine seats on the board of directors. A collective agreement to resolve labor conflicts 
in the 1950’s assured the union 2 percent of the revenue of all oil sales; 2.5 percent of the 
value of any contract private companies received from PEMEX to construct oil infrastructure; 
and 40 percent of exploration, exploitation or drilling contracts. Such rights became 
established and were renegotiated in subsequent collective agreements, reaching their peak 
during the oil boom years (1978-1981). While the union sometimes used this money to 
finance illegal activities, it also used it to develop its own companies. PEMEX also granted 
contracts to private companies, sometimes in a shady fashion. In both cases, however, the 
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The state’s aim in fostering the production of petrochemicals – from 
1930 to 1950 – was meant to sustain labour-intensive industries such as 
agriculture and textiles. As part of the ISI strategy, the state needed to 
increase the domestic production of chemicals in order to replace the growing 
imports of dyes and fertilisers with national production.  
In the period going from 1930 to 1940, the Mexican government tried 
to establish a joint venture with German producers in order to advance in the 
development of domestic production. During the government of President 
Cardenas, the production of fertilizers and dyes were a state’s priority, so the 
state sought to promote a technological association with German producers. 
In 1937, a few months before nationalizing the oil industry, Cardenas invited 
IG Farben to establish a venture to develop a fertilizer plant in Mexico. The 
project was interrupted a few months later, because Cardenas nationalized 
the oil companies in March 1938. With this action, Mexico gained control of 
the industries, including the contracts, projects, patents, and technology 
already used in the sector; before moving on to other activities, Mexico’s 
government had to learn how to manage the petroleum industry: a fact that 
demanded a great deal of human and financial resources, negotiation and 
skills from the Mexican officials. 
After all these nationalizations, PEMEX faced the lack of confidence of 
international investors and a financial boycott imposed by the U.S. and Great 
Britain in the international market. This made acquiring technology, marketing 
                                                                                                                                                                             
final result was a linked network that developed oil technology in Mexico (Brown and Knight, 
1992; Morales, 1988; Grayson, 1980). 
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oil or accessing fresh financial resources, difficult. An analysis from the 
American government (GAO/US 1991a: 8) asserted that from 1938 to 1955  
 
“the world petroleum industry reacted to the expropriation by 
boycotting Mexico’s oil industry. Mexico was limited in its ability to sell 
its oil to foreign customers and buy energy equipment and technology 
from foreign suppliers.57 Consequently, Mexico’s new national industry 
was forced to rely on its own resources.” 
 
   
 This created an atmosphere of heroism for an industry on which the 
autonomous development of the country has relied since then. However, this 
nationalist dimension of the oil industry is a mixed blessing. Each time 
PEMEX tried to establish joint ventures with foreign companies, persistent 
contestation from various nationalist groups (PEMEX technicians, labour that 
was already affiliated to a single union, the party, and some sectors of the 
government) undermined such efforts. The fear that private actors, especially 
foreign ones, would threaten the nation’s sovereignty and exploit its natural 
wealth to their own benefit constantly appeared.  
These nationalist feelings delayed the development of petrochemicals. 
Mexico acquired know-how and physical installations for the industry from 
Germans, would have facilitated to continue the development of a petroleum 
sector on its own. Mexico was in a position to develop a national industry and 
change its position in the world’s economy, from a net exporter of raw 
materials to a source of domestically produced industrialized products. 
                                                             
57 One of the dark chapters of this story is that President Cardenas decided to sell oil in 
exchange of technology to the Nazi government in order to get rid of the international boycott. 
This fact is ignored from history books but remembered in Los años con Laura Díaz a novel 
by Carlos Fuentes (1999).  
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However, nationalist voices reduced Mexico’s potential push as pressures to 
increase petrochemical production rose during the 1950s, when the decision 
to enlarge ISI was taking hold.  
During the mandates of Presidents Miguel Aleman (1946-1952) and 
Adolfo Ruiz Cortines (1952-1958), the Mexican state sought to attract foreign 
investment into the domestic market. Policies to facilitate foreign companies 
installing themselves and developing whole industrial sectors were in place. 
The car industry was one example. In other cases, the state promoted joint 
ventures to attract technology. In the oil industry, President Aleman signed 
contracts for exploration and drilling with some foreign companies in 
exchange for a percentage of the oil produced. 58  
Therefore, it was not surprising that a similar experiment was put to the 
test for the petrochemical industry. Responding to a growing domestic 
demand for petrochemicals, PEMEX tried to develop a first project with 
DuPont59 in the second half of the 1950s, but it only resulted in conflict and 
opposition from within Mexico.  This plant was never established because of 
the pressures exerted by the nationalist sector of the government. The only 
                                                             
58 Details on Meyer, (1973: 459) and Morales, (1988: 25). 
 
59 Morales (1988: 29) states that PEMEX’s Director-General Gutiérrez Roldan negotiated a 
joint venture with Dow Chemicals Co. to develop a petrochemical plant. The accord was that 
Dow would keep 35 percent of the capital and would invest 150 million US dollars, giving 
PEMEX the control of the plant, the administration and the technology.  Phillip (1982) assures 
that the accord was initiated with DuPont. The project was aborted for the same reasons than 
the previous agreements to associate with international corporations. 
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investment made in the sector was done in 1951, involving sulphur production 
(Morales, 1988: 29).60 
Nationalists denounced the agreement with Dupont as reactionary. 
PEMEX was accused of falling back on promotional actions that would 
reinforce dependency on foreign investors and would return to the policies 
implemented during the dictatorship years before the Revolution. Such an 
agreement contradicted the nationalist project of some branches of the 
revolutionary elite. Since then, that portion related mainly to the nationalist 
and most traditionalist sector (Morales, 1988: 29).  But it would also have 
threatened the vested interest that the oil union might have had in the new 
industrial sector. The uncertain boundary between the oil and the 
petrochemical industry allowed the union and nationalists to join forces and 
press for the development of the last one, as part of the publicly controlled oil 
conglomerate. Conflict over how to develop the petrochemical branch 
resulted in a delay of almost 20 years, from the 1940s until 1958.  
As a result of pressures exerted by nationalist groups, the state was 
forced to adopt a restrictive custodial role in petrochemicals, in which 
development was restricted to the state sector. A second amendment related 
to oil to Article 27 of the Constitution was enacted in 1958. It granted the 
nation not only exclusive right to produce and market oil, but also to explore, 
                                                             
60 Sulfur is a basic ingredient in fertilizer, and the government was trying to promote 
agricultural development at the time. 
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drill, transport, and transform it.61 This amendment significantly reduced any 
role that the private sector had and ensured a prominent pace to the 
development of state-led companies. This decision paved the way to the 
energy policy defined during the Stabilizing Development program in 1958 
which is the material for the next chapter. 
 
4.6 Conclusion  
The 1938 amendment to the oil section of Article 27 of the Constitution 
declaring nationalization, granted the state only the right to produce and 
market oil. As it was established, this article left the possibility that the state 
might play a permissive custodial role open, allowing state officials the option 
of establishing joint-ventures with foreigners and domestic investors to drill, 
explore, transform, transport, acquire, and produce technology.  
As said before, the world’s petrochemical industry was undergoing 
consolidation at the same time that the oil industry was nationalized in 
Mexico. The American industry was consolidating a development pole in the 
Gulf of Mexico by the mid-1940s. The most important Mexican oil deposits 
are also situated in the Gulf of Mexico, and this geographical proximity might 
have brought about integration and technology transfer from one country to 
the other. However, the political conditions for doing so have proven that it is 
unreachable mainly for historical reasons reinforcing Mexican nationalism and 
American mistrust. 
                                                             
61 This decision also implied that Mexico would halt its efforts to become an important 
exporter of oil.  
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Before the Second World War, Mexico counted on a small chemical 
market driven mainly by transnational companies and small domestic 
producers. An as a response of American Pressure to force the Mexican state 
to accept the Axis Replacement Program, the first Mexican chemical law 
(1941) resulting from this conflict restricted the chemical production to the 
state and included it in the newly acquired petroleum interests along with the 
German chemical assets and technology. The nationalization of the IG 
Farben facilities represented the reduction of the influence of American, 
British, and Dutch multinational corporations on the Mexican state, and its 
capacity to recuperate control over its national resources (Schuler 1989: 45).  
  Despite such conflicts, by 1958 the company had become one of the 
most important sources of autonomous financial and energy resources, 
supporting the promotion of midwifery activities. Conceived as a public-
service enterprise rather than a rent-seeking one, PEMEX’s demiurgic 
activities let the state supply the market with subsidized energy and gas. 
PEMEX also supported the creation of new industrial sectors granting 
strategic raw materials in order to link manufacture chains. PEMEX has been 
an important source of taxes, and an autonomous source of foreign currency. 
Besides being a public owned industry, PEMEX acted also as a development 
agency, until 1987, providing the base for the development of another sector: 
petrochemicals. 
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Chapter 5. The Mexican petrochemical industry – emergence and 
institutionalization  
 
The birth of the Mexican petrochemical industry was marked by the state’s 
demiurgic role in an era of strong economic nationalism. The overwhelming 
participation of the state made PEMEX take the role of an industrial actor, as 
a promotional agency and as the symbolic flagship of Mexican nationalism. 
As an industrial developer, PEMEX grew after nationalization to be one of the 
foremost public-owned industries in the world. This assured the Mexican 
government control over a strategic sector and one of the most important 
industrial developers in the country. PEMEX, as a promotional agency, 
helped to funnel private investment into new projects and to persuade private 
investors follow PEMEX’s product-supply programs. Being the symbol of 
national unity, PEMEX made the state come to contemplate petroleum 
development as a central component of a sovereign industrial strategy. The 
petrochemical industry was one of the few industrial sectors, which remained 
strictly under the control of Mexican interests, although foreign corporations 
provided the technology and the knowledge.  
As with most industries in Mexico, the oil and chemical sectors began 
to develop at the end of the XIXst century. British, American and Dutch 
companies were dominant in the oil industry, while Germans controlled 
chemicals and petrochemicals. Oil was pumped and exported to refining 
plants abroad; foreign corporations acting in Mexico imported chemicals in 
bulk, and packaged them to be sold domestically. However, the consolidation 
of the revolutionary state made the Mexican government desire to alter this 
  
133 
picture by trying to reduce external influence on the industry of the country, 
since the 1920s. The goal was to promote ISI, attracting both foreign and 
domestic capital to embed it in the Mexican market. This policy goal changed 
in the 1960s, when industrial policy changed from protecting the industries 
settled in Mexico to shielding Mexican businesspeople, as a strategy to 
reinforce autonomy of Mexican development (Cárdenas, 1998). 
This chapter deals primarily with the first phase of Embedded 
Autonomy in the petrochemical industry that from 1958 to 1973. After offering 
a short history of the petrochemical sector prior to 1958 and the assignment 
of basic petrochemical production to PEMEX, this chapter describes the main 
state efforts and policy to attract domestic investors into this industrial sector. 
The state offered to protect them in order to consolidate a Mexican-led 
petrochemical market. In this period the major role was played by state 
through two different organizations: PEMEX, the agent of the state’s 
petroleum policy, and the petrochemical commission, the state agency to 
exert state’s planning, leadership and control over the nascent sector.  
 
5.1 Setting the developmental policy pieces in place 
The debate over when and how PEMEX should have begun producing 
petrochemicals came at the end of the 1950s. This happened when PEMEX 
finally gained access to international loans, and Antonio Ortiz Mena, Finance 
Minister, decided the government would assume PEMEX’s accumulated debt 
in order to let the company with a clean slate to support the new stage of 
industrialization (Ortiz Mena, 1998: 43). Ortiz Mena transformed PEMEX debt 
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into bonds and forced PEMEX to ask the Finance Ministry for authorization 
before engaging in any credit with the international financial system (Ortiz 
Mena, 1998: 43). 
The availability of fresh resources would finish with the financial 
astringency PEMEX has lived for almost two decades. PEMEX decided to 
embark on the domestic production of petrochemicals in 1959. Before that, 
the 1958 and 1959 petrochemical legislation established restrictions on the 
private transformation of oil. Philip, (1982: 344) assures that “this decision 
(…) marks the end of a long and angry struggle behind the scenes. Private 
enterprise in a number of countries, particularly Italy was hopeful that PEMEX 
would leave that facet of the industry to private capital.” 
 After a two-decade long dispute, the main decisions that created the 
legal basis of the petrochemical production were taken in November of 1958. 
A day before leaving office, President Ruiz Cortines took the politically difficult 
step of increasing oil prices and amending article 27 of the constitution, 
enabling PEMEX to expand its participation from oil to petrochemicals. These 
actions let the incoming government62 define the main lines for the future 
transformation of the petroleum industry: one, they paved the way for fresh 
financial resources for the creation of new productive sectors; two, the 
custodial role clearly established the limits and commitments of a demiurgic 
role and therefore, structured the vertical integration of the oil industry; three, 
                                                             
62 The Stabilizing Development Period began with Adolfo Lopez Mateos administration (1958-
1964), lasting two governments. 
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the state counted on the conditions to midwife the private development of the 
petrochemical chains, attracting private investors in the sector. 
 
5.2 The main policy lines 
After rescuing PEMEX finances, Lopez Mateos’ government outlined 
the first national development plan, which assumed the promotion of an 
ordered industrial growth, accompanied of increased job creation, investment 
(public and private), productivity and export activities. The plan launched 
steel, construction of transport equipment, machinery, chemicals, paper and 
its sub-products, non-metallic minerals, and wood production as strategic 
sectors of the industrialization program. The strategy was to organize 
development policies establishing goals, ordering investment and 
encouraging the participation of private groups to advance economic growth 
(PEMEX, 1988: 308). 
In relation to the petroleum industry, the plan included a major internal 
organization and the development of petrochemicals, which “represents (….) 
the superior stage of integration of the nationalized oil industry” (PEMEX, 
1988: 319). Antonio Ortiz Mena, Finance Minister and head of the 
developmental bureaucracy mentioned on chapter 3, settled three objectives 
for the petroleum industry63 in the Stabilizing Development Program (Ortiz 
Mena, 1998: chapter II):  
                                                             
63 Ortiz Mena had also established a program to save PEMEX from bankruptcy and 
converted its debt into long-term bonds. This measure gave PEMEX financial capacity to 
continue operations. They also adjusted prices in order to reduce public subsidies along with 
an increased supervision of Finance Ministry over PEMEX administration. Gutierrez Roldan’s 
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1. Promote the financial stability of the industry, increasing the prices of 
some products;  
2. Verify the organizational structure of PEMEX in order to rationalize its 
administration;  
3. Widen the ratio of processes from oil extraction to manufacturing, 
implying the development of PEMEX’s basic petrochemical industry 
and the conditions for the private participation on production of 
secondary and tertiary petrochemicals. 
As result, PEMEX was forced to be not only a development agency, 
but also a profitable industrial actor. The government named Pascual 
Gutierrez Roldan as PEMEX director-general.64 As part of the developmental 
group, Gutierrez Roldan had pursued a career in developmental institutions 
and parastatal enterprises and he was seen as a technocrat with an 
entrepreneurial vision. He acted as General Director of Credit in the Finance 
Ministry, General Director of the public steel producer AHMSA, and the Banco 
Nacional de Crédito Ejidal. Because of his experience as financer and 
manager, he had the responsibility of making PEMEX a profitable company 
through: the reorganization of its internal organization, the implementation of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
main goal was to pay much more attention to the financial balance of the company and less 
to the long-term planning of the oil industry (Philip, 1982: 344; Ortiz Mena, 1998: 43ss).  
 
64 In the second part of the Stabilizing Development Period (1964-1970) PEMEX General 
Director was Jesus Reyes Heroles and he was responsible for the long-term planning of the 
industry extending activities of exploration leading to the oil boom in 1974. He was also 
recognized for accepting traditional sectors pressures and finishing with all the risk contracts 
Gutierrez Roldan signed with foreign companies to realize exploring activities. Reyes Heroles 
had no previous experience in the oil industry and he was more a PRI-party bureaucrat and 
ideologue of revolutionary nationalism than a technocrat. 
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new strategies for exploring oil, the operation of a system of pipeline 
transportation of gas and oil, and the development petrochemical production 
(PEMEX, 1988: 319-322).  
The nomination of an “entrepreneur” to take charge of PEMEX 
consolidated the government’s developmental group in the company’s 
administration. PEMEX’s Administration Counsel was formed with Antonio 
Ortiz Mena, Finance Minister; Rodrigo Gomez, Bank of Mexico’s General 
Director; and José Hernandez Delgado, General Director of Nacional 
Financiera (the industrial development bank). As we have presented on 
chapter 4, the three of them defined the industrialization agenda and 
controlled the core of the developmental bureaucracy and institutions. 
Gutierrez Roldan defined the petroleum policy goals: assuring the 
future energy needs for the country, intensifying the exploration of new fields, 
drilling new wells, enhancing the pipeline structure, refining, and transforming 
oil into new products: petrochemicals. The aim was to establish settling 
PEMEX as a self-sufficient enterprise and replaced governmental subsidies 
with PEMEX’s own revenues, implementing a real-priced marketing policy 
and assuring PEMEX new long-term investments. Even if the general strategy 
included exports, marketing oil abroad was never a priority, because 
exporting oil would only take place after domestic demand satisfaction. 
Finally, PEMEX continued substituting imports in any branch related to the 
industry’s activities, such as nationally produced materials or the promotion of 
a national-buy strategy (PEMEX, 1988: 319-322). This way it would reinforce 
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the national-led network of suppliers supported in the creation of new 
Mexican companies. 65 
 
5.3 Defining the players: custodial and demiurgic roles 
Some government officials defined the production of petrochemicals as 
a “superior phase of oil nationalization” (PEMEX, 1988: 319). In fact, 
promoting the vertical integration of the industry as a result of the 
commitments of PEMEX’ responsibilities as industrial actor and agent of 
industrial transformation implied the definition of the custodial and demiurgic 
roles. 
The government defined the scope of the custodial role on November 
21, 1958, when President Ruiz Cortines asked the Congress to approve a 
Law proposal regulating Article 27 of the Constitution related to oil. As it was 
a period in which Congress had no political power, the amendment was 
approved on November 29, and published in the official gazette the day after. 
Once in office, Lopez Mateos published an administrative decree based on 
those reforms on March 1959, known as ‘The Petrochemical Law.’ 
                                                             
65 After the harsh negotiation of the collective contract in the mid-1940s described in the 
previous chapter, and in order to gain support from the oil union, in the 1950s Director-
General Antonio Bermudez (who run the company in three consecutive governments from 
1946 to 1958) granted the power to negotiate contracts associated with private Mexican 
individuals or to form cooperatives that performed the drilling and exploring activities 
themselves to the union’s leadership. At a time in which the technological know-how and 
financial capacities were in the hands of foreigners (Morales, 1992: 210-211), this action was 
important to link local industries for the provision of industrial support. The decision to foster 
private and union-based industries at the local level would create a Mexican-led network of 
providers for the company’s technical and service demands–which until then were too 
dependent on foreign technology.  
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The Presidential decree entrusted the government to manufacture 
petroleum products and to foster the vertical integration of the public-owned 
oil industry. The amendment reinforced PEMEX as a public state industrial 
actor and as an agent of development who was responsible for the support 
and attraction of private investment into petroleum industry. The decree 
assumed that “the Mexican state must plan and guide the economy; 
reinforcing the social meaning and perspectives that oil and its derivatives 
should reach in the new horizons represented by the petrochemical industry” 
(PEMEX, 1988: 314).  
The petrochemical law divided the petrochemical industry in two 
domains66: 
1. A basic one, including the conversion from oil, natural hydrocarbons, 
and natural gas to intermediate or semi-elaborate products, and  
2. A secondary one, including the further transformation from 
intermediate and semi-elaborate products into final manufactures and 
consumers.  
The new law restricted the secondary transformation to private 
producers, while the first chemical transformation of oil–to prepare basic 
petrochemicals–was PEMEX’ exclusive domain. PEMEX defined a first list of 
products to be manufactured in the following years: ammoniac, base to 
fertilizers production; Polyethylene and Polystyrene, base to plastic 
production; Dodecylbencene, base for detergents; Butadiene and Styrene, 
                                                             
66 One should remember that international standards define basic 8 building blocks derived 
from aromatic and olefins chapter 4. Secondary and tertiary petrochemicals derive from them.  
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used in the production of rubber; Sulphur, used in the production of sulphuric 
acid (fertilizers); Acetic acid and acetic anhydride, ciclohexane and xylem, 
used in the fabrication of synthetic fibres; Acetone, used as solvent; and 
Phenol, used in the production of plastic, ethyl chloride and ethylene chloride. 
PEMEX first list included 16 products and was publicized in April 1960 in 
order to attract private producers in these areas; by 1967, the basic 
petrochemical list included 45 products (PEMEX, 1988: 314; Snoeck, 1986: 
20-21). The list disseminated PEMEX’ planned production in order to guide 
private investment in the widening and integration of the chemical industry. 
Defining basic petrochemical products by law as the first ‘important’ 
physical or chemical transformation of oil, and the secondary petrochemicals 
as ‘subsequent transformations’ had, at least, three results: first, the industry 
was artificially structured on a private/public division of the petrochemical 
market; second, it determined the vertical integration of the public petroleum 
production from the wells to the first step of manufacturing; and third, it 
misstructured the industrial chains in public and private steps of production 
altogether. Even if the state defined the law discretionally, the state’s goals 
were to consolidate the private investment in the industry and to assure an 
industry owned by Mexican nationals.67 Although this regulation was widely 
                                                             
67 The petrochemical industry that was already established in Mexico was under foreign 
control, and could operate because applying the new petrochemical law retrospectively was 
unconstitutional. However, in the moment that a company tried to grow or diversify its 
production, the company was automatically forced to sell part of its assets to a Mexican 
producer, to fulfill law’s requirements about Mexican ownership. The restrictions were very 
efficient when applied to new industries and created serious limits to already established 
ones. These limitations were extended to the whole industry by the Law of New Industries 
that had promoted industrialization and private investment for the whole industry during the 
1960s (Bucay, 2005).  
  
141 
criticized,68 it implied a step forward in relation with the 1941 law–formulated 
during the World War II–which established that the state must keep control of 
chemical production controlling at least 51 percent of the capital of any 
company acting in the market (PEMEX, 1988: 344).  
The 1959 administrative decree related to petrochemicals was finished 
with any further discussion about private and public domains. In 1963 the 
regulations structured institutional changes inside PEMEX’s management 
when Cesar Bautista–PEMEX’s Refinery Manager–received an instruction to 
create a petrochemical division, specialized in basic petrochemical 
production, different from the refinery area that it had been manufacturing. 
The creation of a specialized area in PEMEX’ structure gave a practical effect 
to the demiurgic role, while producers “used to consider as basic any product 
manufactured by PEMEX, and non basic all the rest” (Rodriguez, 2005). 
Endorsing the nationalism that was guiding the petroleum policy, 
President Lopez Mateos assured that the best consequence of the 
Petrochemical decree emitted by his government was that  
“foreign enterprises acting in the industry were forced to sell the 
majority of its assets to Mexican investors, a fact assuring the country 
that mineral production would never be in the hands of the speculative 
interest of companies dominated by foreign interests” (quoted in 
PEMEX, 1988: 344).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
68 The main critics censured the state centralization of the production of basic petrochemicals 
because state substituted private initiative to acquire technology for petrochemical 
development through debt, granting a hidden subsidy to Mexican industrials. Other critics 
emphasized the fact that the regulations limited PEMEX to make the first transformation of 
oil, giving private producers the opportunity to benefit from the commercialization of future 
developments (PEMEX, 1988: 344). 
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Policy defined on a nationalist, rather than on a technical basis created 
an artificial division in the petrochemical market. The petrochemical chains 
were structured under the proviso that the basic raw materials were an 
attribution of the state, and secondary transformation were an attribution of 
private actors. Contrary to the tendency on the world’s industry integration, 
the state pushed backwards the integration of the different industrial chains 
derived from basic oil derivatives in Mexico.69  
PEMEX became the guiding agent of private investment. For, as Pani 
(2005) remembered,  
“every time PEMEX announced new investments for the production of 
specific raw materials, it was automatically exercising a planning role 
and guided private investment to the products PEMEX was privileging 
to produce. It was extremely difficult–if not impossible–for the private 
sector producing supplies without counting on the assurance PEMEX 
would provided with raw materials.”  
 
5.4 The Petrochemical Commission 
A couple of weeks after taking office, President Lopez Mateos decreed 
the reorganization of the government, and created the National Patrimony 
Secretariat in December, 1958. The new ministry was responsible for crafting 
an administrative structure leading to the effective exercise of the nation 
faculties conferred by article 27 in relation to the use, exploitation, and 
                                                             
69 In developed economies producers of petrochemicals impelled the technological 
innovations derived from oil transformation, and a forward integration of the petroleum 
industry. In this process, private producers absorbed the important investment demanded 
during the first stages of oil transformation (basic petrochemicals), granting profits from the 
forward production of high-priced petrochemical derivates; this structure of integration 
allowed producers to ensure competitiveness, profits, creation of new technology, and market 
positions in the world market assuming responsibility from the complete process of oil and 
natural gas transformation (Chapter 3). 
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management of natural resources. The ministry would supervise the 
operation and finance of all decentralized organizations and parastatal 
enterprises responsible for supervising national resources such as national 
water, mining and oil, among others (PEMEX, 1988: 318).  
Horacio Flores de la Peña worked in this new ministry.70 As Director of 
Administration and Inspection of Decentralized Enterprises and Organizations 
–middle rank bureaucrat– he was a technical member of the Petrochemical 
Commission, and he was responsible for the supervision of PEMEX’ 
activities. Flores was a chief advocate of the nationalist vision endorsing the 
development of the Petrochemical Industry, when the petrochemical 
production was seen as “[an industry] that promised to create what nature has 
forgotten to create” (Rodriguez, 2005). People in universities, government 
and private sector perceived the petrochemical industry as “a horn of 
abundance” (Rodriguez, 2005) from which the development of the whole 
national industry would stand.  
Flores endorsed the idea that oil would run out of importance in the 
long-term, and should be replaced by oil sub-products in the short-term. 
Therefore, in Flores’ logic, the oil nationalization needed to be extended to 
the petrochemical industry, and as consequence, oil transformation into 
                                                             
70 Flores had worked in the Ministry of Hacienda, development banks as Banco Nacional de 
Credito Ejidal and Banco Nacional de Credito Agrícola; he had a specialization in 
development economy and he was a taxi professor at UNAM (see chapter 4). He acted as 
National Patrimony Minister during Echeverria’s Government in 1970-1976, marking the 
break from the developmentalist bureaucracy group.  As part of the most radical branch of 
nationalist bureaucrats, Flores defended vehemently the vision of a state-led development, 
closed markets, protectionism, and no foreign participation in the industrialization of Mexico. 
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petrochemicals should be seen as the superior phase of oil nationalization. 
Some private producers such as Benito Bucay (2005) assured that  
 
“[Flores] felt that the nationalist achievement reached with oil 
nationalization 20 years before, will be lost letting the industry follow its 
natural evolution [without state intervention]. Oil would lose importance 
and therefore, it should be replaced by petrochemicals. As 
petrochemicals were not subject to nationalization, the best policy 
should be to assure petrochemical development and growth nurturing 
100 percent national ownership in any company acting in the sector. 
They considered petrochemicals as an extremely important industry as 
to leave it open to foreign investors.”   
 
 
To lead the transformation from oil to petrochemicals, the Patrimony 
Ministry created an inter-ministerial commission formed by PEMEX, the 
National Patrimony Ministry, as well as the Industry and Commerce Ministry. 
Its responsibility was to midwife the production and demand of 
petrochemicals. Also, it was responsible for granting Petrochemical Permits to 
private companies interested in having access to the industry. Any player in 
the industry must prove they contributed market knowledge, investment 
capacity, business plans, production skills, and a justified necessity of basic 
petrochemicals. Every three to five years a producer needed to get a new 
permit or to renew an old one (Bucay, 2005).  
The Commission studied all cases and granted or denied a permit 
discretionally. Pani (2005) remembers cases in which a producer demanded 
a permit to produce 30,000 tons of a product, and the commission decided 
the company could produce 60,000 tons; or the contrary, the commission 
assumed that a business could only have capacity to produce 15,000 tons, so 
it emitted, at discretion, the permit for smaller or bigger amounts than 
  
145 
requested. The commission, however, only assured permits to companies 
with at least 60 percent Mexican ownership, a viable business plan, and 
technological partners–national, foreigner, or PEMEX (Bucay, 2005).  
Midwifery activities began once an entrepreneur obtained a permit.  
“A petrochemical permit granted the exclusive market niche for the 
production of a ‘so-called’ secondary product for a certain number of 
years, the possibility to renew the permit, access to raw materials with 
a reduction of 20% of the international price (…). Newborn industries 
also got protection from international and domestic competition, the 
possibility of growing and consolidate without worrying for 
competitiveness in their production. New industries got automatically 
cheap credits [from development banks] and fiscal subventions” (Pani, 
2005).  
 
In brief, a petrochemical permit assured business with access to subsidized 
products from PEMEX and the full protection of the state.  
The commission stipulated some conditions to approve the entrance of 
private companies. The most important were: the project would have at least 
60 percent Mexican ownership; it would use the most advanced technology 
available; it would be settled in the most effective locality to marketing; and it 
would be able to export eventually. The state’s control on permit emission 
facilitated planning on the demand PEMEX would be facing.71 The state also 
had power over the definition of the number of players in every chemical 
productive branch, over the reduction of internal competition, and over the 
                                                             
71 The national-ownership would be reinforced in 1974 when the Foreign Investment Law 
passed and it limited to a maximum of 40 percent foreign investment in petrochemical 
companies. The legislation previewed indeed the establishment of joint ventures in order to 
gain up-to-date technology to the sector.  A foreign TNC could become embedded to the 
domestic market with those associations or through the Mexicanization Law. This last one 
established a grandparent clause that recognized some foreign companies already acting in 
the market, but limited any expansion unless it became associated with a Mexican 
counterpart holding a majority (for details, Bucay, 1992). 
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construction of protective barriers for newborn industries. The goal was to 
settle domestic production, ignoring how competitive the industry would be. 
In this period, the commission was essentially under state direction, 
and it did not smooth the progress of negotiation between public and private 
actors. State officials regulated, planned, controlled, protected, and 
authorized which private actors would participate (Bucay, 2005, Pani, 2005, 
and Rodríguez, 2005). Even if the commission performed a midwifery role by 
promoting the birth of a national industry, it cannot be considered an 
embedded autonomy agency during this period. The Commission’s role was 
to set out the direction and details of the industry.  These policy positions did 
not result from private and public actors acting together, but instead came out 
to be a state agency creating the conditions for private existence. According 
to the producers interviewed for this thesis, the Commission’s role evolved 
from a regulatory to a planning organism and the strategic actors passed from 
a passive to an active position. They even resorted to contestation when 
necessary. 
The Commission did not define a particular policy or mechanism to lure 
private investors into the sector, nor was it “… walking in the street or ringing 
doors inviting people to initiate them into the petrochemical business” (Pani, 
2005).72 The Law of New and Necessary Industries of 1955 framed the 
promotion of new investment, but even if the Commission’s goal was the 
promotion of the industry, its activities were more passively than actively 
performed.  
                                                             
72 Ing. Carlos Pani, personal interview with the author, 23 November, 2005.  
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The Commission was, in Pani’s opinion, reactive to private 
manifestation of interest to start a petrochemical business; it was only after 
some lobbying  performed by private actors, that the commission emitted a 
permit. Permits were assured in a case-by-case basis, resolving the 
conditions to protect new industries afterwards. It is important to underline 
that the blending of promotional roles played by the state in this period 
granted private businesspeople free access to the most capital-intensive part 
of the petrochemical chain. Private petrochemical producers were established 
precisely in those parts of the chains where production was more affordable 
and better rewarded.  
In 1959, PEMEX defined a plan to build ten plants, three of them to 
manufacture ammonia. The other seven would produce benzene, toluene, 
xylems (octoxylems, metaxylems, and paraxylem), ethyl-benzene, acetylene, 
styrene, butadiene, ethylene, polyethylene, ethyl clorure, and 
dodecilbencene. PEMEX’s program gave priority to the state’s aim to support 
agriculture, hence the production of fertilizers and synthetic plastic were on 
the top of the agenda. A second place was granted to import substituting 
industries; and finally, the program defined a particular interest in the private 
production of detergents, aromatics, alcohols, plastic and products derived 
from paper (PEMEX, 1988: 344-345).73 From there, new private industries 
were established in association with PEMEX, financed by development banks 
such as Nacional Financiera (NAFINSA), or by private banks. Even if it is too 
                                                             
73 For a complete list of all the companies established by PEMEX, by itself or in ventures with 
private and foreign companies see (PEMEX, 1988: 345-350). 
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difficult to get particular detail of the negotiations, ventures, or conditions 
established with the nascent industries at the time, we found that through 
NAFINSA, the state associated with the private conglomerates to initiate 
companies such as Celulosa y Derivados (CYDSA) with the Monterrey 
Group, Viscosa de Chihuahua, and Montrose Mexicana (PEMEX, 1988: 344-
345) consolidating petrochemical production into biggest business groups in 
Mexico, from 1959 until now.  
The time passed by and conflicts erupted as the commission interfered 
into the final parts of petrochemical chains. As a joke, some businesspeople 
interviewed for this thesis illustrated this interference saying that after a few 
years the Commission tried to release permits to produce clothes, machinery, 
plastics products or even car parts only because, in their industrial origins, 
they were derivatives of oil, when the commission’s only responsibility was to 
regulate access to the first and second stages of the chemical transformation 
of oil. State regulators tried to force producers in the final parts of the 
petrochemical chains to initiate the whole legal process to establish the 
company following the restrictions established in the petrochemical law as if  
“by default, the commission had the responsibility to regulate and plan 
any issue related to the petrochemical and chemical development. 
Inside the Commission, and specially because of the personalities of 
the officials participating in it,  [the Commission] began to evaluate the 
plans, lead the participants, or approve the goals for the whole 
industry, as if the private businesspeople were also part of the state” 
(Bucay, 2005).  
 
 
Pani (2005) remembers that the commission “finished acting as the 
ethos of the whole industry, and established specialized areas for studying, 
  
149 
revising, and analysing the international market, and along with PEMEX, 
[both agencies] conducted investment into the sector” (Pani, 2005). These 
made the results of the petrochemical policy ambivalent. On one hand, the 
government succeeded in defining a policy which let to the creation of a 
national petrochemical industry by guiding, reforming, and/or creating 
institutions to support it, assuring public and private investments, planning the 
production of the sector, protecting infant industries, etc. The Petrochemical 
Commission, in this first period, was a space for planning, regulating, 
controlling, and facilitating the establishment of private producers. With the 
guiding force of the Petrochemical Commission, private actors began to be 
involved in the plans and goals that were defined by state officials in order to 
produce petrochemicals domestically.  The seeds of embedded autonomy 
were being planted. 
 
5.5 The Results 
The blend of promotional roles performed by the state in order to 
initiate a backward-linkages state-led petrochemical industry shaped a 
political inertia of overprotection to both the union and private sector. Control 
of the industry is since then vested on the interest of all actors involved. Their 
main protective shield is nationalism. As Philips (1982:345) explains,  
 
PEMEX’s development of petrochemicals tied the company in, even 
more closely with the private sector, which was allowed to invest in 
secondary petrochemicals (with foreign interest allowed a maximum of 
40 percent). It is likely that this connection provided a further reason for 
PEMEX to invest heavily in petrochemicals since the secondary sector, 
which had been defined as a national priority, also grew rapidly during 
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this period (…). Moreover, PEMEX’s own investment further stimulated 
investment in the private sector despite occasional recriminations from 
both sides to the effect that the other was holding it back through non-
fulfillment of particular plans. 
 
The importance gained by the petrochemical branch of PEMEX forced 
the company to make some institutional adjustments, by creating a 
specialized division in the organizational structure to produce basic 
petrochemicals, in 1965 (Philips, 1982:345). 
 
The self-sufficiency target for Mexico stimulated investment rather than 
holding it back. Already by 1963, Mexican petrochemicals growth was 
described as spectacular, and between 1965 and 1970, 28 percent of 
PEMEX’s total investment was in petrochemicals, which in 1970 
provided 10 percent of total PEMEX income. There was no market 
constraint on PEMEX’s expansion; the government simply prohibited 
imports of those products, which PEMEX produced. However, in order 
to avoid conflict with the private sector, PEMEX adopted a policy of 
pricing its output at international prices.74  
 
The state also launched a technological research center to support 
PEMEX when it created the Mexican Institute of Petroleum (Instituto 
Mexicano del Petróleo, IMP) in 1965. This was an institution, dedicated 
exclusively to the research, teaching and development activities for 
innovating technology for the petroleum industry. IMP was conceived as the 
technological branch of PEMEX (Aboites, et al 2004: 14).75  
                                                             
74 PEMEX was until 1990’s unable to define local prices for its petrochemical products and 
has always defined them by international standards instead of by local production costs 
 
75 “Since its foundation in 1965, the IMP was conceived as the institution that would reduce 
technological dependence and, as a consequence, support to the development of the 
petroleum industry. The decree that created the IMP had multiple purposes: a) Doing basic 
and applied research; b) Developing disciplines related to basic and applied research; c) 
Educate professional researchers and technicians; d) Disseminating scientific research to its 
application in exploration, exploiting, refining and petrochemical technologies; e) Training 
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Domestically produced petrochemicals obviated the need for 60 million 
US dollars worth of imports during the first five years of private production, 
and over 350 million between 1965 and 1970 (Snoeck, 1986). The 
petrochemical commission approved the establishment of 365 projects in 
secondary petrochemicals from 1959 to 1976 (Mercado de Valores, 1978: 
112). In 1965, imports represented 54 percent of the domestic production; by 
1971 they had been reduced to 21 percent (Estrategia, 1976: 28).  
Mexican production covering domestic consumption passed from 68.9 
percent in 1964 to 89.6 percent in 1970 (Mercado de Valores, 1978: 261). 
From 1960 to 1970, the production of basic petrochemicals grew from 66 
thousand to 1.26 million tons a year (in 1977 state production had reached 
4.2 million tons) (Comercio Exterior, 1978: 545). While the private secondary 
petrochemical sector represented 26 percent of the production in 1960, it 
represented 43.5 percent in 1971 (Estrategia, 1976: 25).  
On the other hand, the policy had at least six unexpected results: 
 First, the combination of custodial and demiurgic roles structured an 
artificial division between public and private actors in the petrochemical 
market. This division resulted in an overwhelming, yet legally sustained, 
demiurgic role of the state that was determined primarily by nationalism, and 
by the political will to create a domestic-led petrochemical industry that would 
reduce foreign influence in one of Mexico’s key industries. In the long-term, 
this decision would inhibit the integration of the industry, reducing 
                                                                                                                                                                             
clerical, labour and technical workers to manage petroleum and chemical industries (Aboites, 
et al 2004: 18) 
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competitiveness in world markets, as we will see in the final chapters of this 
thesis.  
 Along with this, the nationalist principle guiding the petrochemical 
policy gave PEMEX an extraordinary responsibility. In centralized economies, 
the petrochemical industry–being part of state apparatus–created different 
specialized industries to provide the market with basic petrochemicals. For its 
part, the US market was developed on private ownership of specialized 
producers. In Mexico, it had been PEMEX, a single state industry, that had 
major responsibility for manufacturing a wide range of basic products 
necessary for the further production of chemical products (Bucay, 2005). 
 Second, the Commission assumed the regulation of FDI in the 
petrochemical industry, even if it was not part of its specific competence. 
Nationalism behind this policy did not imply a Mexican know-how or a real 
Mexican management of the industry. Even if the commission tried to assure 
the creation of companies of domestic ownership, most of the time, Mexican 
ownership was on the paper, not in the management. Mexican ownership in 
papers often let Mexicans with no knowledge of the industry as the exclusive 
producer of certain products, while the foreign technological associate 
managed the company. 
Third, as a result of almost all the ISI policies, the state’s demiurgic role 
guided private access in production, the midwifery role–expressed in 
Petrochemical permits that granted exclusive production and wide protection 
to industries–created a high concentration of private petrochemical 
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companies.76 By 1969, only six from 32 companies installed in the production 
of synthetic resins controlled about 60 percent of the production. From the 
eight companies elaborating celluloid and non-celluloid fibres, only one 
(Celanese Mexicana) absorbed 66 percent of the total revenues in the sector. 
In pesticides–without taking into account state-owned Guanos y Fertilizantes–
only three companies controlled more than 40 percent of the national 
production (Snoeck, 1986: 27). The state’s interest in promoting an 
autonomous agricultural sector titled the petrochemical production towards 
fertilizers and insecticides. The demiurgic activities, as a consequence, 
negatively affected the production of other basic petrochemicals that the 
market demanded. 
Fourth, the functioning of the Inter-Ministerial Commission became a 
major concern for its lack of flexibility, involving three ministries and even the 
presidency. Not only was the bureaucratic procedure to get petrochemical 
permits slow, but also the discretional definition of basic petrochemicals 
became so heavy due to legal incertitude that it resulted in a disincentive for 
investment and technological innovation. This situation created a source of 
conflict between private producers and PEMEX any time a new product or 
technology was requested, because it eventually led to state participation in 
private domains, a fact that was highly contested. The contrary also occurred 
once private producers developed new technologies, reducing steps in 
                                                             
76 According to Evans, this is not a bad result in itself, for the goal of the state would evolve to 
let the consolidation of national champions compete internationally and integrate small and 
medium producers as well in the process.  
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production and eventually producing basic petrochemicals for which PEMEX 
was meant to have a monopoly.  
 The functioning of the permits created corruption in the part of private 
producers the Commission could not control. The permits granted exclusivity 
and reserved specific production to a private manufacturer. The process 
began to divert its original goal when a person endowed with a permit went to 
the Industry Ministry to get the import permit of the product he was suppose 
to produce, arguing he needed to import it until the local production would 
take place. So, through different bureaucratic routes, she reaches both the 
exclusive production and the exclusive import of the same product, assuring 
profits without making any investment (Pani, 2005). The second problem was 
permitting black market, when a fictive industry existing only in papers but 
granted with a permit, would go to the market to offer the assets, selling all 
the rights to other producers (Bucay, 2005). 
   Third problem related to permits was that the Commission was 
releasing permits to products technically no needing one. As some producers 
took advantage of the permits, others began to fear to ask for one and 
opening the Commission space to hinder in the industry by granting permits 
to products even if they were not the second transformation of 
petrochemicals. As Bucay (2005) experienced in his own business: following 
the regulations in place, he established an industry to produce phenol, a sub-
product of cumeno (both products to produce resins and varnish). He got the 
permission to get cumeno, a basic petrochemical produced exclusively by 
PEMEX. If the petrochemical law had been applied correctly, the commission 
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participation would have finished there. However, when a client of his, a 
producer of phenol resins to produce varnishes asked for a permit to produce 
phenol resins, he got it.  Bucay (1998, 2003, 2005) criticized the commission 
for acting discretionally and releasing permits interfering with the functioning 
of the industry going beyond its attributions, thus making the basic 
petrochemical list grow ad infinitum adding products needing no regulation. 
Fourh, nationalist policies did indeed reinforce an industry owned by 
Mexicans, whether public or private entrepreneurs. Along with the influence 
granted to the union, nationalism has been an excuse to structure an 
untouchable set of interest and rent-seeking attitudes from all actors involved 
in petroleum production, which we will be describing in the following chapters.  
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Chapter 6. The Demiurgic State in Danger 
 
During the years 1973 to 1986, the petrochemical industry in Mexico 
confronted three major events: the increased world oil prices as result of the 
1973 oil embargo imposed by OPEC, the short-lived Mexican oil boom (1977-
1981), and the 1982 debt crisis. Most analysts considered the fast 
development of petrochemical production during the 1960s as one of the 
finest achievements of the Mexican developmental bureaucracy, but shortly 
afterwards the 1973 world oil crisis altered the general landscape of the 
world’s petroleum industry. The crisis generated scarcity of petrochemical 
products in the world market. The shortage of petroleum derivatives 
compelled Mexican petrochemical producers towards rationalized use, 
increasing collaboration between private and public manufacturers. As close 
collaboration turned into trust, embedded autonomy–which means that public 
and private producers are working together–smoothed the process in order to 
share initiatives to advance investment and rapid development for the sector. 
The definition of shared goals in petrochemical production changed the 
quality of exchanges between private and public manufacturers, opening 
space for embedded autonomy to institutionalize. The state’s main agencies, 
PEMEX, the Petrochemical Commission and the planning and banking 
institutions, settled goals, investments, and objectives with private industrials 
organized in the Asociacion Nacional de la Industria Quimica (ANIQ, 
Chemical Industry Association). The state and industrials’ first aim was 
assuring Mexico’s self-sufficiency by reducing the negative effects the 
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international petroleum market instability had in the Mexican petrochemical 
industry, in a moment when Mexico had become a net importer of oil. 
 The picture for the petrochemical sector changed when the magnitude 
of the reserves that had been found in the Chiapas basin in the early 1970s 
became known. Mexico experienced an oil boom in the middle of the decade. 
Based on an expectation of growing revenues, the state encouraged a 
structural reform in the industry, orienting oil and derivatives to export 
markets. The state decided to re-orient PEMEX’s growth as an export 
oriented industry and the new orientation spilled over to the rest of the 
industry late in the 1970s. The plan was to orient a new industrial capacity to 
export markets, and reach a self-reliant economy. Growing oil revenues 
would finance exports with the aim of consolidating the Import Substitution 
Industrialization (ISI) strategy. The policy fostering the fast growth for the 
petroleum industry stood on specific goals that were defined with major 
private players who felt ready to consolidate their position as national 
champions and become world players. The Planning Ministry and PEMEX 
gained a short-lived central position, displacing the more cautious Finance 
and Central Bank development program. 
 During this period, two structural changes took place within the 
petrochemical sector: the entire Mexican oil industry was reoriented towards 
export markets and the relationship between public and private actors in the 
sector moved closer to a form of embedded autonomy, as collaboration and 
trust increased.  Public and private producers’ goal was to reduce the 
vulnerabilities exposed by two very different crisis periods. Embedded 
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autonomy was institutionalized via a new institution: the ANIQ set up an 
informal commission (known as Comision ANIQ-PEMEX) that included 
representatives of PEMEX and the private sector. It was meant to facilitate 
the exchange of information so as to address the scarcity problem. As the oil 
boom let the orientation of the industry to change, private producers 
associated with the state settled the goal to reorient the petroleum industry 
into exports. Then as the debt crisis appeared into the scene, the state and 
businesspeople were ready to survive through export activities. Then, part of 
the government strongly supported the structural reform of the economy 
luring the private sector into a development paradigm shift.  
 The end of the period included in this chapter circa 1985 shows a state 
in conflict. The 1982 crisis found a policy-shift plan midway, and clearly 
exposed the different visions key officials held for the development of the 
country. While some of them defined the crisis as a cash flow problem, 
temporal export programs took place to reinforce ISI development plans. 
Another group defined the crisis as the exhaustion of a development model, 
thus forcing a paradigm shift and the liberalization of the market, which in the 
petroleum industry would have implied the withdrawal of demiurge activities to 
give place to midwife private national champions and to husband international 
players. During 1982 and 1985, ministries’ defending both positions made 
their offices design dissimilar plans to conceptualize the future development 
of the petrochemical industry according to their paradigm vision. 
 The goal of this chapter is to assess the changes lived between private 
producers and public officials, marked by greater trust and collaboration in the 
  
159 
face of the three main moments marking these years: the international oil 
crisis, the oil boom and the domestic crisis. The different contexts 
transformed the state-producers’ relationship, leading to petroleum and 
petrochemical industries structural reform, preparing them to exports. 
However the state’s leading role was untouched even the paradigm shift 
scenario. The state guiding role has persisted as the guiding force of the 
petrochemical sector. 
 
6.1 A sector in trouble  
 During the 1970s, many OPEC members nationalized their oil reserves 
and altered the existing conventions with oil companies, gaining a major say 
in the definition of crude oil prices in the world market. Prices increased ten-
fold from 1973 to 1980, ending the availability of cheap oil characteristic of 
the 1960s, creating a major world crisis (PEMEX, 1988: 339). 
 As oil became scarce so too did petrochemical products. 
Petrochemical industries had grown rapidly around the world. High 
investment rates in the 1960s meant capacity surpassed demand. The 
industry’s reaction was to reduce investment so as to create an artificial 
shortage. The problem became compounded in 1973, when the oil shock 
followed on two years of low investment. The combination of factors crafted a 
problem when world producers could not find new raw materials, translating 
demand into price increases and, at the same time, giving a boost to new 
investment. These external events obviously had consequences in Mexico as 
well. 
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 Until the mid 1960s, PEMEX focussed on pumping already exploited 
fields. Indeed, PEMEX had developed the petrochemical industry by diverting 
resources from exploration. The impressive growth of the petrochemical 
industry had put pressure on PEMEX to increase oil production. In 1964, 
PEMEX was investing almost 25 percent of its annual budget into exploration. 
 Arguing that Mexico’s autonomy was in peril, PEMEX Director-General, 
Jesus Reyes Heroles, strongly defended the large investment he had 
destined for exploration activities during the 1960s, a time when access to 
cheap imported oil was seen as an easier solution. The budget’s increase in 
exploration was contested by some sectors in the government, who argued 
that Mexico should further take advantage of the cheap oil available in the 
world market. Reyes Heroles, reinforcing the nationalist position inside 
PEMEX administration, considered Mexico could jeopardize the basis of its 
sovereign development if the country began to rely on foreign resources to 
promote development. This decision would imply abandoning the nationalist 
attitude of self-determination, equating a sudden transition from import-
substitution to import promotion.77 Reyes Heroles was one of the 
masterminds behind nacionalismo revolucionario (revolutionary nationalism), 
the official ideology dominating the period going from 1970 to 1986. 
 As Morales (1992: 234-235) states, 
“Nationalist principles continued to guide Mexican oil policy. Under 
Reyes Heroles, the principle that stated that the industry’s autonomy 
                                                             
77 Another important decision Reyes Heroles made was to cancel all the risk contracts signed 
during the 1950s (PEMEX, 1988: Chapter VI) leaving out private investments on oil 
extraction. 
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was safeguarded by the control of resources gained new momentum. 
A nationalist emphasis became evident in two areas: first, with the 
cancellation of risk contracts signed during the first Bermudez 
administration [and] service contracts that proliferated during the 
administration of Gutierrez Roldan; and, second, in the development of 
the petrochemical industry (…). While it is true that with the 
cancellation of private contracts the government was laying down the 
boundaries for competition between private and public investment, the 
Directorate of PEMEX was also pointing out that the control of the oil 
industry remained in its hands in order to ensure the economic 
autonomy of the country. The demarcation of such boundaries in the 
petrochemical industry provides a further example of this”. 
  
  
The intention to establish a self-sufficient oil industry became a policy 
goal during President Echeverria’s administration beginning in 1970. 
However, it was the President’s decision to continue the low-priced energy 
provision to the domestic industry until 1974, when the situation became 
unsustainable. That year Mexico had begun importing oil aggressively 
causing difficult economic conditions for both PEMEX and the state’s 
finances.78 With frozen domestic oil prices, the state through PEMEX 
increased the transfer of resources to the private sector, in order to keep the 
industry functioning in an over-protected context. The government aimed to 
avoid the economic and political pressures coming from a radical change in 
energy prices that would automatically provoke general price increases.79  
                                                             
78 From 1971 to 1973, oil imports grew from 672 thousand barrels (tb) a year in 1971, to 
10,776 tb in 1972, and 23,613 tb in 1973.  In 1973, PEMEX only supplied 87.6 percent of the 
national demand.  Mexico had become a net-oil importer (Morales, 1988: 35). 
 
79 The state was facing a major legitimacy problem by this time. The bloody solution to the 
student movement in October 1968 made the state decide to keep subsidizing the economy 
in order to reduce political challenges. The state tried to deal with the lost legitimacy through 
the increase in public spending, the widening of state agencies, and the co-optation of new 
social organizations to the state apparatus. Radical social movements – in the far right and 
far left – began to organize urban guerrillas, which the state violently repressed also. The so-
called, dirty war in Mexico finished with about 300 disappeared persons. In 1977, the state 
decided to promote the first political reform that allowed mainly left-wing movements to 
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In order to restore rapid growth of the economy, President Echeverria’s 
government proposed a shared development program that stood on public 
investment and expansion of state-owned companies. The state altered the 
blending of the promotional roles played until then and initiated a feverish 
custodial role increasing regulations in almost every sector in the economy, 
and settled increased demiurgic activities. Along with this, the state began to 
perform some midwifery actions that would facilitate the organization of 
business into holdings, the access to finance through stock markets, the 
concentration of the market in domestic players, and the obstruction of 
international investment in the economy with the approval of new FDI 
regulations in 1974. 
Two of the most important–and failed–reforms that the government 
intended to create were those related to fiscal reform and commercial policy. 
The fiscal reform implied a gradual increase of state’s revenues through 
taxes, which the private sector vetoed; the state opted to finance its activities 
through inflation and external debt. The second reform implied a gradual shift 
in commercial policy. Commercial authorities and business organizations 
agreed to a gradual opening of the market that would increase the 
international competitiveness of the industry. By the end of the 1970s, the 
Mexican market was expected to be open. The state’s goals were both to 
support the consolidation of international competitive business groups–which 
                                                                                                                                                                             
organize political parties and gain access to the Chamber of Deputies. Since then, the state 
promoted a gradual liberalization of the party system that has not resulted in the PRI 
relinquishing control of the country (Molinar, 1991; Loaeza, 1989, among others). 
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would be dominant actors in the domestic market–and at the same time, to 
increase public participation in production. In turn, this had two goals: to 
complement private investment in order to faster growth and to reduce the 
private sector growing influence that had been a result of midwifery and 
husbandry policies. Both goals would reinforce state’s autonomy. However, 
Echeverria accepted the veto of key actors on the commercial policy shift as 
well (Cardenas, 1998). 
 Mexican economy finished in crisis by 1976, and the government 
signed agreements with the IMF. As all reforms that were intended, altered 
the state’s relationship with the private sector, the key-actors refusal to alter 
status quo made the Mexican market become more protected than before the 
reforms were intended. One of the consequences of the failed reforms was 
that the state’s developmental agencies lost coherence and the 
developmental consensus tore up. Therefore, President Echeverria decided 
to define macro-economic policy at will through investment in public sector 
production (Luna, Tirado, Valdes, 1987; Valdes, 1997; Cardenas, 1998). 
Nevertheless, the most important private groups and organizations 
reorganized their structure, altering the industrialist leadership and the 
institutional affinity between public and private actors. The business 
community also promoted the creation of new umbrella organizations to 
prevent the growing influence that the aggressive demiurgic role was giving 
the state in the economy through the creation of parastatal industries. 
Industries and businesspeople mistrusted most of the policies entailing 
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expansionist demiurgic and custodial actions, even if they were benefited 
from them (Luna, Tirado, Valdés, 1987; Valdes, 1997).  
 
6.2 Facing scarcity: a new understanding in the petrochemical industry 
While Mexico had become a net oil-importer from 1968 to 1974, the 
government concentrated its actions on increasing regulations and altering 
the institutional framework in which oil and petrochemical production had 
performed. A few weeks after taking office, President Echeverria pressed 
Congress to endorse a new law altering the organization of PEMEX. Despite 
this attempt to improve the company’s administration, PEMEX’s autonomy 
was still tightened when Echeverria transferred policy-decision for the 
petroleum sector from Finance to the National Patrimony Ministry (SEPANAL, 
Spanish acronym). The new Ministry became responsible for the future 
development of the industry, altering the control exerted by the Finance 
Ministry in supervising not only the oil policy and programming of future 
development, but also the company’s finances. 
As for petrochemical production, PEMEX continued the engagement of 
supplying the market with any product demanded. In some cases, private 
producers have gotten import permits for raw materials without considering 
whether PEMEX produced them or not (Rodriguez, 2005). Beginning the 
second half of the 1960s, those permits were restricted, and abrogated by 
1968. As time came by, the petrochemical legislation hardened, and the most 
important control mechanism established in the law was voiding indirect 
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access to raw materials, thus making PEMEX the sole provider, a decision 
persisting until 1986 (Rodriguez, 2005).  
 
6.2.1 Custodial role and the Petrochemical Commission 
In 1971, the state defined the production of petrochemicals as a priority 
for the first time in its history. The government promoted new regulations for 
the petrochemical sector in order to reach a rational control of the future 
growth of the industry. The new law tried to enhance the performance of the 
Petrochemical Commission reducing the procedures to issue petrochemical 
permits, and the ministries involved to issue permits, which needed the 
approval of three ministries and the President’s office. In 1971, SEPANAL 
became the only institution responsible for issuing petrochemical permits and 
it was in charge of the definition of petrochemical policy.  
The rules restricting foreign investment in the petroleum industry kept 
the same limits. However, in 1974 the government issued a new Law that 
meant to Regulate Foreign Investment, which according to businesspeople 
launched the most restrictive control over foreign investment in the 
petrochemical industry.  
 
“The petrochemical [1959] Law was the first [regulation in the country] 
setting restrictions for foreign participation in the national industry [FDI 
was limited to a 40 percent of the stock]. The 1974 Foreign Investment 
Law restrained FDI for the whole economy, and reinforced the limits 
established for Petrochemical production in the first place. If the 1959 
law restricted the expansion of already established foreign industries, 
the 1974 law restricted foreign access into the [national] industry 
absolutely” (Rodriguez, 2005). 
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The new regulation sought to clarify the definition of basic 
petrochemicals and to establish a clear division between the private and 
public producing domains. However, private producers contested officials’ 
decision any time a new product was listed as a basic petrochemical and 
restricted to PEMEX’s production. SEPANAL reinforced the pattern that was 
established since the origin of the industry–even if PEMEX was facing a 
troubled financial situation–to ensure subsidized raw materials to the 
petrochemical market. From 1970 to 1976, the basic petrochemical list grew 
from 49 to 70 products (Snoeck, 1986: 53). 
 These regulations not only failed to solve the problems associated with 
the definition of basic and secondary domains, but also created new grey 
zones in technological innovations. As result of the 1973 oil crisis, the 
petrochemical industry was facing major technological changes. The main 
international producers sought to improve technology in order to compress 
production steps into cost-reducing and energy-saving methods. New 
Mexican regulations reinforced disagreements when either public or private 
producers tried to acquire advanced technology. Bucay (1991:25) argues that 
private industry was forced to depend on obsolete technology as long as it 
fitted the requirements of the law. By its side, PEMEX also had a limited use 
of the newest technology if it infringed on the private domain. Both situations 
were strongly contested.80  
                                                             
80 The argument offered by the private sector can be ambiguous. The 1971 law granted the 
SEPANAL enough discretional authority in the definition of basic products. However, when 
the structural reform was initiated in 1986 to deregulate the whole industry, the state justified 
its actions in the same ‘rigid law’ defined in 1971. As a result of the deregulation, between 
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In spite of these troubles, the petrochemical industry kept its position 
as the most dynamic sector of the economy from 1960 to 1975. Since its 
birth, petrochemical production grew three times faster than the GDP 
reaching a rhythm of 17 percent a year. PEMEX’s basic production grew 42 
percent per year during the 1970s only. The petrochemical market also kept 
the concentration and specialization characteristic since its origin: 68 percent 
of PEMEX’s production was concentrated in only four products: ammonia, 
anhydride carbonic, ethylene, and ethane (Comercio Exterior, 1978: 546). 
 
6.2.2 New collaborative pattern: The ANIQ - PEMEX Commission 
 Two issues marked the petrochemical industry in the first half of 1970s: 
scarcity and collaboration. The canon was that any time PEMEX initiated the 
production of a basic product the secondary market would expand its 
production to the derivatives of that product. It was usual that the demand of 
raw materials surpassed PEMEX’s supply capacity, and this demand was 
usually complemented by imports. The scheme became a problem as the 
world’s petrochemical market collapsed as a consequence of the world oil 
crisis. PEMEX had its provision capacity jeopardized, as gaining access to 
imported raw materials happened to be complicated and unaffordable. The 
solution envisaged was settling a quota system that forced collaboration of 
private producers.  
The idea of establishing a quota system resulted from a working group 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1986 and 1991, basic petrochemicals were reduced from 70 to only 8 products without 
altering the petrochemical regulations.  
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formed by the National Association of the Chemical Industry (ANIQ, Spanish 
acronym) during the organization’s annual summit in the summer of 1973. 
The group, lead by Leopoldo Rodríguez, analyzed the situation and found 
that some chains counted with less than 15 per cent of its requirements to 
continue manufacturing. The group found it urgent to establish some criteria 
to define which chains should take preference for reaching PEMEX 
consumers and filling their demand. Rodriguez faced a huge fight with 
phonographic discs producers, for example, whose demand on resins was 
defined at a lower level than the demand coming from other industries using 
poly-chloride-vinyl resins; even the most benefited chains could not satisfy 
more than 75 percent of their raw material needs (Rodríguez, 2005).  
With the aim of reaching the fairest accord possible to allocate the 
available raw materials amid private consumers, ANIQ and PEMEX agreed to 
establish a special commission to face the crisis. In October 1973, the ANIQ-
PEMEX Commission began working on negotiating the distribution of raw 
materials within PEMEX and private producers together. ANIQ ‘helped’ 
PEMEX to find and negotiate imports of some basic products in the 
international markets, and if expected demand could not be reached even 
with imports, the Commission accorded the quotas that each manufacturer 
would get. The concentration of the market in very few producers facilitated 
the settlement of the agreement. 
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The commission worked until the mid-1980s. In Rodriguez81 (2005) 
words 
“Since 1966, PEMEX had performed its regulatory role of the industry 
by supplying raw materials. The [ANIQ-PEMEX] Commission played 
such and important role because for the first time we shared the 
responsibility with PEMEX to decide how to allocate raw materials 
within private producers. We accorded together how to supply not only 
PEMEX’s production, but also PEMEX’s imports, and this was a critical 
issue [to keep the industry working]” 
 
 
During this period, the Mexican market faced shortages even of 
toothpaste. The country became conscious of the vulnerability faced by the 
Mexican industry as a consequence of the international scarcity, feeding the 
nationalist feelings that have seen export-led development as particularly 
risky for the country’s future. The problem was defined as Mexico have been 
affected not only as a result of the world crisis itself, but also because PEMEX 
investment had historically been unable to supply domestic demand of basic 
petrochemicals, ignoring the fact PEMEX was the sole provider since its 
creation in the 1930s.  
ANIQ proposed Mexico should achieve autonomy from abroad, and 
self-sufficiency became a key word for the private petrochemical producers 
(Rodriguez, 2005). PEMEX also welcomed the idea to push for self-
sufficiency, paving the road to the increased protection the whole industry 
gained during this period. 
                                                             
81 Leopoldo Rodríguez was Vice-President of Desc, a major domestic petrochemical group. 
He was member of several commissions organized by ANIQ to analyze the market situation 
and became president of ANIQ’s in the mid-1980s. He participated in the negotiation of 
NAFTA’s chapter related to Oil and Petrochemical Industry as private sector organization’s 
representative as we will described further.    
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Rodriguez (2005) remembers that 
 
“I was the first person to be surprised when PEMEX showed such 
enthusiasm for our proposition to pursue self-sufficiency as the only 
way to reduce the negative effects of the international crisis in the 
industry. Until then, our relationship with PEMEX has been only a 
‘political one’, especially in the operative field. We, in the private 
sector, and PEMEX’s administration have sustained an antagonist 
relationship based in suppositions until then. We, in the private 
industry, have wrongly considered PEMEX’s administration as an 
incompetent and technically limited bureaucracy. In their side, PEMEX 
administrations have thought of us as an antinationalist bunch of rent-
seeking industrials. When scarcity forced us to work together to face 
the crisis, we discovered we were wrong about the stereotype we have 
made of each other. We were mistaken…” 
 
 
Indeed, the commission opened a new space for exchange and 
collaboration between private and public producers. The distrust gave place 
to assurance and reliance. PEMEX’s officials found an important support to 
obtain additional funds to initiate new projects in ANIQ’s proposition. PEMEX 
found a new capacity to negotiate private integration since the projects were 
accorded in advance with private producers, in the hope to attend a balanced 
supply-demand in petrochemicals, basic and secondary. The commission that 
was originally settled to negotiate quotas in order to face a critical year 
worked until 1976, seeking mechanisms to balance the market and keep an 
adequate level of manufacturing production. 
 
6.3 The Policy Shift: the creation of an Export-Oriented industry (1977-
1982) 
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By the end of 1974, Echeverria’s government tried to shift the 
conservative oil policy in order to increase exports once the level of oil 
reserves was confirmed early that year. This decision would have increased 
the government revenues and also it would have saved the viability of its 
troubled economic program.82 The technical branch of PEMEX vetoed the 
government and reduced the flow of information that was related to the 
magnitude of the reserves, to the President’s office. They assumed that the 
President would waste the resources by selling them faster and irresponsibly 
in the world’s market, instead of making rational choices in benefit of the 
Mexican industrial development.83 Even if PEMEX rejected the expansionist 
policy of Echeverria, oil production began to grow at a rate of 20 percent 
yearly since 1974 without having promoted a policy shift (Morales, 1986: 64) 
to finance public spending. 
The fast growth policies that began in the second half of the decade 
stood on the blend of promotional roles the government defined in the early 
1970’s. The regulations approved during Echeverria’s administration in 1971 
granted the state enough discretion to promote the sector at will, restrained 
                                                             
82 The private sector reduced its investments at the same time that the state was pushing 
ahead its expansionist plans to increase its demiurgic role. Mexican foreign debt increased 
from 6 billion in 1970, reaching a historical high of 22 billion of US dollars in 1976. At the end 
of Echeverria’s government, there was widespread distrust and very high rates of capital 
flown out of the country. As a consequence, when President Lopez Portillo took office in 
December 1976, he found the economy in crisis and constrained by an accord signed with 
the IMF a few months previously. The private sector decided not to invest in any sector of the 
economy in response to a growing presence of the state. However, once the high level of oil 
reserves was confirmed, the state thought it could count on oil revenues to alleviate the grave 
economic situation. The state opted to play the oil card (Centeno, 1997, Loaeza, 1999, and 
Luna, Tirado and Valdes, 1987). 
 
83 For this discussion see Morales, (1988: 60-70). 
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FDI, and widened protectionist policies to private domestic producers. All the 
same, the old pattern of the state’s demiurgic role increased along with the 
promotion of ventures led by PEMEX in order to attract private investors or 
technology in sectors that the state considered essential. As in the past, the 
success of the petrochemical industry relied on the performance of the 
demiurgic state. Public investment and the new productive capacity were 
essential to plan, equilibrate, and stimulate the petrochemical industry in 
general. 
Unlike Echeverria, the incoming government of Lopez Portillo (1976-
1982) saw the oil discoveries as a bonanza, and the President decided to 
implement an Export-Oriented oil policy in 1977, which would sustain the new 
fast-industrialization policies and public spending. Mexico would become a 
major exporter, beginning with oil. In order to accomplish this objective, the 
petroleum industry went through a major structural reform and became the 
first Export-Oriented sector in the country. In only five years, the productive 
capacity of oil and petrochemicals tripled, as Mexico became the seventh 
world oil producer, altering the political and economic influence of PEMEX 
inside the government (Snoeck, 1986: 41). 
PEMEX was officially under the umbrella of Patrimony and Industry 
Promotion Ministry (Secretaria de Patrimonio y Fomento Industrial). However, 
PEMEX’s Director-General, Jorge Diaz Serrano won an important deal of 
institutional autonomy to define the new oil policy. Diaz Serrano was a private 
entrepreneur related to oil production and was associated with former US 
President George Bush during the 1970s. As a close friend of President 
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Lopez Portillo, he was authorized to define PEMEX’s expenditure, to 
negotiate indebtedness abroad and defined the petroleum policy directly with 
the President without consulting other members of the government. Diaz 
Serrano’s appointment consolidated the breakdown of the developmental 
bureaucracy in power from 1958 to 1970 when President Echeverria decided 
to define economic policy in his office.  
Diaz Serrano began to lament that  
“PEMEX was the only oil company in the world operating in red 
numbers, and which sells 80 percent of its production to the domestic 
market at half of the international prices. That policy must change” 
(Excelsior, 29 de April de 1978). 
 
The official discourse stated once again that reinforcing PEMEX 
automatically strengthened Mexican autonomy. By shifting PEMEX towards 
exports, the petroleum industry would provide the country with the resources 
needed to define an autonomous development strategy without any foreign 
intervention or constraints. The goals of the new oil policy were firstly to 
satisfy the internal demand for oil, and secondly, to add value to oil in order to 
increase exports of manufactured products in addition to raw materials. The 
state would implement a husbandry role that would let the industry reach 
international standards and increase competitiveness in the economy 
(Mercado de Valores, 1979: 797).  
In close consultation with private producers, PEMEX’s future 
administration defined a new policy during the transition period going from 
July to December 1976. This policy was build upon the following lines:   
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• Increase exploring activities in order to cope with the domestic 
demand for sustaining rapid growth in the industry derived from the 
national policy proposed;  
• Reach a peak of 2.2 million barrels per day in 1982 (a goal reached 
in 1980, two years before planned); 
• Double the refining capacity; and, 
• Triple the production of basic petrochemicals in order to cover the 
demand coming from private secondary and tertiary production.84 
The policy considered oil revenues as a multiplying factor for the 
growth of the country. The revenues from oil exports–one million barrels per 
day–would finance the public expenditure in the fostering of the structural 
transformation of the petroleum industry. As a consequence, all the 
investment was based in foreign debt, used to acquire equipment and to erect 
new oil facilities. It was programmed to pay back at the beginning of the 
1980s. The government justified its decision to finance the implementation of 
the new policy through debt; the external debt of PEMEX alone represented 
25 percent of Mexico’s GDP in 1982 (Vanneph: 1982: 8).   
                                                             
84 The general objectives of the oil industry were later included in a very ambitious 
industrialization plan defined by the Ministry of Patrimony in 1979. The Patrimony’s plan–the 
National Plan for Industrial Development (PNDI, Spanish acronym)–began to be negotiated 
with the private sector in a case-by-case basis in continuation of the alliance for production 
offered by the Lopez Portillo government in 1977. The PNDI granted investors many 
subsidies and benefits in exchange for creating an export capacity in the industry. Benefits 
would be granted to any industry exporting 25 percent of its capacity (without affecting the 
supply of the domestic markets) for at least three consecutive years. The investment during 
these years let the industry rely on exports during the crisis period between 1982 and 1985, 
and was the basis of sustaining the EOI model that had been implemented since 1986.  
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 Most of this policy stood on the new relationship forged between 
private producers and public officials during the crisis years. The scenario to 
embedded autonomy state action in the petroleum industry had begun. 
 
6.3.1 Embedded Autonomy and the “boom” of the petrochemical 
industry  
When Jose Lopez Portillo (1976-1982) took office and announced the 
newly discovered oil and natural gas reserves, producers in the petroleum 
industry had already built a special relationship. The petrochemical sector’s 
main actors had already done their homework during the crisis years: learnt to 
work together and identified their needs, their priorities in future investment, 
etc. For this reason public and private producers made the petrochemical 
industry the first sector in the country that was ready to settle an agenda to 
faster the structural transformation of the industry. This evolution would be 
supported by the discovery of Cantarell, one of the biggest oil and natural gas 
reserves in the world. 
Private and public producers in the petroleum industry had joined 
efforts during the crisis years. As a result, they had gained trust in their 
technical and administrative capacities, identified their weaknesses and 
agreed on how to correct the petroleum industry. For the first time, PEMEX 
would not decide by itself how, where, and when to initiate new investments. 
Coincidentally, the research institutions in university chemistry departments 
created 20 years before that were meant to sustain the development of the 
industry and the Instituto Mexicano del Petróleo (Mexican Petroleum Institute) 
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were already consolidated. All this carried on the idea Mexico counted with a 
virtuous condition that would facilitate to foster the structural reform of the 
industry. This was based on easy external credit, internal consensus, 
consolidated research and development institutions, and technical capacities 
(Bucay, 2005; Rodriguez, 2005; PEMEX, 1988). 
During the first half of the 1970s, PEMEX started the construction of a 
petrochemical complex at La Cangrejera, in the Gulf Coast state of Veracruz. 
Its 19 plants and its expected 2.8 million-ton-per day capacity gave Mexico an 
undisputed leadership in petrochemical production in Latin America (Snoeck 
1986: 42-52). Private investment went together with PEMEX’s launching of 
the new petrochemical complexes. Petrochemical producers working together 
fostered a very rapid growth in the industry. PEMEX kept the leading role and 
the performance of husbandry actions assured private producers the 
existence of basic materials in order to follow the petrochemical 
transformational chains downwards. World producers reacted with alarm to 
both the reduction of Mexican imports and to the projected growth. The 
participation of private and public producers in international conventions and 
congresses focused on explaining the actual accomplishment that the 
Mexican plans would have (Pani, 2005).85  
 It all became public during the annual convention of ANIQ, in October 
1976. PEMEX finally confirmed the size of the oil reserves found in the 
                                                             
85 By the end of 1976, market analysts predicted that Mexico would eliminate imports of 
ammonia, methanol, acetaldehyde, ethylene oxide, polyethylene, vinyl chloride, and acrylo-
nitrile. The construction of new plants during Echeverria’s administration drove up the 
installed capacity by 70 percent (Snoeck 1986: 42-52). 
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Chiapas basin. At the time, Mexico had one of the biggest oil reserves in the 
world. For this reason the new government team, who had established close 
contact with key private producers and ANIQ during the transition period, 
invited private producers to change the idea of balancing domestic market 
and reaching self-sufficient petrochemical chains, into realizing a strategy of 
growth based on international commercialization. PEMEX’s public invitation 
came a few weeks before Lopez Portillo’s government took office. Officials 
settled the plan’s main lines in close consultation with private producers 
during the transition period from Echeverria to Lopez Portillo (Rodriguez, 
2005). 
The goals stipulated on the petroleum plan–later expanded to the 
whole industry in the Industrial National Development Plan–will be described 
in the next part of the chapter.  
 
6.3.2 The 1979 Petrochemical program: Midwifery and husbandry roles 
At the beginning of his government, President Lopez Portillo 
announced his determination to promote a structural reform in the petroleum 
industry. While this transformation reflected the decision to transform Mexico 
into a net oil exporter, as we have mentioned before, the plan also intended 
to transform the petrochemical industry into a world player. The state’s goal 
was to add value to oil taking advantage of the even larger source of raw 
materials and financial resources coming from oil exports. The incoming 
resources–on an autonomous basis–would play a crucial role in financing the 
future growth of the whole economy. The state’s investment in refining, 
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exploration, and production grew nearly eight times, while the production of 
petrochemicals increased just over six fold (Philip, 1982: 353). 
The Minister of Patrimony, Andres de Oteyza announced that the 
state’s decision to include the petrochemical industry in the nine prioritized 
sectors in which the state would allow crucial investment and special 
subventions to promote new private ventures in March 1977.86 As such, the 
state would seek to rationally integrate the petroleum industry, and in 
addition, to take full advantage of the existing infrastructure. By increasing the 
provision of basic petrochemicals, the state attempted to push the private 
production of secondary and tertiary products as well.  
Improving the structural conditions of the industry would have a direct 
effect in the performance of the demiurgic role.  PEMEX continued acting as 
the principal engine behind the secondary petrochemical sector. However, no 
new product was listed as a basic petrochemical during the boom years. The 
state centred its efforts on increasing the vertical integration of PEMEX, and 
limited its objectives to enlarging production of the basic products, which the 
company was already committed to provide.  
As national and international economic restrictions relaxed, the 
government announced a plan that was meant to extend the midwifery and 
husbandry roles already used for petroleum production for the whole industry. 
In order to regain the private sector’s trust, Lopez Portillo’s government 
                                                             
86 From the beginning of the industry in 1959 until 1982, the state had defined the 
development of basic petrochemicals as priority. By reforming the economic chapter of the 
constitution in December 1982–which was the basis to begin the structural reform of the 
economy–the state included the production of basic petrochemicals as a strategic activity in 
article 28 and declared that its production had to be exclusive to the nation. 
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proposed to form an Alianza para la Produccion (Alliance for Production) in 
1977 in which the state negotiated on a case-by-case basis. The alliance was 
a political pact among the state and the representatives of industrial 
chambers in which the former offered a series of advantages and subventions 
in exchange for important increases in private investment that had been 
paralysed during the last year of Echeverria’s government. Once the 
economic restrictions that had been negotiated in 1976 with the IMF ended in 
1978, the state was able to announce a general plan for pushing the rapid 
growth of the economy through the National Plan of Industrial Development 
(PNDI) published in early 1979.87 
 As part of this strategy, PEMEX announced a new program that 
entailed the creation of four petrochemical poles in the country. PEMEX-
ANIQ’s commission had already realized that in order to increase 
competitiveness, the physical integration of the industry between public and 
private producers must be fostered.88 PEMEX also offered special incentives 
to companies that moved their plants to the new regions. In doing so, they 
would enjoy access to cheap energy and the advantage of reducing the high 
costs of transporting big volumes of raw materials. In any case, the plan 
                                                             
87 As we have already said, the PNDI established a variety of resources to consolidate 
industrial exporting facilities. Capital was provided to industries that could export at least 25 
percent of its production over three consecutive years. The plan dictated that this new 
capacity ought to carry out exporting activities in order to avoid harming domestic markets. 
 
88 Until then, PEMEX policy had been to supply producers by demand. PEMEX transported 
basic products to private producers that were close to final markets. The new plan offered 
subventions for producers to move their plants into the new petrochemical poles in order to 
increase integration and reduce costs.  
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sought to force Mexican petrochemical producers to follow the same 
integration pattern used by the international producers.  
 The four petrochemical poles would assure private investors a 
preferential price programs for ten years, as well as reductions of up to 30 
percent in energy prices (oil, electricity or natural gas). The agreement with 
private producers was to share investment in order to create the new 
infrastructure needed. In exchange, a presidential decree would grant the 
preferential price program for ten years after the new plants began 
functioning. Due to the extremely ambitious plan that resulted, the state 
decided to divide the strategy and to concentrate on the creation of two 
petrochemical poles.89 A timid husbandry policy was included in the plan 
mainly to increase competitiveness. Additional price-reductions were offered 
in basic petrochemicals to any producer that installed new plants with 
exporting capacities.90 The goal that targeted the improvement of the 
industrial efficiency and competitive advantage of the sector relied solely 
upon the low-price policy of raw materials.  
According to Philip (1982: 353) the new situation offered the state…  
                                                             
89 Analysts in the petrochemical industry began to fear that the Mexican plan would make the 
country an international leader. However, as soon as it was cut in half, they realized that 
Mexico would not represent a threat, for the domestic market would end up absorbing the 
new petrochemical production due to the growing Mexican population (Spitz, 1988: 488). 
 
90 As part of the husbandry role, the state planned to remove protections that the industry 
historically enjoyed. For the second time, the commercial authorities and the private sector 
began to negotiate a gradual liberalization of the market. By 1979, they reached an accord to 
join GATT. However, due to the lack of national support, President Lopez Portillo announced 
in the oil nationalization ceremony of 1980, that Mexico would continue to follow a sovereign 
development agenda instead. For a study of the first GATT negotiation, see Dale Story, 1987; 
or for an analysis of the evolution of commercial policy from the 1970s to the 1990s, see 
Lopez Quiroga, 1998. 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the opportunity of taking full advantage of scale economies–notably in 
the petrochemicals sector–to lower domestic costs (…) [and] provide a 
further stimulus to Mexican technical capacity (…) when world market 
conditions were difficult, the Mexican refining and petrochemicals 
industry would be able to be certain of a steady supply of crude oil at a 
predictable price. The same could not necessarily be said of industries 
where the feedstock had to be imported (…) access to almost limitless 
supplies of low-cost crude oil would give PEMEX a considerable 
competitive advantage in an oligopolistic international market (…). The 
government responded to the major oil discoveries by making a bold 
and probably successful effort to turn Mexico into a major international 
refiner of oil and producer of petrochemicals. 
 
The plan sought to increase basic and secondary production to reach 
27 million tons yearly, from the 12 million tons attained already. With a mean 
growth of 17 percent yearly, the contribution of petrochemicals to GDP would 
pass from 1.7 to 3.8 percent in 1982 (Mercado de Valores, April 1977). The 
plan targeted an ambitious growth of 125 percent in capacity. Of total public 
and private investment demanded to reach this growth rate, the state–through 
PEMEX–assumed two thirds, and the private sector assumed the rest.  
According to the plan, private and public investment would be 
complementary. PEMEX concentrated the investment in the construction of 
complete refineries while private producers will have connected their brand-
new plants to them. The entire new infrastructure in routes, rails or ports, 
would be financed by private investment in exchange of special ten-year 
subvention that assured differentiated prices in raw materials, electricity, fiscal 
reductions, etc. The warrant for this exchange was a presidential decree 
assuring them for 10 years once the new investment began functioning. 
The most important innovation of the new plan was that there were 
conditions for the creation of a new export capacity in the industry. Most of 
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the subventions required that companies exported at least 25 percent of their 
productive capacity for three consecutive years–without affecting the 
provision of the domestic market.91 This policy fostered private investment to 
increase export capacity.92 Exporting plans included direct and indirect export 
activities aiming to integrate export activities downward not only of raw 
materials but also derivatives such as fibers, plastic, artificial fabrics, etc. 
ANIQ proposition was to push the articulation of productive chains until the 
last link aiming the increment of transformed products instead of raw 
materials (Rodriguez, 2005). 
Snoeck (1986: 36) says that as a consequence of ISI policies and the 
petrochemical regulations, the range of the exporting capacities attributed to 
the domestic market was limited; exports of basic petrochemicals would 
always constitute a secondary goal–even the new export strategy of basic 
petrochemicals became a secondary goal. The enlargement of the productive 
capacity was oriented to satisfy the most demanded products in the domestic 
market.  
Attention to competitiveness was not at the top of the agenda. Indeed, 
the Patrimony Minister assured that  
                                                             
91 This husbandry role was later offered to the overall economy and actually served to create 
an exporting capacity, which supported the temporary exporting program implemented during 
the emergency situation of 1982 and 1985, and the shift to an EOI since 1986.  
 
92 The completion of the complex in Cangrejera Veracurz, for example, illustrate the shift in 
the governments mentality from the self-relying attitude to make the new installations would 
reach international standards and export capacity. When it was finished in 1980, the state 
became capable to produce 48 (from the 33 it already produced) basic petrochemical 
products. Still imported the 22 of the products included in the official lists. The publicly owned 
industrial plants grew from 63 to 133 that reduced in a half the import of raw materials (from 
21 percent of the total of national consumption in 1977 to 10 percent in 1982) (Comercio 
Exterior, 1978: 547).  
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“For the state, the promotion of the [basic] petrochemical industry 
offers the most profitable and rational use of the oil, for this reason it is 
state’s goal to accelerate and increase the flow of investment in the oil 
sector and basic petrochemical in order to benefit the economy as a 
whole” (Mercado de Valores, April 1977).  
 
For private sector, Rodriguez (2005) argues, the special flavor of the 
meal was that the new policy kept the extreme protection already existent. 
Along with the new subventions, the new policy maintained high tariffs and 
non-tariffs barriers, the first was in the range of 60-80% in the most basic part 
of the chain, official prices that were still over real prices, increasing tariffs, 
and almost impossible to get import permits. The protection made even 
companies using obsolete technology profitable. Keeping all the previous 
conditions, state and industrials were discussing about world-scale plants, 
making the new stimuli, impossible to ignore.  
 
6.3.3 The results 
During the boom years, Mexico opened a new petrochemical plant 
every 45 days (Snoeck, 1986: 63). Even if the results and investments were 
impressive, the state had not reached the development of a self-reliant 
petrochemical industry. By 1982, Mexico was still importing about 20 products 
out of the 70 listed as basic petrochemicals, which represented 13.5 percent 
of national consumption. As a result, only two products were exported instead 
of the 21 in the original plan, and the trade balance of the sector reached a 
deficit of 12 billion pesos (Snoeck, 1986: 55).  
Despite this trade imbalance, the demiurgic role seemed to reinforce 
the PEMEX position. As a result of the boom years, PEMEX was able to 
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install even more productive capacities, increasing petrochemical production 
from 2.4 million tons yearly in 1970, to 13 million tons yearly in 1982.  PEMEX 
also increased the number of industrial plants from 37 to 92, and diversified 
total production from 26 products to 40 products in 12 years. The real growth 
rate per year was 15.2 percent. Furthermore, employment in the 
petrochemical area of PEMEX went from 1,500 to 18,213 (Snoeck, 1986: 
113). Székely (1983: 109) says that the participation of the oil sector in the 
GDP passed from 4.3 percent in 1970, to 7.4 percent in 1981.  
Between 1975 and 1985,93 the productive capacity of the entire 
industry (public and private) went from 6.6 to 18.9 million tons (mt), following 
a yearly growth of 11 percent. Basic petrochemicals grew from 2.4 mt in 1975 
to 7.5 mt in 1985; while secondary production went from 2.7 mt to 6.9 mt 
yearly. The number of products increased from 165 to 422. These were 
manufactured by about 220 industries. In economic terms, the petrochemical 
industry’s proportion of the GDP went from 1.1 percent in 1961, to 2.1 percent 
in 1984 (SEMIP, 1986; Bucay, 1991).  
The biggest and best-organized companies were the ones that took 
better advantage of the grants and benefits derived from the PNDI. Big 
business dominated the market and had access to national and international 
resources in order to move into the new poles and take advantage of the 
PEMEX subventions. Analysis of the industry done in 1976 (Estrategia, 1976: 
                                                             
93 The government disguises the official figures about the real results of the boom policy 
since they do not indicate the industrial collapse in 1982. As shown in the text, Snoeck (1986: 
113) assures that petrochemical production by PEMEX reached a peak of 13 million tons in 
1982 while the official figure was only 7.5 mt by 1985 (SEMIP, 1986). That implied that the 
capacity for production reached only half of the capacity reached 3 years earlier. 
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27) probed that from the 500 biggest business groups in Mexico, 22 of them 
were petrochemical companies. Of the 100 biggest, ten were petrochemical 
companies. In fact, these ten companies kept controlling over 80 percent of 
national production and their dominant role was reinforced during this period. 
Those national champions were: Guanos y Fertilizantes, Industrias polifil, 
Univex, Celanese Mexicana, Nylon de Mexico, Union Carbide, Celulosa y 
Derivados, Petrocel, Tereftalatos Mexicanos, and Fertimex.  
 
6.4 The 1982 debt-crisis:  Banco de Mexico and the Private external debt 
 The most important industrial groups went bankrupt between 1981 and 
1982. Private entrepreneurs borrowed about 15-20 billion (20 percent of the 
national external debt) to be repaid in the short-term.  In only one year, the cost 
of the private debt increased six times, as a result of the devaluation of the 
peso and the rise of international interest rates in 1982.94 Even in extremely 
favorable conditions of a public current account, it would be difficult to repay 
that debt based on the lending conditions. In addition, the central bank 
recognized its incapacity to supply the amount of US dollars that the market 
required during this period. 95 
 The state promoted a rescue plan to cover the exchange risk of the 
private debt incurred before the 20th of December 1982, when the President 
                                                             
94 "Bankers Question Mexico's Plan to Help Private firms repay their Foreign Debt", The Wall 
Street Journal, Tuesday May 24, 1983, p. 40 
95 "Mexico Offering Firms New Rate to Pay Suppliers", the Wall Street Journal, Tuesday 
March 1/1983, p. 38. 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decreed exchange controls. A trust was created by the central bank 
(FICORCA)96 to ensure the repayment of the business people’s debt, 
rescheduling the repayment plan from one year to a 6-8 year term. FICORCA 
relieved the debt burden of the most important businesspeople in Mexico, 
enabling them to acquire the subventions offered by the PNDI.97 After 
transferring the debt to FICORCA, the private business group listed in the 
Mexican Stock Market reduced the overall debt by 69.9 percent in 1983, and 
by 32.6 percent at the end of 1984. Along with this rescue plan, the state’s 
husbandry activities allowed big business to be in a privileged situation by 
acquiring access to foreign currency, due to export activities. 
 According to Eugenio Clariond98 the state action did not only give 
already broken businesses viability, but it also assisted the long term planning 
of those industries.  
                                                             
96 The Trust to cover the exchange risk (Fideicomiso para la Cobertura de Riesgos 
Cambiarios) was established in order to warrant the payment of the private external debt by 
the Bank of Mexico in 1983. The director was Ernesto Zedillo, who would be president in the 
period 1994-2000. As a public enterprise, FICORCA gained access to the controlled-prized 
dollar (46 pesos and a free-floating dollar of 146 during 1983) in order to pay the foreign 
banks the renegotiated debts. Once each industrialist got a rescheduled debt between 6-8 
years, FICORCA lent the equivalent debt in pesos to that businessperson. Mexican 
entrepreneurs paid a peso-debt valued at the 1982 currency level while a US dollar trust was 
paid to the foreign creditor. This action reduced the debt-value the companies incurred and 
guaranteed the repayment of loans to foreign banks. 
 
97 Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, Programa de Refinanciamiento a Cargo del 
FICORCA.  AGN, Unidad de la Crónica Presidencial, Gobierno de Miguel de la Madrid, 
SHCP/06-10-01-85/Caja 3 Exp. 10/1988 y Ruis Durán, Clemente ed., "Empresas en la Bolsa 
¿Reestructuración Financiera?, Informe Financiero Trimestral, El Financiero, Año 1  No. 1, 
18 de julio de 1984, p. 17. Steve Frazier, "Mexican Companies Enthusiastic About Central 
Bank Plan to Settle Foreign Debt", in The Wall Street Journal, Friday, Nov. 11,1983, p. 31. 
"Mexico: A manana Plan Serves Companies on the Brink", in Businessweek, November 7, 
1983. 
98 President of Grupo IMSA, Eugenio Clariond, controls about 40 percent of the national 
production of galvanized steel. He was former President of the Mexican Council of 
  
187 
“They were, in fact, industries technically broken. The program 
implemented by Ernesto Zedillo gave new air to unviable businesses, 
which had contracted a US dollar-debt when the dollar was worth 20 
pesos, and by the end of the year, its value was 200 pesos.”99  
 
On the other hand, another businessperson assured that the success of 
FICORCA was due to the adaptability of the Bank’s officials in its relationship 
with particular business needs.100 
 According to the industrial sectors, the most important businesses 
registered in FICORCA were mainly those that were defined as strategic for the 
state, i.e. 
• Chemistry and petro-chemistry renegotiated 71.3 percent of their foreign 
liabilities (about 158 billion pesos). 88.3 percent of this money was 
directed to only four businesses groups (Celanese, Union Carbide, 
CyDSA and IRSA), which made up four of the seven dominant 
petrochemical groups in the Mexican market. 
• About 50 percent of the program’s total resources (about 7.5 billion US 
dollars) were given to five conglomerates (Alfa, Visa, Vitro, Desc and 
CYDSA). Alfa, Desc and CYDSA have important investments in the 
petrochemical industry. 
• The other rescued sectors were metallurgy, automobiles, machinery and 
construction. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Businessmen: an umbrella organization, which includes the 35 richest businesspeople in 
Mexico.  
 
99 Interview with Eugenio Clariond Reyes Retana, 10 de agosto de 1993, in (Vila, 1994) 
100 Interview with Alberto Santos de Hoyos, 12 de noviembre de 1993, in (Vila, 1994). 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The petrochemical and chemical industry were the most active 
recipients of FICORCA. Again, the Central Bank designed the plan assuring a 
long-term disposition to pay to the foreign bankers, alleviation on external debt 
to the private sector, and a relief in assuring foreign exchange that was not 
assured at the time to the government. Private industrials negotiated on a 
case-by-case basis once again. Most of petrochemical indebtedness is 
explained by the expansion lived during the oil boom and the close 
participation on the dream of becoming world players. 
 
6.5 Last breath of the demiurgic state 
As a consequence of the crisis in 1982, PEMEX was forced to raise 
prices.101 PEMEX agreed with the private sector to a trimester price-
increasing policy and kept the pattern that prices would not exceed 20 
percent more than the international price reference. The goal was to assist 
the long-term planning of the private sector in the definition of their export-
policy, which would support the survival of the whole sector in difficult times 
(Snoeck, 1986: 57).  
The new price policy did not represent a break with the past because 
the state objective shifted away from the old midwifery role consisting of 
                                                             
101 When the economic conditions changed because of the 1982 crisis, one of the most 
important problems for the private industry was the impossibility PEMEX had had in 
establishing real prices for raw materials. Historically, PEMEX has defined prices by lowering 
them from international references. Before 1982 there was no pattern in establishing a real-
priced base for basic products. In fact, the subsidized pricing scheme has still been the most 
important source of competitiveness for the private industry–rather than productivity. 
Historically, PEMEX has increased prices on raw materials responding to increases in 
international markets, avoidance of speculative actions, and in order to support PEMEX’s 
financial situation.  
 
  
189 
attracting private investment by capitalizing the secondary sector through low-
price basic products (raw materials). When the state decided to implement a 
husbandry role–pushing businesspeople into international markets–not only 
would raw material prices have had to approach the level of international 
standards, but also, private producers would have had to reduce their profits 
in order to reach international standards (Mattar, 1994).  
Even if some authors posit the difficulty in correlating the effects of 
publicly subsidized prices on the level of private investment in the accelerated 
growth of the sector, it is clear that most of the benefits went to only a few 
players that became national champions of the petrochemical industry. At the 
end of the oil boom, only four groups (Celanese, CYDSA, Alfa, and Desc) 
controlled the production of 22 (out of 150) petrochemical secondary goods in 
the country, which equated to 75 percent of the market revenues (Snoeck, 
1986: 58). As Philip (1999: 39) summarizes: 
PEMEX’ financial position was actually deteriorated during the oil 
boom period. The most important reason for this is the low income 
received from domestic sales. During 1980-1981, approximately half of 
Mexican oil output was consumed at home–the same was true for 
PEMEX petrochemicals output. The cost of sales will be higher than 
that of crude oil exports because locally sold oil has to be refined and 
marketed. However, PEMEX earned over three times more from its 
exports than from its domestic sales in 1981. As we can see, there was 
an enormous subsidy to the domestic consumer. 
    
Bucay (1991), a leading chemical businessman, says that the image of 
building world-class, fully competitive facilities proved irresistible for the 
private producers. Private investors took full advantage of all the midwifery 
and husbandry stimuli offered by the state during the boom years. These 
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stimuli helped developing the private petrochemical sector intensively. The 
new plants reached the objective of increasing public/private integration in the 
same production complexes. However, some of those plants were barely 
halfway completed in 1981, year in which the oil prices dropped and debt 
piled up very fast, thus contributing to the Mexican debt crisis in the summer 
of 1982. Private industry had no choice but to complete its half-built facilities 
or go bankrupt. In this crisis situation, the government simply cut public 
investment– including PEMEX–to the bone. Private sector ended up investing 
in infrastructure to the point where the amount of fixed investment was 40 to 
50 percent higher than what was planned originally.   
According to Bucay, (1991: 126)  
a cause of the long building period, the incentives that were never 
paid, amounted to more than one-quarter of what they would have 
been, and certainly they never compensated for the extra investment 
(…). There is however a positive side to this story. The facilities built 
during this phase [like Cydsa’s new pvc plant, Temex TPA 
installations, Negromex rubber, and Celanese plants at the Cangrejera 
complex] were among the most modern and efficient in the world, and 
they assured selected niches of competitiveness, which will serve 
Mexico well for many years. 
 
In effect, the new facilities were the main reason for both the marked 
improvement in the competitive position of the sector and the rapid switching 
to exports made by businesspeople soon afterwards. The new facilities eased 
the industrial shift to export production when the government created the 
temporary export programs between 1982 and 1985. Secondary 
petrochemicals represented 88 percent of all the petrochemical exports in 
1986. This was the reason for a positive trade balance of 360 million dollars, 
which compared favourably with the negative balance of 590 million dollars 
  
191 
reached in 1982. The competitive position of these plants was also explained 
by their newness and by the fact that they had reached environmental 
standards, which were already important at the time. The average age of 
Mexican petrochemical plants in operation was 6.5 years versus more than 
13 for those in the United States and more than 16 for European plants. This 
made the Mexican petrochemical sector more modern and competitive, and 
better adapted to environmental and health needs, than competitive plants in 
other parts of the world (Bucay, 1991: 126). 
 
6.6 Different visions to face the crisis 
 As we have seen in some detail in Chapter 3, President Miguel de la 
Madrid proposed the amendment of the economic chapter of the constitution 
just a few weeks after taking office. His goal was to clearly establish and to 
define the command the state would keep over the economy. It was also to 
reinstate the eight sectors that would continue to be exclusive attributes of the 
state.102 For the first time, the state assumed the engagement of basic 
petrochemical production constitutionally. This decision formalized the 
artificial structure in which the industry had existed.  
 A complete agenda of structural reform took place in two different 
moments of the government: one was the correction of macroeconomic 
                                                             
102 Echeverria and Lopez Portillo created public owned enterprises in almost every sector of 
the economy. Before initiating a major withdrawal of those companies, de la Madrid 
established eight sectors (oil, emission of coin and bank notes, postal service, telegraphic 
and radiotelegraphic services, railways, basic petrochemicals, satellite communications, oil 
and hydrocarbons, radioactive minerals and generation of nuclear energy and electricity), 
which would continue as exclusive attributes of the state. All the rest would be managed by 
the private sector. Presidents Salinas and Zedillo implemented further reforms in the 1990s. 
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variables; the other was the radical opening of the market that implied, among 
other things, the retraction of the state’s demiurgic role.  
Since 1986, the state had liberalized trade and foreign investment 
policies, deregulated the economy and privatized some of the principal 
sectors of the economy. As the country had become extremely dependent on 
the export of one single commodity (oil), the most important task the state 
initiated was the diversification of the exporting capacity of the country. From 
1986 onwards, the paradigm shift took hold, integrating the economy to the 
global circuits. By taking this route, the idea that the economy would gradually 
deviate towards self-sufficiency was abandoned. Export-Oriented industries 
became the engine of the economy. 
 However the two visions of development–ISI and EOI–co-existed in 
key government agencies during the first part of President De la Madrid’s 
term in office. The first view sought continuity with previous state endeavors 
and it was the position of the Finance Minister who assured that the economy 
was facing a major cash-flow problem. He also claimed that once 
expenditures were reduced, an acceptable level of growth would be reached. 
According to this framing, petrochemical investment had to face temporary 
restrictions, while exports were promoted so as to keep the industry afloat 
through these difficult times. A secondary result was the saving of jobs that 
would otherwise disappear due to the collapse of the industry.  
The second position inside the government proposed a radical reform 
of the economy that was recommended by the Budget and Planning Minister. 
For them, the emphasis should be on the integration of chemical chains, the 
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consolidation of national champions and the raising of both investment and 
international competitiveness for the sector.  
 
6.6.1 Continuity: Petrochemical policy for the period of 1983-1985 
The energy policy was definitely influenced by the competing 
paradigms used by the government to treat Mexico’s economic troubles. For 
those who blamed inadequate cash flow as the source of the crisis, the 
policies directed towards PEMEX sought:  
- To increase tax revenue on oil exports.  
- To take advantage of the high level of demand for goods and 
services in the petroleum industry. The company was forced to 
initiate an ISI practice setup that would protect the local supply-
network and reduce as many imports as possible.  
- To assume the PEMEX debt, because it had contracted 39 percent 
of the public external debt by itself. PEMEX’s transformation into 
EOI activities ensured that it would be the only autonomous source 
of foreign currency to finance the state’s apparatus. 
However, PEMEX’s role changed. In the past, the company subsidized 
the development of the country through major subsidies in energy and from 
1982 onwards PEMEX guaranteed enough resources for public spending. 
PEMEX paid a VAT of 58 cents out of every dollar it received as exploitation 
tax. According to Morales (1988) and Székely (1989) PEMEX represented a 
mean of 30 percent of the government revenues at the time. The charge over 
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PEMEX’s finances was so high that in 1999, 86 percent of total PEMEX’s 
revenues went to finance day-to-day governmental expenses.  
The public company also supported the survival of the industry in the 
middle of the crisis. PEMEX granted support to the domestic industry through 
the establishment of an ISI program that consisted on using Mexican goods 
and services in ever-larger proportions.103 PEMEX’s General Director Mario 
Ramon Beteta (1987:77) assured that while two-thirds of PEMEX acquisitions 
were imported in 1981, in 1985 imports represented less than one-sixth of the 
company purchases; national producers provided all the rest. However, the 
state was not in a position to continue investing. Therefore, it minimized its 
actions in order to provide raw materials that would let the market function. 
The petrochemical projects would be finished only if the government 
classified them as a priority to substitute imports, and if more than 70 percent 
of the plants were constructed by 1983. However, financial astringency made 
the government stop every other project since 1983, without further 
consideration (Snoeck, 1986: 118).   
The government announced a new petrochemical plan two years after 
the government took office, in 1984. This plan continued the idea of reaching 
self-sufficiency, yet economic conditions forced the state to establish a 
modest goal in future growth. Compared with an 86 percent in 1982, the 
government targeted a provision of 92 percent of the domestic demand for 
1988. The vision of keeping an autonomous domestic trajectory and 
                                                             
103 Between 1982 and 1988, PEMEX placed more than 2 million orders covering purchases 
of more than 1 billion pesos.  
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eventually reaching developed countries in the international market remained 
central. In relation to this objective, PEMEX would also try to export basic 
petrochemicals. This was done even when the company was already facing 
troubles in supplying the domestic market and in having no money to 
continue the construction of new plants that were oriented to exporting 
activities. The goal was so absurd that any petrochemical engineer or investor 
would have disapproved of this plan due to the low return on investment.104 
The world was facing an overproduction of petrochemicals and 
increases in world competition–in addition to the limited resources of the 
state–, which weakened the export potential of petrochemicals and the 
support needed by secondary producers. Favouring the exports of products 
derived from the basic goods would continue to drain the sector finances and 
to reduce the integration of private and public domains (Snoeck, 1986: 118). 
During the period of 1982-1985, a new problem arose. As exports increased, 
the lack of resources to initiate new investments increased the obstacles for 
industrial integration. This problem was reinforced once the market was 
liberalized and the private sector was allowed to import directly from abroad 
(Unger, 1994: 49). 
 
6.6.2 Preparing the paradigm shift: the rational route 
                                                             
104 Even if PEMEX had tried exporting basic petrochemicals, the decision would be a waste 
of time. The most lucrative part of the chain–nationally and internationally–is the production of 
derivatives from secondary petrochemicals to final products. 
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The National Development Plan (NDP) of 1983-1988 (published in 
1983 by the Budget and Planning Ministry) gave priority to the petrochemical 
industry in order to meet the growing domestic demand and to generate 
foreign currency reserves by shifting from imports to exports. The 
petrochemical industry was important for supporting the development of a 
national capital-goods industry and for its direct and indirect ability to create 
jobs. Among the guidelines established by the NDP in the petrochemical 
sector, the following stood out as essential aims:  
1. To secure an ample, assured and diversified supply of primary 
petrochemicals for the production of basic goods. In order to 
accomplish this, the traditional supply shortage of PEMEX had to 
be overcome. 
2. To promote the integration of production chains for the rational use 
of natural resources and to promote a greater national integration in 
production and facilities.  
3. To promote the generation of foreign exchange from exporting 
intermediate and finished products. To accomplish this, it was 
necessary to participate actively in international markets.  
4. To promote the installation of an efficient and internationally 
competitive industrial complex, encouraging technological 
assimilation and development activities as well as improving plant 
productivity.  
5. To contribute to the decentralization of the federal structure.  
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6. To minimize environmental pollution. This was the only new 
component after the last PNDI. (Barnes and Christianson 
1986:112).  
Three basic strategies have been delineated in order to guide the 
development of the Mexican petrochemical industry, namely: the integration 
of production chains; the creation of regional development strategies; and the 
selective promotion of export, based on comparative advantage. The policy 
then would focus on the integration of the petrochemical chains in order to 
detect specific needs of each industry and to target the improvement of the 
comparative advantages. These targeted policies for specific industrial needs 
contrasted widely with the vision of the self-reliant development paradigm of 
previous governments. As we will see in the next chapter, the state defined a 
policy that abandoned the universal vision of development, which had guided 
the state action until then. The policy implemented in 1986 sharply contrasted 
the traditional vision of appropriate state action. 
The Budget and Planning Ministry (SPP for its acronym in Spanish) 
began to focus on the promotion of the comparative advantages of the 
petrochemical sector as early as 1981. The ministry accredited the 
importance of attending the particular industrial needs on a case-by-case 
basis, when it analyzed the industry from the level of the manufacturing chain. 
This approach would help the state identify the most internationally 
competitive groups and it would push them toward Export-Oriented growth, 
before encouraging the less competitive producers. This was the prevalent 
vision after 1986 and it has lasted until the present strategy.  
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The plan recognized that for a long period of time, PEMEX would be 
unable to invest in new installations. After the duration of this inaction, the 
inability to invest became the basis of a vision that considered a complete 
withdrawal of state’s demiurgic role in producing secondary petrochemicals, 
thus giving rise to a privatization plan that was defined in 1986, initiated in 
1987, and then implemented (failing twice) in 1993 and 1996. The primary 
objectives of this plan shifted from those of achieving a self-sufficient market, 
to giving an emphasis to productivity and efficiency, instead. It also pursued 
an increase on the integration and competitiveness for the sector.  
During this period, the government did not make new investments in 
petrochemicals. In spite of the impressive results in the production of basic 
petrochemicals, the new PEMEX’s facilities proved to be insufficient when 
trying to reach the growing demand of basic goods required for export 
production. While PEMEX was able to build 46 processing plants in eight 
large complexes in only four years (1978-1981), the company has been 
unable to invest in new projects in the petroleum industry since 1982. In many 
cases, the big swing to exporting derivatives that was consolidated in 1987 
(after Mexico joined GATT) created extraordinary deficits in national primary 
production, which grew rapidly to represent about one third of total needs by 
1988, representing a value of about 5.5 US billion dollars (GAO/US Congress 
1991: 2) 
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In 1987, the performance of PEMEX became an important issue with 
private producers.105 PEMEX was not reaching the capacity needed to supply 
private producers promptly enough, neither as to reach export demands. 
Since the economy depended on oil exports, the state was in no condition to 
invest in basic petrochemicals at all. As a result, the inefficient and corrupt 
administration of PEMEX became a major national concern for the first time. 
Private producers began to complain that PEMEX was never able to satisfy 
the needs of the growing secondary industry. Therefore, the country was 
forced to import a significant proportion of its primary product needs. This 
structural trouble was emphasized during the deregulation period. Mexico 
began to increase imports of basic petrochemicals reaching a peak of 15 
billion dollars in 1995. We will discuss this issue in further detail in chapters 7 
and 8.   
                                                             
105 Mexico joined GATT in 1986, orienting its industrialization to exports. 
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Chapter 7. The paradigm shift 
 
The year 1986 marked the beginning of change. The first week of that 
year, the oil-union leader, José Sosa, threatened President De la Madrid 
during the New Year’s celebration ceremony.106 Sosa warned him, saying that 
the unions mistrusted the new economic agenda, which the President had 
proposed a few months earlier. He also stated oil workers would not accept 
any reform in the petroleum industry. Sosa was concerned that foreign capital 
would gain influence in the petroleum monopoly at the expense of domestic 
interests.  
“Pretending to change the nationalist vision, within which the state had 
managed PEMEX since the oil nationalization, would imply a risk for 
the company.  If PEMEX sinks, you [the President] will sink, and the 
whole country will sink with both of us” (Proceso 480, 13-January-
1986). 
 
A few weeks before the New Year’s celebration, on November 25th, 1985, 
Mexico had officially submitted a bid to join the GATT. This decision marked a 
watershed because the state became committed to a development model that 
was oriented to export. The state’s new attitude towards trade was thus set in 
place, in order to deal with the deepening of the economic crisis that had 
been exacerbated by the massive earthquake in September 1985. The 
government was reorganized and conditions were established in order to 
                                                             
106 Over the 71 years in which PRI controlled the government, the President held a ‘New 
Year’s celebration’ at the beginning of each year with the official unions, and various peasant 
and social organizations affiliated to the party, as well as with influential entrepreneurs in 
order to show the unanimous support for what Krauze (1997) has called “The Imperial 
Presidency.” 
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push forward a coherent policy in the structural transformation of the 
economy. In response to these reforms, the most traditional supporters of 
Mexican nationalism organized a quiet resistance.  
As discussed in the previous chapter the state had set up special 
programs to save big business from bankruptcy, and direct them towards 
growth through temporary export activities. From then on, the state began to 
redesign the Mexican industrial landscape, adapting it to a new Export-
Oriented Industrialization (EOI) model. The state also redefined its 
promotional roles so as to adapt itself and the domestic market to the 
international circuits of production. 
The goal of this chapter is to offer additional evidence to sustain the 
hypothesis that during the paradigm shift the state continued to prioritize 
protection of domestic producers and consolidation of national champions. 
Even if the state was acting under a new policy paradigm, it remained 
dependent upon the same path as previous governments, consolidating a 
national bourgeoisie. By doing so, the state would secure the long-term 
viability of the national transformation.  
The chapter begins with a brief description of the conditions specific to 
the international petrochemical industry, which had gone through important 
changes as a consequence of the oil crises of 1973 and 1979. The state had 
to consider the international context in order to redefine the national 
petrochemical industry. The hope was that succeeding in this objective would 
counterbalance the negative effects of the crisis years. Following this 
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account, we will then describe the main pillars of the new petrochemical 
policy, the first stages of privatization effected in 1988 and the impact that this 
had on making Group Alfa one of the world’s biggest producers of special 
textiles and spandex in 1988. The chapter ends by analyzing the general 
reorganization of PEMEX, which pushed the attraction of private investment 
and the integration of the petrochemical industry forward. Since the 
integration in 1986, competitiveness and investment were the key words of 
petrochemical plans, thus composing the new blend of state promotional roles 
resulting from the reform.  
 
7.1 The new world context.  
By the 1970s, the petrochemical industry of developed countries 
reduced its leadership role in the concentration of technology that had led to 
high profits and growth rates. It had also given place to the normalization of 
consuming diverse products (fertilizers, nylon stockings and plastic bottles) 
that were part of the original industrial expansion. The novelty of the first 
products was lost, making a sort of mature and embattled industry. According 
to Spitz (1988: 462-507) conflicts arose from three different sources. 
 First, important pressures were rising from the consolidation of new 
social movements. On the one hand, the industry was attacked for its 
devastating effects on the environment. As well, pacifist movements 
contested the contribution of petrochemicals to the military industrial complex 
(particularly in response to the use of napalm by United States’ forces in 
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Vietnam).107 Both issues in fact, altered the general frame of traditional 
business activity in the United States and in Western Europe. 
Secondly, the arrival of new petrochemical producers in the 
international arena also disrupted the cartel in which the market had 
functioned. Oil rich countries such as Mexico, Canada and Saudi Arabia 
began to add value to their oil and consolidated an internationally competitive 
petrochemical industry.  
The third and most important issue was related to the fluctuations of oil 
prices. Accordingly, traditional producers of petrochemicals were forced to 
increase investment in cleaner technology and infrastructure, paying more for 
raw materials, which made traditional producers–United States, Europe and 
Japan–less competitive. These producers began to focus on the solution of 
domestic constraints and therefore, they reduced investments abroad in order 
to improve local competitiveness and the integration of chains. 
The development of the American petrochemical industry (Spitz, 1988: 
506) turned inward during the 1970s and 1980s in order to resolve domestic 
impediments rather than follow the expansionism characterized by the post-
WWII period. American producers lost competitiveness for a number of 
salient reasons:  
• Producers faced higher outlays on equipment so as to meet the 
standards of various environmental control programs. 
                                                             
107 The production of weaponry and other military goods was fundamental in the development 
of the petrochemical industry during the World War II.   
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• Similarly, new standards required the discontinuation of chemical 
products deemed harmful (e.g. insecticides, detergent builders). 
• The United States’ Congress proscribed the fees previously paid to 
foreign producers in order to secure export contracts.  
According to the same author (Spitz, 1988: 525), Europe and Japan 
had succeeded in building up their own petrochemical industries. These new 
installations left American firms little residual advantage in terms of 
technology, plant size, or even raw material costs in many industries. By the 
late 1960s, the Western European chemical industry had grown more rapidly 
than its American counterpart. In addition, the consumption of primary 
petrochemicals began to approach American levels. 
The rapid growth of European demand for petrochemicals spurred the 
construction of new capacities, surpassing the earlier surge in the United 
States’ market twenty years before. The high European expansion rate was 
explained by the combination of different factors, such as: relatively high 
economic growth; the use of different synthetics in the market, and a 
decrease in petrochemical prices relative to the rising prices of many other 
materials. As a result of this surge in demand for plastics, synthetic fibres, 
solvents, coatings, and other petrochemical products, European producers 
started to think of petrochemical growth rates in terms of GDP percentages 
rather than in real numbers. As a result of the multiplying effect, European 
producers became disappointed as petrochemical growth rates dropped 
sharply in the 1970s, which resulted in excessive productive capacities (Spitz, 
1988: 525-539).  
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The licensing of petrochemical technology had been liberated 
throughout the world since the 1970s. As a consequence, almost any country 
or private producer with enough money and courage to build large and 
modern petrochemical complexes employing the most modern capacities 
could do so with relative ease. In general, this meant the introduction of small 
European countries onto the world stage as they began to build their own 
plants instead of engaging in ventures with bigger producers already installed 
in the same trading area. Even countries such as Norway, Sweden, Finland 
and Portugal–all with populations far too small as to justify major investment 
in petrochemical projects for domestic consumption–eventually decided to 
build large installations, and to orient them towards major export trade (Spitz, 
1988: 467-468).  
The creation of new petrochemical installations started to increase in 
the 1960s and it was in full swing by the mid-1970s. This happened not only 
in small European countries, but also in non-traditional oil producer countries 
such as Canada, Mexico, Saudi Arabia and some East Asian countries. As a 
result of this additional build-up in capacity, both American and West 
European producers began to reduce their market scope, and faced a new 
problem: access to raw materials (Spitz, 1988: 467-468). 
The increased provision of petrochemical products in world markets 
exacerbated a major concern for developed economies, mainly because they 
were unable to assure access to feed-stock supplies. During the 1970s, the 
most important access to oil was consolidated in the hands of oil rich nations, 
including not only OPEC countries, but also Canada, Mexico, and other 
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countries with abundant oil and natural gas reserves. American and European 
petrochemical producers could not continue acting with the cartel attitude that 
dominated their actions a decade before (Spitz, 1988: 521-526).  
The abrupt changes in world energy resources occurred at the same 
time that the demand began a sharp decline. This happened after developed 
nations had already been affected by the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979. 
Therefore, the 1980s was a decade in which vertical integration and inward 
consolidation became the key to maintaining commercial positions in the 
world scene of petrochemicals. The goal became to increase competitiveness 
through the consolidation of economies of scale, thereby reducing production 
and transportation costs. This was a protective measure from the new 
countries that arrived to the industry. In addition, developed countries sought 
to focus on products with high added value and in which technology was still 
protected by proprietary rights (Spitz, 1988: 12). 
The world’s industry started building up their capacities based in very 
optimistic previsions of the future demand. However, its growth plans failed to 
predict the slow-down of the world economy in the 1980s, thus forcing the 
withdrawal and closure of large petrochemical installations in Japan, Western 
Europe and the United States. Spitz (1988: 539) explains that excessive 
capacity created a major structural problem for the industry because it 
became widely dependent on the major economic cycles in the world 
economy. As a consequence, the petrochemical industry had to face a major 
structural constraint and its development was determined by cycles of over-
production and under-production. 
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As world demand rose, the petrochemical industry began to increase 
production, investment and prices. This situation led producers to increase 
petrochemical productive capacity. This was accelerated by the demand and 
it led to over-production. Market saturation began to affect prices. Once prices 
began to fall, in turn affecting the demand, the low part of the cycle began; 
producers were forced to reduce both production and investment, and along 
with these, they saw their profits and prices reduced. This problem surfaced 
every 3-5 years (Spitz, 1988: 468; Rodriguez, 2005).  
 
7.2 From economic stringency to dismantling the demiurge apparatus 
 The new energy minister, Alfredo del Mazo, took office in April 1986.  A 
few months later, a new general strategy was established in order to convert 
petrochemicals into an export orientated industry. The 1986 plan–elaborated 
in collaboration with the Commerce and Industrial Fostering Ministry–, 
included a changed vision of the state’s promotional activities. As the goal 
passed from the production of raw materials to the promotion of 
competitiveness, the first premise of state action was to focus on the level of 
petrochemical chains. Integration of every chain–from basic building blocks to 
secondary and speciality products–let the state identify the particular 
necessities of every sector. The state was able to point out the sectors that 
would most easily convert to the new EOI strategy and to support them before 
aiding less competitive sectors (SEMIP-SECOFI, 1986 #227). 
The new plan offered a completely different picture of state action. This 
view considered the Commerce Ministry, Hector Hernandez, as a key 
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supporter. The Commerce Ministry assumed the attribution on defining 
commercial and industrial policies, role the Finance Ministry performed during 
the 1960s. Instead of locating the main problem of the industry in the lack of 
self-sufficiency, the new plan focused on the lack of articulation and 
integration among the industry, which was meant to foster competitiveness. 
Instead of forcing PEMEX to target the production of specific products defined 
as basic petrochemicals and to provide them to the consumer centers, the 
state continued consolidating the complexes in order to enhance public and 
private integration. The state did this in conjunction with the construction of 
large oil refineries. Instead of producing domestic surpluses to be sold in 
international markets, the industry would strive to integrate with international 
circuits, thereby gaining access to technology, market niches and new 
sources for financing investment. Instead of targeting global growth without 
considering the actual structure of the market, officials began to emphasize 
the petrochemical chains, one by one in order to make sharp definitions not 
only of the objectives, but also of the obstacles of future planning. Previous 
plans only emphasized the improvement or rationalization of state actions 
(SEMIP-SECOFI, 1986).  
 However, the state did not consider the actual circumstances of 
PEMEX engagements, nor the strategic participation PEMEX had had in the 
petrochemical industry. As a result of the debt crisis, PEMEX did not invest in 
new capacities as much as it responded to current demand. In addition, 
financial stringency and the correction of macroeconomic figures were still the 
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only goals of the state. Therefore, PEMEX was falling far behind the private 
sector as illustrated by Philip (1990: 44) 
“The cutbacks in PEMEX investment were not based on any careful 
study of the costs and benefits of particular investments (…) there can 
be little doubt that PEMEX did face profitable opportunities which it 
could neither take itself nor divest to the private sector (…). Oil refining, 
petrochemicals and natural gas production (including the export of 
natural gas to the United States) were all covered by the state 
monopoly so that any deficiencies in state funding could not be made 
up from the private sectors”. 
 
 As said in the previous chapter, from the four petrochemical poles 
outlined in the 1978 petrochemical plan, PEMEX began the construction of 
two in 1978: the Cangrejera and Morelos complexes. It abandoned the other 
two. PEMEX committed to finish the construction of the new plants before 
1985. This engagement, along with privately supported construction, would 
make Mexico a significant petrochemical power. But financial stringency 
affected not only the integration of petrochemical chains but also the 
construction of the Cangrejera and Morelos complexes, which suffered 
important delays. 
 The complementarities reached by private and public actors working 
together got important results such as: new infrastructure, physical integration 
of plants and brand-new installations that were ready to compete in the world 
markets. Private investors accepted to co-invest with different public agencies 
in order to create new infrastructure such as: railroads to attend business 
transport needs; new ports such as Altamira, whose petrochemical corridor 
was mainly financed by private petrochemical producers; Coatzacoalcos port 
whose construction was jointly financed between PEMEX and private 
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producers; and the Pajaritos port terminal, whose construction was financed 
by PEMEX (Rodríguez, 2005).  
 
“Much of the subsidies that had been agreed with the government 
would take place after the realization of private investments, and the 
new capacities were on place. Private and Public investment created 
much of the new petrochemical infrastructure together, and records of 
those inversions were filled by ANIQ. PEMEX disordered investment 
was widely criticized and some blamed PEMEX dispenses of public 
money for the crisis. [In petrochemical infrastructure] is hardly said that 
we wasted the resources, we invest all the resources received, maybe 
our plans were wrong, but money was used on implementing them” 
(Rodríguez, 2005). 
 
 
 Rodriguez (2005) assured that while some chains reached the goal of 
integration, others never did.  
 
“Before the crisis, we reached the goal of providing the market and 
even getting surpluses to export derivatives, the products 
manufactured by the private sector. We reached the objective of 
exporting by producing entirely through domestic production” 
(Rodríguez, 2005).  
 
When the year 1982 arrived, all the projects were half way to completion. The 
Cangrejera complex was completed as originally planned, while the Morelos 
complex called off the construction of some plants. The construction of both 
complexes was delayed long enough as to affect the production of derivative 
petrochemicals. In the private sector, plants that were half-constructed or in 
detailed planning stopped for two years, to be restarted in 1984. From 1982 
to 1986, PEMEX continued to assume the responsibility of fulfilling all 
petrochemical demand in the country whether its production allowed so or 
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not. PEMEX also tried to encourage exports in order to finance industry 
production (Rodríguez, 2005). 
 If in the period from 1982 to 1984 the petrochemical growth policy 
adjusted to economic stringency, the paradigm shift initiated in 1986 created 
a schizophrenic role for PEMEX. On one hand, the state continued assuming 
the provision of petrochemical raw materials and excluded private investment 
from production of petrochemicals in the constitution amendment of 1983. On 
the other hand, the new paradigm dictated the reduction of PEMEX’s 
demiurgic role. The 1982 crisis first and the paradigm shift that later took 
place made PEMEX reduce investment to the minimum in order to keep the 
secondary petrochemical industry functioning.  
The paradigm shift consolidated the embrace of an ideology of state 
withdrawal that implied transferring the state’s place to the market. As a 
consequence, the state abandoned the demiurgic role, and with it, the 
strategic place PEMEX had played in the support of domestic petrochemical 
production. This new policy approach made it difficult for officials to envision a 
solution for the shortage  of petrochemical raw materials that the market 
faced. The logical solution was importing them. Officials lost sight of the 
strategic role PEMEX’s investment had played. The new principles guiding 
petroleum policy hinged on different values. As a result, Mexico reinforced its 
dependency on imported basic petrochemicals in order to supply its industry. 
Between 1983 and 1988, Mexico spent about 5.5 billion US dollars on 
importing these commodities (GAO-US, 1991a: 2, GAO-US, 1991b: 5). 
Imports on primary petrochemicals constituted 22 percent of the total needs 
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of the industry, or 35 percent if fertilizer ammonia is excluded (Bucay, 1991: 
125). 
In addition, the mixed vision on petrochemical policy after 1986 had 
unattended consequences: Mexico consolidated international dependency 
instead of the hoped-for self-sufficiency. According to reports from the United 
States’ Congress in 1991 (GAO-US, 1991; GAO-US, 1991) the plants that the 
Mexican government began to build in the early 1980s were still incomplete at 
the beginning of the 1990s due to insufficient investment. PEMEX annulled 
the idea to complete 21 investment projects planned in 1978 in order to meet 
Mexico's demand for petrochemicals (GAO, 1991: 2; GAO, 1991: 5). The 
problem became complex because  
 
“Mexican law prohibits private and foreign investment in basic 
petrochemicals; the petrochemical industry had no other source of 
investment (…). The reduction of government investment in basic 
petrochemicals was followed by a corresponding investment reduction 
of secondary petrochemical producers” (GAO, 1991: 2). 
 
  
Mexican trade deficit in basic petrochemicals began to increase as a result of 
the insufficient investment in this sector’s production capacity. “The Mexican 
Petrochemical Commission believes that without sufficient investment, the 
need for dollars to pay for petrochemical imports could grow even greater, 
reaching as much as $8.6 billion by 1996” (GAO, 1991: 2).  
 
 
By 1986, the state abandoned the policy of subsidizing raw materials that had 
been established since 1959. Basic petrochemical prices reached 
international levels, after a period in which (Unger, 1994: 50) the prices of 
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petrochemical products sold by PEMEX in 1981 were from 40 to 63 percent 
lower than international levels and far from the original 15 percent the state 
had decreed in 1959. Private producers received the decision that PEMEX 
would sell only products produced in Mexico at the end of the third quarter of 
1986. For the first time in 20 years they were forced to buy raw materials 
abroad. In a short period of time, they had to gain both credits and 
international experience. PEMEX offered some of its expertise, but 
companies had to learn on the fly (Rodríguez, 2005).  
Private producers were forced to create a supply network and to 
negotiate the prices for raw materials on their own. They were, however, 
assisted by state officials in order to learn how to do business in PEMEX’s 
international circuits. However, the reduced volume of individual acquisitions 
implied price increments as well (Pani, 2005). PEMEX, following the 
constitutional requirement, continued to supply the market with basic 
petrochemicals. However, in October 1986, President De la Madrid published 
a first decree reclassifying basic products from 70 to 34,108 and liberalizing 
product permits for the private production of 500 additional products.109 
Nonetheless, even with this change, PEMEX was still the only producer of 
most of these products. 
                                                             
108 From 70 products classified as basic petrochemicals in 1986, PEMEX produced only 44 
and imported the rest for its distribution in domestic market (Morales, 1997: 58). 
 
109 Under the same deregulation, secondary products that had been restricted to Mexican 
producers until then (companies that had at least 60 percent Mexicans ownership) were 
reduced from 605 to 66 with the goal of injecting foreign investment in the sector. (Turner, 
1989) 
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A central point of the deregulation initiative was that the state did not 
need to change the petrochemical law of 1971 in order to create a new 
definition of PEMEX’s participation in the market. Paradoxically, the rules 
defined by President Echeverria in order to justify an increasingly demiurgic 
role in the sector were the same regulations guiding the state’s withdrawal 
and shift to the new policy. The 1971 law was so ambiguous that it granted 
the Energy Ministry enough discretional power to enable the definition of 
policies within contrasting objectives–such as state pre-eminence after 1971 
or market dominance from 1986 on. Nevertheless, PEMEX, the petrochemical 
commission and SEMIP continued the definition of PEMEX’s exclusive 
manufactures. There was no up-to-date public list of basic petrochemical or 
justifications of new products of exclusive PEMEX production until 1986. 
Decisions were taken on a case-by-case basis (Rodíguez, 2005).  
In these years the neoliberal approach co-existed with the old control 
pattern. For example, the petrochemical commission maintained its role of 
granting petrochemical permits until 1991, but at the same time the 
commission began acting as an consultative organization responsible for 
developing research, until its disappearance. In this phase plants with new 
permits also started operating.  In 1989, the permits granted in 1987-1988 
alone, added 25 percent in additional demand for basic petrochemicals 
(Bucay, 1991: 125). 
The accords signed in the Pacto de Solidaridad Económica in 
December 1987 were meant in part to contain inflation growth and the prices 
of basic petrochemicals and natural gas. These increased gradually until they 
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reached international standards. In contrast, private prices were kept 
constant; this was done to sustain what was previously established in the 
economic accord. In about one year, private producers of petrochemicals saw 
a considerable reduction in the huge profits that had been made thanks to 
PEMEX subsidies over the three previous decades. Profit levels–which had 
been significantly higher than those of international producers–reached 
international levels as well (Mattar, 1994). 
At the end of 1986, PEMEX announced the cancellation of the 30 
percent reduction in energy and raw material prices agreed to with companies 
prior to of the 1979 presidential decree. The industry contested this decision 
promptly. The decree had promised reduced prices for a ten-year period once 
plants began working, in exchange for investment in petrochemical 
infrastructure undertaken [?]jointly by PEMEX and private industrials from 
1978 to 1981. The government and ANIQ engaged in a heated fight, with 
private producers asking the Supreme Court to evaluate the legality of the 
action. Once the Supreme Court’s first decision favoured private industrials, 
De la Madrid’s government intensified pressures and finally the decree was 
“arbitrarily” (Rodriguez, 2005) annulled at the end of 1987. The agreement 
made with Lopez Portillo in 1978 had promised 10 years of special prices by 
decree, once the investments were done and the enterprise had credited its 
‘gained-right’ access to the program. So, in 1987 some companies were 
found with no more than a year of subventions, having in already exercised 
their investment in their own restructuration and infrastructure. 
  
216 
For the first time, actors began to talk about a special relationship 
between chemical producers and the state. “As we are basically a Mexican 
owned industry, the government had major margins and negotiation skills as 
to impose arbitrary decisions” (Rodríguez, 2005). In the mid-eighties, the 
government was not ready to accept a challenge like the one presented by 
the organization of chemical producers. Using the power of different 
Ministries, and the strong personalities of some Ministers, it struck back with 
all the means it had in hand, until ANIQ and the few corporations that 
continued the legal battle opted for abandoning the process. 
Companies were forced to make their own financial predictions in a 
new context and in a hard way. In a period of two years, PEMEX’s 
engagement of full provision ended, thus they had to learn the import process 
for raw materials directly.110 After Mexican’s adhesion to GATT, protectionist 
tariff and non-tariff barriers fell, special prices were annulled, and 
competitiveness became the flavour of the day (Pani, 2005). Most 
importantly, the state’s new ideology decreed no new investment in the sector 
or policies directed to create an adequate environment to foster investment. 
“The state just took back the patterns guiding the development of the industry 
for 25 years” (Pani, 2005).  For example, when the GATT agreements took 
effect in the summer of 1986, the cancellation of import permits liberalized 
imports of 87 percent of the national production–transforming them into tariffs. 
                                                             
110 Pani (2005) adds that direct provision from international markets created a new problem 
for the transport infrastructure. As PEMEX owned by law all transport capacity to receive and 
sell raw materials, private producers had no physical space to acquire products abroad. 
PEMEX let private producers use its own physical infrastructure or otherwise charged fees for 
receiving, storing, and handling provisions. 
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In turn, import tariffs were established at a mean of 5-10 percent. In the two 
years from 1986 to 1987, the official price lists, applied to 21 percent of the 
production, were eliminated (Mattar, 1994: 162). The last blow to the industry 
was related to competitiveness. As a result of the commercial liberalization, 
final producers such as the toy makers and some textile or rubber (for bike 
and car tires) makers disappeared in a couple of years.  
The chained effects on derivatives producers were important. As some 
industries planned on future consumption of companies that were fated to 
disappear, they also faced severe effects. The only options faced were 
restructuration towards exports or perishing (Pani, 2005).  
 Since 1985 and along with the challenge represented by structural 
reform, new industrial capacities began to work.  
 
“We have a complete new world. When Lopez Portillo consulted to join 
GATT in 1978, we had a petrochemical operation based on small, 
inefficient plants, using obsolete technology; of course we answered 
no [to the GATT adhesion] (…). By 1987, 80 percent of petrochemical 
and chemical production was manufactured in brand-new world-class 
plants that were efficient and competitive, which could easily take the 
risk of international competition” (Rodríguez, 2005).  
 
 
As President of ANIQ in 1987, Leopoldo Rodríguez (2005) proudly 
remembers saying to president De la Madrid “we [as a sector] are ready to go 
with Mexico into the world economy”.  
 
7.3 State promotional roles: two models living together? 
 As mentioned in chapter three, the 1982 internal negotiation inside the 
PRI-government resulted in the amendment of the so-called economic 
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chapter of the constitution. From there, the nationalist wing of PRI accepted to 
liberate most of the industrial branches in which the state was participating. 
The sole exception was basic petrochemicals, whose production was 
restricted to the state in the constitution. However, the list of basic products 
could be arbitrarily defined by the state, without following any technical 
definition. When the custodial role passed from restricting to empowering 
private investment, it was done without even changing the basic regulations 
in the sector. The Energy Minister had enough discretionary authority to 
define in a precise way the products that the state considered as basic, 
secondary, and tertiary.  
 The declassification process sought to reduce the pressure on PEMEX 
to meet the demand of the private sector. The state would reach international 
definition of what basic products are once the third decree was announced in 
1991. Since 1991, the state has only defined the eight building blocks at the 
origin of the petrochemical chains: the olefins (ethylene, propylene, 
butylenes, and butadiene) and the aromatics (benzene, toluene, and 
xylenes), plus carbon black. All the rest would be considered as secondary, 
and by definition, could be privately produced. 
  The petrochemical plans defined during the oil boom recognized the 
important effect that integration has on competitiveness. The state began to 
emphasize this issue as the key for future development. Integration, in the 
official documents, is considered as a determining factor in the 
competitiveness of the industry. According to the Energy Ministry (Secretaria 
de Energia, 1997: 38), integration can be as important as controlling scale 
  
219 
economies or technical innovation in some chains. Since the industry has 
been affected by low and high cycles since the 1980s, the competitiveness of 
the petrochemical chains relied on integration. Integrated chains allow the 
definition of strategic decision-making for producers: as profits come from 
upstream production, commercial positioning in the world market comes from 
downstream production. Transport costs became irrelevant when a producer 
could increase and manipulate prices along every petrochemical chain to 
increase both positioning and profits (Secretaria de Energia, 1997: 38). 
The attraction of private investment is an essential factor in reaching 
the objective of integrating production chains. Therefore, investment and 
integration became attached to privatization schemes. It is important to 
mention that even during the oil boom – when integration was an important 
objective of the state in order to increase the competitiveness of the industry 
– President Lopez Portillo did not consider changing the artificial structure in 
which the industry was born. In contrast, President De la Madrid’s reforms 
began by legalizing this industrial disarrangement through a constitutional 
amendment and granting to the state the production of basic petrochemicals. 
He reduced the list to its minimally technical expression later. Even if further 
state actions reduced the demiurgic role to its minimally technical expression, 
as we have shown, these decisions were done more on an ideological basis 
than on technical studies.  
The result was that the quasi-annulation of the demiurgic role affected 
the implementation of the reform negatively, as the old paradigm continued to 
coexist with the new one, thus complicating the achievement of the goal that 
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pursued the creation of competitive advantages. It did not matter how far the 
state would withdraw; in the end private producers still had to depend on 
PEMEX for getting hold of raw materials. For its part, PEMEX transformative 
capacities needed private capital and open private-sector participation, yet 
regulations still made it impossible for foreign firms to enter the Mexican 
market. 
 The pursuit of the main goals–integration and private investment–
became problematic when the major deregulation policy was announced in 
1991. The more the midwifery and husbandry roles would succeed, the more 
PEMEX would have to increase investment and production of basic 
products.111 So, public investment continued to be as important as it was in 
the past, even if the list of basic petrochemicals had been dramatically 
reduced. If their midwifery and husbandry plan to increase private 
participation were to succeed, the state would have to reinforce its demiurgic 
role.112  
The technocrats that aimed to provoke a paradigm shift sought new 
schemes,  and they always implied increasing demiurgic participation as in 
the past. Midwifery and husbandry actions looking to increase international 
competitiveness reinforce this contradiction. During interviews, 
                                                             
111 According to Bucay (1991) the petrochemical commission kept granting permits for 
production in order to induce private investment. However, the permits granted in 1988 alone 
increased by 25 percent of private demand on PEMEX’s basic products in 1989. 
 
112 As introduced in Chapter 3, the petrochemical and chemical industries are considered to 
be close because of the fact that industrial transactions occurring inside the different 
petrochemical chains develop from the same eight basic products. The different links of the 
chains give rise to about 74 different industries (Mattar, 1994; Chapman, 1991). 
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businesspeople keep saying that technocrats became “more Catholic than 
the Pope” when defending the orthodoxy of their policy and rejecting new 
investments in PEMEX transformative capacity. PEMEX indeed lost its role as 
a promotional agency, to become a public-sector industry. 
Moreover, there was no place in the context of the new paradigm for 
supporting the link between private and public domains because there was no 
place for the further expansion of demiurgic roles in the new paradigm. This 
comes in addition to the fact that the power of oil union–whose margin of 
manoeuvre was derived from its dual participation in the administrative 
council of PEMEX and the PRI political council–menat PEMEX’s management 
would be driven by political influences. Along with it, government dependence 
on oil revenues increased, representing 50 percent of total tax revenue 
(Gonzalez-Pedrero, 1982). The company financed PRI’s activities and the 
union’s ‘social’ activities. 
 
7.4 Integration as the key for the future 
 The declassification of basic petrochemicals saved PEMEX resources, 
but it hardly solved the disintegration of the industry. International producers 
that began to aggressively export to Mexico then occupied the place that 
PEMEX had abandoned. This fact only increased the obstacles for the state’s 
primary objective of promoting the integration of chains in domestic hands. 
Unger (1994: 52 points out that the reclassification of October 1986 allowed 
PEMEX to save 500 million US dollars yearly. However, transferring 
PEMEX’s import costs to private producers only accentuated the structural 
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disintegration of the Mexican industry in the context of an open economy. 
Private actors reacted by increasing imports on a temporary basis instead of 
investing in production themselves. Neither PEMEX nor the private sector 
would initiate new investment while waiting for the privatization process. 
Since the liberalization of the market, transnational corporations 
increased intra-firm commerce from 24 percent in 1980 to 57 percent in 1990. 
These exchanges were executed mainly with foreign enterprises acting in 
Mexico. In terms of exports, domestic firms tried to keep a diversified 
international strategy as a goal for trade and to avoid dependence on the 
American market. However, the most important exchange was from American 
imports in 75 percent and exports in 40 percent (Mattar, 1994: 182; Unger, 
1994). 113 
 As part of the trade liberalization policies, PEMEX began to assist 
private producers in dealing with international circuits, at the time PEMEX 
kept as the sole supplier to medium and small producers. The first goal was 
to teach them how to create international producer networks and to acquire 
products and technology, as well as to invest and setup ventures through 
associations. (Mattar, 1994). However, to foster integration and implement an 
aggressive policy of privatizations was part of the plan.114 Both PEMEX and 
private producers stopped new investment before for the privatization process 
that was later planned and initiated in 1988. The result of the first stage of the 
                                                             
113 European imports stood at 15 percent while Latin American exports represented 30 
percent. 
 
114 The complete privatization plans of 1993 and 1996 will be explained in chapter 8.  
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reform was that the competitiveness through integration, gained by the 
petrochemical industry during the oil boom, began to lose momentum as a 
result of the partial abandonment of demiurge. State place, as said, began to 
be filled through imports and integration began to be lost.  
 The state considered the growth in exports as a key part of its strategy 
to maximize the added value of hydrocarbons. This focus reinforced the 
competitive advantages in the best integrated chains in sectors such as 
synthetic fibres to benefit the textile industry, chemical specialties related to 
auto parts, electronic domestic products, communications and electronics, 
synthetic resins to improve the production of plastic products and elastomers, 
a basic material to produce rubber products (SEMIP-SECOFI, 1986). 
 As a result of the husbandry activities, the exports began to grow. As 
such, the participation of petrochemicals in total exports raised from 1.2 
percent in 1980 to 3.3 percent in 1990. The secondary products grew from 
0.3 percent to 1 percent in the decade. Final products, and particularly fibres, 
resins, and fertilisers, grew from 0.2 to 1.7 percent. Exports in proportion to 
production doubled to reach a peak of 22.1 percent in 1990. The most 
important growth in exports naturally came from final products (Unger, 1994: 
72). 
 De la Madrid’s government marked the first period in which no growth 
was registered since the inception of the petrochemical industry. Official 
figures reveal that between 1979 and 1985, the industry doubled its 
productive capacity. These numbers however, reflect the impressive results of 
the investment during the oil boom and reduce the impact of the crisis 
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years.115 The survival of the domestic producers is explained by the two 
temporary export plans initiated in 1982 and 1985. However, a study made by 
the Energy Commission in the Chambers of Deputies assures that the 
reforms made in 1986 let the petrochemical industry grow at a mean of 8 
percent in the second half of the 1980s–a growth led by exports and Export-
Oriented industries that took advantage of the export facilities constructed 
during the oil-boom (Arceo Castro, 1996: 19; Comision de Energéticos, 1995: 
11). 
 The state’s increasingly demiurgic role of the 1970s was rhetorically 
justified in order to reduce the concentration of the market in private hands. 
The new policy was looking to reinforce the consolidation of national 
champions; therefore concentration became an inevitable consequence for 
increasing competitiveness. In fact, the concentration of petrochemical 
production in Mexico was not dissimilar to that occurring in world markets. As 
in the past, the conditions of a quasi-monopoly that resulted from the initial 
privatizations would only reinforce the domestic market. This would not affect 
domestic consumers through market liberalization because consumers would 
have access to international supply if domestic conditions were not 
convenient to them.  Even if the conditions of international competitiveness 
were established, the plan sought to privilege the domestic ownership of the 
main industrial petrochemical groups, privileging Mexican integration and 
Mexican leadership in the domestic market (SEMIP-SECOFI, 1986: 29).  
                                                             
115 Look for footnote 18 on chapter 6. 
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 As the state kept a fixed attitude towards privileging and protecting 
domestic private investors, the law for attracting foreign direct investment 
simultaneously maintained the restriction of foreign producers. This clause 
still limits foreign participation to a maximum of 40 percent in any venture. 
Subsequently, the state created a similar stipulation in the privatization policy, 
in an attempt to reduce the concentrated market. Policy-makers were not 
aware that this concentration was no longer a problem in the promotion of 
national champions (Teichman, 1995: 23-25). 
 
7.5 The first privatizations 
 Grupo Industrial Alfa was one of the four groups in which the 
Monterrey Group was divided after the assassination of its President, Eugenio 
Garza Sada, in 1973. This firm was also the main beneficiary of the first stage 
of privatization, receiving control of the Mexico’s largest petrochemical plant 
in 1988. Alfa had begun its incursion into the chemical and petrochemical 
industries in 1956, when it bought Nylon de Mexico and Polioles. In 1976, 
they participated in the Mexicanization of Fibras Quimicas and two years 
later, it bought Petrocel – all these were industries related to the production of 
polyethylene fibres. Alfa’s chemical and petrochemical facilities represented 
17 percent of the synthetic fibres in the Mexican market concentrating on raw 
materials such as polyester, nylon, and spandex (Vila, 1994: 218-237). 
Alfa was a key ally of Lopez Portillo, and the government granted all 
the benefits that it could to support the Group’s aggressive business 
  
226 
diversification. However, Alfa’s expansionist attitude was disordered and it 
took control of many companies participating in almost every sector in the 
economy without having an industrial plan that would justify these actions. In 
order to fuel Alfa’s growth, the state granted the company special prices in 
electricity, gas, oil, and transport, in addition to fiscal credits and tax 
reductions.  
 By 1978, only three years after Alfa began to participate in the 
petrochemical sector, its assets in petrochemical production represented 31 
percent of the total revenues of the national industry. All this incursion into 
petrochemicals was done through join-ventures with world leaders in different 
areas: Nylmex for the production of Nylon with Dupont of the United States; 
Figusa for the production of polyester fibres with Akzo of Holland; Polioles for 
the production of chemical products with BASF of Germany; and Petrocel for 
chemicals products with Hercofina of the United States (Vila, 1994: Chapter 
7). 
 During Lopez Portillo’s government, Alfa initiated seven joint-ventures 
in which it kept control of the companies while acquiring technology from the 
foreign partners. At the beginning of the export plan, exports were centered 
on HYLSA steel (99 percent), only to be replaced by the export of paper, 
artificial fibres and televisions, which in few years represented 87 percent of 
Alfa’s total exports. Petrocel, an important exporter of DMT (a product used in 
the manufacturing of fibres and polyester) became among the most important 
exporters of the group since 1985.   
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Alfa’s finances began to show its weakness in 1980, indicating the 
firm’s impending crisis that would last seven years. The conglomerate 
experienced such grave economic troubles and losses between 1980 and 
1981 that Lopez Portillo’s government granted special loans through 
Banobras (a municipal development bank) in order to assume the exchange 
risk of its external debt that reached about 2.3 billion US dollars.  
Alfa was forced to give up control of its assets by foreign bankers and 
its administration council was relieved of stewardship duties.116 The firm was 
also forced to implement a rationalization plan in which the entire company 
was reorganized around business lines. Only three big sectors would 
continue to operate through subsidiaries after the restructuring process:  first, 
petrochemicals that were managed through Alpek; food that was controlled 
through Sigma; and steel that was controlled by HYLSA. Furthermore, the 
company divested the other sectors it had participated in and sold them. 
 Tereftalatos Mexicanos (TEMEX) was one of the first joint ventures in 
the production of petrochemicals initiated by the state in 1978. The 
construction of this initiative was announced in April and it represented the 
first venture in which PEMEX, Celanese (a national private producer owning 
28 percent of the assets) and Amoco (Standard Oil-Indiana and technological 
world leader with 8 percent) agreed to produce the basic materials for the 
production of Pure Terephthalic Acid (PTA). Production was concentrated in 
                                                             
116 Alfa was the most benefited business group from the FICORCA a few years later (CIEN 
A7/E45, quoted in Vila 1994: Chapter 7). 
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Cosoleacaque, Veracruz where PTA117 was manufactured from paraxilene. 
This plant would seek to make Mexico a self-reliant country in the production 
of this basic material and was the only national producer of it (Mercado de 
Valores, august 14, 1978: 1). 
 TEMEX was one of the first companies whose production was 
reclassified as a secondary petrochemical in 1986, and was sold in November 
1988–only four days before the end of Miguel de la Madrid’s government.  
The sale was unsurprisingly disputed by the most important producers of 
synthetic fibres in Mexico: Alfa, Cydsa, Gentor118, Celanese119 and even 
Amoco of the United States.  When TEMEX went on the selling-block, the 
company supplied PTA exclusively to three national champions in polyester 
production: Celanese (who already owned 28 percent of the assets), CYDSA, 
and Alfa. These three conglomerates combined to form 70 percent of the 
national polyester market. 
 The result of the public auction was announced in November 26, 1988. 
Alfa won the bid with an offer totalling one and one half the value of the 
company. Under this new company, Alfa became the only national supplier of 
TMT and DMT (basic raw materials for the productions of fibres and plastics). 
TEMEX was one of the biggest companies to be privatized in the De la 
Madrid’s government, and it was worth 200 million US dollars in 1988. The 
                                                             
117 PTA is a basic raw material in the production of polyester and synthetic fibers, of which 
Alfa had 30 percent of national production. 
 
118 These three groups are mostly controlled by Mexicans and managed to attract technology 
mainly by associations with world leaders in their specific sectors. All three are located in 
Monterrey. 
 
119 Mexican association with Hoechst owns 40 percent of Celanese. 
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privatization of TEMEX was announced by Nafinsa that sold 58 percent (out 
of the 68 the bank owned) of the company’s assets. It would eventually force 
Alfa to stay associated with Celanese. On the other hand, Celanese would 
also consolidate its position in synthetic fibres. Since TEMEX was the main 
supplier of raw materials to Celanese, the integration of the two main players 
would also be sustained.120 
 With the attainment of TEMEX, Alfa became one of the world’s top five 
producers of polyester and the only one in Mexico that produced raw 
materials for the textile sector. The acquisition of TEMEX resulted in Alfa 
gaining monopoly control of its main raw materials market. It also resulted in 
the complete integration of the chains that produced fibres and textiles, which 
were already controlled by Alfa. This fact would significantly reduce the 
competition Alfa had to face in the liberalization of the market. The acquisition 
also represented Alfa’s inception into international markets and it meant that 
Mexico would become a competitor of Korea and Taiwan, which were world 
leaders in the production of polyester. 
 Petrocel–the Alfa subsidiary that officially bid for the company–was the 
first to market Dimetil Tereftalato (DMT) in the world, and Tereftalatos 
Mexicanos was the ninth top producer of Tereftalic Acid (PTA) in the world at 
the moment of its privatization, according to official reports. This high level of 
production greatly influenced the state’s decision to grant the company’s 
                                                             
 
120 For details on this privatization see  Marco A. Torres ‘Grupos locales disputan paraestatal’ 
El norte 26-10-1988 and Marco A Torres ‘Tereftalatos otorga a Alfa liderazgo en 
petroquimica.’ El norte, 26-11-88 This belongs in the Bibliography 
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assets to Alfa. Thus, Alfa became associated with Celanese and PEMEX.  
Alfa became the first national producer of petrochemicals. However, 
Celanese gave up its participation in 1990.121 
 Only one year after the privatization of TEMEX, Petrocel became the 
first exporting company in the country. Its exports grew by 27 percent in only 
one year. The newly acquired plant enabled Petrocel to expand the 
elaboration of polyester plastic and photographic film. In the moment of its 
privatization the plant was only 10 years old, which provided Alfa state of the 
art technology, propelling it to become the leading producer of fibres and 
primary materials for fibres in months. 
The goods produced in the domestic market by Alfa, allowed it to 
follow what Pozas (1999: 185) calls a ‘nationally centered strategy of 
internationalization’ in which Alfa maintained a central position in the 
international relationship. This made it capable of inviting foreign partners to 
enter joint ventures in Mexico. Alfa continued to maintain control of the 
Mexican market in which the strategic alliances were carried out – whether 
they were technological alliances, long-term supply contracts, the joint 
creation of a new subsidiary, or a combination of the three. In this model, the 
local firm always maintained the control over its company and its subsidiaries 
by keeping the majority of shares. Meanwhile, foreign firms used Alfa’s 
                                                             
121 Press reports argued that the state choose Alfa mainly for the expansion plan Alfa outlined 
with the acquisition, and because of the important level of investment during the next five 
years worth more than 200 million US dollars. 
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knowledge of the Mexican market to coordinate foreign investment without 
directly competing with Alfa itself. 
 
7.6 Privatization as state policy 
 The first plan to privatize petrochemicals was implemented during the 
De la Madrid’s government on a plant by plant basis. This plan sought to deal 
with the two most important problems in the industry simultaneously: 
integration and lack of investment. Private sector actors acquiring specific 
plants that would be conducive to their specialization would achieve 
integration.  
The state maintained an active role in inducing and supervising private 
investment and avoiding rent seeking on the part of the buyer. In doing so, 
the state required potential buyers to compose a detailed investment plan in 
order to qualify for the bids. The technical feasibility of the long-term 
investment plan became one of the most important criteria in assigning the 
plants. Finally, the state did not immediately relinquish entire participation in 
the process in order to supervise the transition and to ensure the integrity of 
the private sector.   
Integration was facilitated by the fact that buyers were already clients 
of basic petrochemicals produced by PEMEX. These often operated in the 
same the petrochemical complexes.122 Therefore, the process of passing 
                                                             
122 It is worth remembering that PEMEX planned to integrate production in the same physical 
spaces in which it produced basic petrochemicals. The original plan was to build 4 
petrochemical poles in 1979, which were later reduced to 2. 
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control from PEMEX to private producers was relatively smooth. Private 
producers bought up-to-date installations that allowed a faster integration with 
domestic chains and increased international competitiveness. There was also 
the notion of privatizing on a plant-by-plant basis. This way, capital would be 
relatively accessible to almost any medium to large company–depending on 
the product–and the company would be gaining access to raw materials and 
integrating backwards through the chain.123 
Privatization became a sort of midwifery action that allowed the state to 
integrate national champions. Blending this approach with some state 
husbandry would consolidate international competitiveness for the 
petrochemical groups. It is important to remember that, according to the plan, 
large domestic producers would increase their quasi-monopoly influence over 
the domestic market, which would in turn reduce foreign competition in the 
Mexican market. As Pozas (1992; 1994; and, 1999) studied in greater detail 
during the 1990s, the internationalization strategies followed by business 
groups were dependent on the nature of the industrial sectors in which they 
participated. However, even in cases like the internationalization of the 
cement industry, which–by the nature of the product–demanded the 
expansion of production abroad, the state assured that national groups 
reinforced their dominant position in the Mexican market before its 
internationalization. 
                                                             
123 The plan even considered the possibility that medium-sized companies might associate 
among themselves in order to bid on public assets, assisting the integration of different 
specialities that would have otherwise been excluded from the transition. 
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 Nevertheless, the petrochemical privatization plan would also affect the 
interests of the union-owned industries that were related to servicing PEMEX. 
Privatization would also affect the union’s role of representing workers and it 
would result in the reduction of administrative personnel that this privatization 
would have implied. Moreover, the union’s capacity in maintaining monopoly 
control over service companies and the representation of workers would be 
threatened by the privatization of petrochemical national champions.124  
Conflicts with the Planning and Budget Minister at that time, Carlos 
Salinas, were indicative of the decline in economic interests of the union. 
Salinas began to establish the most stringent norms in assigning public 
works–especially in relation to PEMEX. Since January 1984, the flux of 
contracts to union service companies and sub-contractors were cut. Only in 
the petrochemical industry, the union had been assured 50 percent of the 
construction, development and dismantling of the plants. In addition, the 
union’s management of social benefits from PEMEX to workers (housing, 
hospitals, supermarkets, etc.) would be threatened as well.125 As the union 
controlled just about every position in PEMEX’s management, the company 
employed about 3,000 persons under the label of personal de confianza 
(trustees) in order to ensure strategic functions and the reform of PEMEX. 
 Behind the scenes, the problems between Salinas and the oil union 
increased as soon as Salinas became the PRI candidate for President. 
                                                             
124 The union exercised a closed shop, exclusively representing workers from the rank-and-
file to the technical expert. In addition, clause 36 of the collective contract signed by PEMEX 
and the union in 1946, guaranteed that the union would receive at least 40 percent of the 
service contracts. 
 
125 See Corro in Proceso (14 marzo 1988; ) 
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Salinas’ main objectives were to improve the management of PEMEX and the 
continuation of structural adjustment that we will detail in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 8. Institutionalizing the paradigm shift: deadlock and 
failure 
 
 Carlos Salinas’s government (1988-1994) focused mainly in gaining 
national and international trust by attracting new investment. His government 
implemented a radical reform agenda that concentrated its efforts on reducing 
external debt and on diversifying commercial destinations. Once the debt 
agreement was reached, the goal was to connect economic growth with 
international markets, to diversify commercial destinations, and to attract new 
investment. In the first quarter of 1990 though, Salinas’s government decided 
to negotiate a Free Trade Agreement with the United States, which was 
extended to NAFTA when Canada was included. This period, characterized 
by government and private producers working together, reinforced a new 
collaboration trend that was based in a protective liberalization of the national 
industries while going through the process of internationalizing the economy. 
Nevertheless, Salinas was unable to change the core of the nationalist 
revolutionary policy, specifically at the base of the petroleum policy. All reform 
process showed its limits. 
 Salinas’s determination to consolidate credibility in the shift of the 
development paradigm was the key of his period. Most of Salinas’s legitimacy 
problem derived from questioned elections, PRI fracture and internal 
resistance to advancing structural reform of the economy. One of the most 
resilient opposition against the new development agenda was the oil union, 
whose leaders not only funded Cuauhtemoc Cardenas’s opposition 
movement, but they also resisted openly any reform in the petroleum industry 
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and any possibility to change the conditions of the collective agreement. For 
this reason, after a few weeks in office, Salinas imprisoned oil union leaders, 
changed the rules of FDI in order to attract investment into the sector, 
reformed PEMEX’s structure and created the conditions for privatization. 
 This chapter will focus on the collaboration and deepening of structural 
reform in the petroleum industry. It is characterized by the definition of new 
rules that were meant to attract private investment, by the institutional 
reorganization of PEMEX and by the leading role played by chemical 
businesspeople inside business organizations during the negotiation of 
NAFTA. Yet the story is one in which the government failed to pass the 
petrochemical privatization or to attract new private investment into the 
sector, in spite of the important reforms that had been accomplished. The 
petroleum sector seemed destined to continue to live with the nationalist 
revolutionary institutions for a long time. 
 
8.1 Salinas strikes back 
 If the year 1986 began with a manifestation of the oil union leadership 
power that threatened President Miguel de la Madrid, 1989 surprised the 
country with the incarceration of the whole oil union leadership. The 
imprisonment of Joaquin Hernandez Galicia and Salvador Barragan 
Camacho along with 34 other oil union members was motivated not only by 
the union’s opposition to the reform-wing of the PRI, but also to the 
privatization of PEMEX’ secondary petrochemical industry. 
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 Since the beginning of Salinas’ government, the President announced 
his intention of restructuring PEMEX, which implied the withdrawal of the 
significant demiurgic role that the state had played in the industry (García 
Reyes, 2005: 371-376). Even with the leadership imprisoned, the government 
had to deal with ample resistance in order to initiate the reforms. Since 1987, 
the oil union leadership had funded an internal opposition movement led by 
Cuauhtemoc Cardenas (son of the oil-nationalizer ex-President Lazaro 
Cardenas, 1934-1940) in order to save the nationalist strategy for the 
country’s development and especially for the management of the petroleum 
industry. This resistance resulted in the division of the party when Cardenas 
opted to abandon PRI and created a movement to campaign for the 
presidency in 1988.126  
 Another source of conflict was the renegotiation of the collective 
agreement between PEMEX and the union in relation to austerity plans of the 
state. The renegotiation began just a few months after the imprisonment of 
the union leaders127 and it reduced union benefits drastically. Among the 
                                                             
126 In 1987, Cuauhtemoc Cardenas and Porfirio Munoz Ledo began to form the Democratic 
Current inside the PRI. The main goal was to attack the traditional way in which the President 
selected the successor. The process resulted in the fissure of the PRI, and the formation of a 
larger coalition named the Democratic National Front that was meant to support Cardenas as 
a presidential candidate. After the contested election in the summer of 1988, the DNF 
became the Partido de la Revolucion Democratica (PRD). The PRD challenged the PRI, 
arguing that they were the real inheritors of the Revolutionary project the PRI had 
relinquished with neoliberal reforms. For a couple of years, Salinas and the PRI had faced an 
ideological issue, as the PRD’s platform was the failure of the reform process initiated a 
couple of years before. “In the Cardenas–Munoz Ledo view, as the official party pursues its 
monetarist policies to the detriment of sectors that have supported it, the pacts will rupture 
completely, benefiting the PRD which will attract groups alienated from the PRI even as the 
PRD strengthens its own network for the 1994 presidential campaign” (Wilkie, 1990 p. 43) 
 
127 Sebastian Guzman Cabrera –the union leader installed by a convention manipulated by 
Salinas’ government after the imprisonment of the former leadership– lost the  leadership in 
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privileges lost in the 1989 agreement were: PEMEX’s obligation to subsidize 
union stores; the union’s exclusive right to perform contract work for dry-land 
drilling, plant maintenance, industrial installations and infrastructure 
development; the requirement that PEMEX must pay 2 percent of the value of 
all outside contracts to the union’s social works fund; and the obligation of 
contracting companies to employ union personnel. The 1991 agreement 
brought even further revisions undermining union participation in the 
allocation of jobs. Promotions were also eliminated and union interference in 
the organization of the enterprises was terminated. As a result PEMEX’s labor 
force was reduced from 212,000 to 110,000 persons between 1989 and 1993 
(Teichman, 1996: 6; Loyola-Diaz, 1990). Even if most analysts agreed that 
the imprisonment of the oil union leadership opened the way to push for 
PEMEX’s reform, the reorganization of PEMEX waited until 1992. 
 
8.2 The reorganization of PEMEX 
The sewer line explosions in downtown Guadalajara in April 1992128 
gave the government the opportunity to reform the organization of PEMEX. 
The government presented the issue as an infringement upon public security, 
thus pushing PEMEX’s administrative reform. In 1990, the Energy, Mines and 
Parastatal Industries Ministry’s (Secretaría de Energía, Minas e Industria 
Paraestatal, SEMIP Spanish acronym) National Program for Energy 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1993 after a five-year term to Carlos Romero Deschamps. With the change in leadership, the 
reforms were jeopardized because the new union leader was not as complacent as Guzman 
had been. 
128 For the Guadalajara explosions see Galarza, Corro & Correa in Proceso. April 27, 1992, 
and May 4, 1992. 
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Modernization announced the government’s intention to rationalize PEMEX’s 
organization in order to push decentralization–limiting management 
responsibilities in business lines–and to create new scales and scopes to 
enhance efficiency (García Reyes, 2005: 371). 
In July 1992, Congress passed the new regulation on PEMEX’s 
administration, which established PEMEX as an organization comprising a 
corporate staff and four operational units (Rousseau, 2006: 391).129 PEMEX 
based its reorganization upon a proposal elaborated by McKinsey and Co. in 
which the guiding idea was letting PEMEX set specific agreements with 
investors according to the company business lines. For doing that, PEMEX 
was reorganized by creating a corporate control holding and four subsidiaries 
(García Reyes, 2005: 370-375; Rousseau, 2006: 390-391). 
 In January 1993, the new subsidiaries began functioning 
independently. They were: PEMEX - Exploration and Production, PEMEX - 
Refining, PEMEX - Gas and Basic Petrochemicals, PEMEX - Petrochemicals, 
and, additionally, an autonomous organism named PEMEX International in 
order to deal with PEMEX investments abroad. The new units enjoyed 
autonomy to define organization, planning, finances, investments, business 
plans, and administration. Along with it, every unit received control over 
facilities, plants, and for the first time, the government defined a price for each 
unit (García Reyes, 2005: 371-375).  
                                                             
129 The administration Council of PEMEX increased its seats from 9 to 11, leaving 5 to the oil 
union, and keeping the six others who were appointed by the President in order to ensure the 
government retained control of the company. Even with these reforms, the oil union kept a 
strong position in the definition of PEMEX’s policy. 
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The reorganization of PEMEX –along with the reclassification of basic 
products– created a clear physical division in the complexes, determining 
what and where the state would continue producing and what and where was 
to be privatized in the years to come. For the first time, the government made 
it clear that PEMEX - petrochemicals owned 60 units that produced 
secondary petrochemicals and 10 petrochemical complexes (Garcia Reyes, 
2005: 373). Along with the new interpretation of the previous custodial 
definitions, this restructuring would facilitate the eventual sale of the 
petrochemical plants and complexes. 
In mid-1992, PEMEX has announced the disincorporation of secondary 
petrochemicals and the disinvestment from obsolete plants counting on 20 
years or more. PEMEX closed the ammoniac and acrylonitrile plants in 
Cosoleacaque, and the methanol plant in San Martin Texmelucan. Along with 
this policy, the company decided to halt the production of non-biodegradable 
detergents. 
Some aspects of the policy that were subsequently followed by 
PEMEX altered the general frame in which PEMEX had been playing. The 
management of PEMEX by business streams, and the evaluation of its 
performance according priority to profitability altered the subsidizing attitude 
PEMEX had played in Mexico historically. However, as the privatization 
sequence did not follow as planned, management costs increased, as 
services offered inside PEMEX subsidiaries were established in real market 
prices, and administration apparatuses were duplicated or triplicate in every 
unit (Pani, 2005).  
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As we will explain in the next section, the basic rules regulating FDI, 
the Petrochemical Commission and the attraction of investments also 
changed. The Petrochemical Commission was dismantled in 1993, and it was 
reduced to the maintenance of official figures and institutional statistics of 
public and private producers. 
 
 8.3 Different pieces of a new custodial role 
 After a decade of recession, the attraction of investment into the 
petrochemical sector became ineluctable. Along with the creation of a 
specialized subsidiary that was in charge of producing and marketing 
petrochemicals, the attraction of new investment forced further reforms in 
related issues: changing the rules to attract investment in a very restricted 
sector, reclassifying petrochemicals in order to expand the scope of private 
participation, and creating financial strategies to widen physical infrastructure. 
 
8.3.1 New rules for FDI 
 On May 16, 1989 the government published new rules for the 
application of the Law to Regulate and Attract Foreign Direct Investment in 
the official gazette. As Salinas had no control in Congress, the new 
regulations passed as a presidential decree that would define the application 
of the Law. The government opened a new debate on the legality of 
decreeing a regulation that contradicted both the Law and the constitutional 
mandate (Medina-Mora, n.d). Acting by decree Salinas tried to avoid failure in 
a conflictive, and almost certainly unsuccessful, negotiation in Congress to 
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pass a new Law to regulate FDI. The government sought to overcome the 
restrictive regulations related to the oil and petrochemicals (among others), 
constrained by the constitution.  
 The new rules opened a side door to FDI in petrochemicals. In 
combination with the reclassification of petrochemicals, the Mexican 
government gave foreign investors the possibility to acquire 100 percent 
ownership of a secondary petrochemical plant if they established a special 
trust with a Mexican credit institution (GAO-US, 1991). The trust would give 
the foreign investor the governance of the company and the profits from the 
venture, while direct control of the company would remain with the Mexican 
trustee during 20 years (Medina-Mora, n.d.: 174).  
The second way in which the state planned to attract investment was 
through the construction of utilities by national or international companies 
under the auspices of PEMEX, who would also manage the operation of the 
plant, providing return to the investor, and ensuring the long-term provision of 
raw materials at stable prices (GAO-US, 1991, Davila-Sanchez, 1994).  
 Embedding foreign investment in the domestic market was difficult due 
to the fact that foreign investors sought to control the industry from the oil well 
to the final product. Still, new regulations allowing foreign investment into the 
sector tried to overcome the general restriction established in 1973, a 
limitation prevailing until today, limiting the ownership of a petrochemical plant 
to 40 percent. As said before, on 1990, foreign investors were allowed to 
create a trust that would control new enterprises and leave all profits to the 
investors. Since 1996, foreign investors were allowed to control 100 percent 
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of any new plant producing secondary petrochemicals, as we will see in next 
chapter. 
 
8.3.2 Reducing basic petrochemicals to its minimal expression 
 The second main piece of policy shift was the reclassification of 
petrochemicals. In close consultation with private producers, De la Madrid’s 
government reduced the list in 1986, and then Salinas’ government adjusted 
the list from 34 to 20 petrochemicals classified as basic in 1989, to finally 
reach 8 basic petrochemicals during NAFTA negotiations in 1993 (Rodríguez, 
2005). The government also decreased the number of petrochemicals 
classified as secondary from over 700 to 66, and for the first time provided a 
definitive list of these products. All the petrochemicals that were not included 
in these two categories were unregulated and therefore opened to complete 
private and foreign ownership (GAO-US, 1991). 
 Even if the Petrochemical Commission disappeared in 1993, Salinas’ 
government deregulation affected its work. First, the government restricted 
rules to issue petrochemical permits, adding the limit of 90 days to release 
permits after which applications would be automatically accepted. Second, 
the reclassification of basic and secondary petrochemicals ended the 
commission’s discretion to define the products. Third, as the commission 
ceased its regulatory role, the government transformed it to a consultant body 
to kept statistics from national producers.  
 The space for embedded autonomy had suffered an institutional 
alignment during the oil boom. Even though during the 1980s the commission 
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still kept the regulatory role and was responsible to releasing permits to 
producers it has played since the 1960s. With the reclassification of basic 
petrochemicals by the government the commission became redundant. The 
location of exchanges shifted to the Commerce and Industry Ministry, the 
institution responsible for the negotiation of NAFTA. The adjustment of the 
basics list to NAFTA requirements will be discussed on the following pages.  
However, even if petrochemical production was opened to private 
participation, PEMEX has still been the only producer of those goods until 
2000. The only manufacturer of ethylene, vinyl, and butadiene in Mexico is 
PEMEX until now. According to Pani (2005), PEMEX’s participation on those 
markets stayed untouched because their main consumers were small and 
medium manufacturers.  
 
8.3.3 New financial architecture 
 PEMEX created a program to obtain private or foreign investment in its 
petrochemical plants. In exchange for capital funds to construct the plant, 
PEMEX promised to repay companies with petrochemical products 
elaborated from those new plants. Under PEMEX supervision, the companies 
built the plants leaving PEMEX as the operator (Davila-Sanchez, 1994; GAO-
US, 1991). 
 As Davila-Sanchez (1994) has studied in detail, to attract investments 
without losing property, PEMEX instated two major policies: 
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- In 1989, PEMEX initiated programs in order to foster private domestic 
investment in the construction of new plants in exchange for raw materials for 
the investors. 
- In order to augment the integration and productivity capacity of 
intermediary products, an association between private producers and PEMEX 
was framed. Taking into account that the supply of basic petrochemicals was 
in their interest, the private sector was invited to finance the construction of 
plants that were in process of building during the 1990s. These programs 
assured that PEMEX would receive the investment allowing the company to 
increase production.  
Following the same author (Davila-Sánchez, 1994), the programs took 
two different forms: 
a. The advanced payment plan: This plan was applied to the 
construction projects that were held up due to inadequate state 
resources. The investor groups paid PEMEX in advance for the 
products that the new plants would soon produce. PEMEX used 
that money to let the plants prepare for production. Furthermore, 
the clients would receive an annual pre-accorded volume of basic 
petrochemicals until the amount invested was returned, including 
the interest. 
b. The Build-Lease-Transfer Plan: This program was conceived to 
foster new projects. The private corporations built, leased and 
transferred the petrochemical plants to PEMEX, while PEMEX 
reserved the right to choose the technology and engineering 
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standards in addition to supervising the plant’s construction. 
PEMEX also kept the operation of the factory, renting it with the 
buy-out option from the original constructor. PEMEX paid the rent 
with a long-term supply of basic petrochemicals until the original 
investor got back the investment. 
As said in previous chapters, the competitiveness of an Export-
Oriented petrochemical industry mainly stands on the degree of chain 
integration because integration guarantees constant prices in raw materials 
(SEMIP-SECOFI, 1986). In spite of all the reforms described, PEMEX kept 
the role of acting as the most important supplier in the industry (García 
Reyes, 2005: 371-376). PEMEX still assumed the responsibility for the 
competitiveness of the sector, continuing its supply of traditional low-prices 
through making long terms contracts with its clients and keeping stable 
prices, supply, and conditions. 
Not surprisingly, American corporations were still reluctant to invest in 
Mexico’s petrochemical industry by 1991. Their argument that the Mexican 
state kept a government monopoly over oil production blocking the full 
integration of the industry into private hands was constant throughout the 20th 
century. The other argument was that the state monopoly that produced basic 
petrochemicals was incapable of providing all the raw materials necessary for 
producing secondary goods. Last, but not least, and maybe as a more 
realistic argument for the discouragement of American investment, most of 
the reforms granting security on foreign investment on the sector rested on 
presidential decrees and discretional measures of Mexican institutions. As we 
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have argued before, and Susana Chacón (2006: 229-255) has documented, 
American petroleum producers mistrusted the lack of institutionalization on 
the Mexican energy policy. Mexican government has tried to attract foreign 
investment without assuring long-term warrants to investors in different 
periods of history, a fact that American producers reject. Market liberalization 
created for American producers a better scenario, for since the market 
opening in 1986 Mexico has been importing from American producers (GAO-
US, 1991). 
 
8.4 NAFTA’s 6th chapter 
Considered as a watershed for Mexican traditional politics, the “making 
of NAFTA” is another example of embedded autonomy (Cameron et al., 2000 
quoted on Ortiz Mena NL, 2005). State and private actors worked together 
during the negotiation with the United States and Canada.130 The Mexican 
government negotiated based on the information produced by private sector 
organizations and defended every sector’s positions in order to establish the 
Mexican goals and limits in every chapter of NAFTA. Private owners and 
organization’s leaders were present on defending their own interests on what 
                                                             
130 In an extremely quick chronology, in 1989, a few weeks after taking office, Salinas met 
President George Bush in Houston where the American President invited Salinas to form a 
free-trade region, an idea Mexico’s president rejected. After Salinas’s participation in Davos 
in February 1990, the Mexican president decided to accept the invitation, leaking the decision 
in March 1990 in the United States’ press. During spring 1990, at Salinas’ demand, the 
Mexican Senate organized a national forum to study the future possibilities for Mexican 
regional future from which, not surprisingly, the Senate endorsed the idea of negotiating a 
free-trade zone with the United States, thereby creating the image of national support for the 
government. Negotiations started in June 1990. In February 1991 Canada joined the process 
and the official signature of the document was in December 1992. After a complex legislative 
approval process on the US Congress, NAFTA began on January 1994 (Puga, 2004, Ortiz 
Mena LN, 2005a, 2005b). 
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was colloquially known as “the next door room”. They advised the Mexican 
negotiation team on issues related to their industries/sectors. 
ANIQ established contact with the American and the Canadian 
counterparts since 1988 in order to evaluate regional integration in chemicals. 
In that year, Mexico began studying the possibility of joining a five-sectors 
integration agreement that had been discussed on a tripartite basis earlier in 
1988, recognizing the American political intention to push for integration 
(Rodriguez, 2005). In 1991, ANIQ suggested that integration with the 
American market would be advantageous for Mexico. Their argument in favor 
of integration was that Mexico could benefit from petrochemical production in 
the United States, and it could join the provision networks settled in the 
Mexican Gulf (Puga, 2004: 101; Bucay, 1991: 119-157). 
By September 1990, some industrials were ready to push the five-
sector-negotiation initiated two years before, when ANIQ’s president, 
Leopoldo Rodríguez, played a fundamental role in persuading the 
membership of Consejo Coordinador Empresarial (Business Coordinating 
Council CCE) to support NAFTA. After meeting CCE’s leaders to talk about 
the process reached by chemical and petrochemical negotiations, Rodriguez 
suggested the government’s negotiation team to establish two different 
agendas in order to avoid contaminating the negotiations with domestic topics 
worrying entrepreneurs. Businesspeople were preoccupied because “not-
defined issues” related to infrastructure, consumables prices, energy, logistic 
and labor among others, were not in the agenda. As suggested by Rodriguez 
(2005) being Mexican nuisances, those issues integrated a domestic agenda 
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created in order to avoid contaminating the negotiation with the United States 
and Canada. 
In addition to this, ANIQ’s furnished the methodology to integrate the 
external agenda. As it is well known, the government’s negotiation team 
asked every industrial, agricultural, and service chamber for a monograph 
that included the state of the sector, which aspects were ready for 
negotiation, which were not negotiable, and the timing they needed to open 
the sector to free trade. The goal was to identify the weaknesses and 
strengths in order to define goals and limits of the negotiation (Rodríguez, 
2005; Puga, 2004: 131-157). In the 1970s, ANIQ developed a methodology to 
analyze the petrochemical and chemical sector’s real situation. This method 
was extended to the rest of the industries in order to attend the government’s 
request of producing the sectors monograph that would support the 
negotiation process (Puga 2004: 131-157). 
Private participation was organized through the Coordinator for Foreign 
Trade Business Organizations (Coordinadora de Organismos de Entidades 
de Comercio Exterior, COECE), which was an ad hoc organization created 
and funded by private sector organizations. CCE’s final decision was taken by 
Presidents of CCE, CONCAMIN (Confederacion de Camaras Industriales, 
Industrial Chambers Confederation), CMHN (Consejo Mexicano de Hombres 
de Negocios, Mexican Council of Businessmen), and CEMAI (Consejo 
Empresarial Mexicano de Asuntos Internacionales, Mexican Entrepreneurs 
Council for International Affairs): Rolando Vega, Luis German Carcoba, 
Antonio Madero Bracho, and Juan Morales Doria. These four men decided to 
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create a new, very inclusive organization that would monopolize the 
negotiation. Every chamber (industrial, commerce, services, and agriculture) 
would choose its representative (Puga 2004: 131-157).  
Even if there are debates on the government’s influence on the 
COECE’s definition and further organization (Alba y Vega 2000, Cameron y 
Tuin (2000) y Jacek (2000) quoted on Puga, 2004: 131-149), Juan Gallardo 
Thurllow acted as President following CCE’s decision. For the selection of 
COECE’s General Director, the second position on board, it has been 
documented that the General Director of Banamex (National Bank of Mexico), 
Antonio Ortiz Mena (Finance Minister during the Stabilizing Development 
period as seen previously) selected a very close collaborator of his, Guillermo 
Güemez (Puga, 2004: 131-149).131 
  COECE had two different internal organizations. The first one was 
following the productive sector structure. The second was in charge of 
NAFTA chapters’ negotiation. For the first one, ANIQ coordinated the 
chemical sector in what Rodriguez (2005) considered “a wide sense of the 
term”: including basic and intermediary chemicals, using  
 
“Almost the same definition used in the United States, which included 
paints, detergents, perfumes, and all kind of products manufactured 
from chemicals. Each sector had a coordinator who acted as a 
government advisor” (Rodríguez, 2005). 
 
                                                             
131 Banamex is one of the biggest banks in Mexico, controlling 25 percent of the market. After 
1982 bank nationalization, the president named every bank’s general director. Salinas named 
old finance minister mastermind of the stabilizing development period discussed on chapter 
5, Antonio Ortiz Mena as Banamex’s General Director. Puga (2004:131-149) documented 
that Guillermo Güemez was named COECE’s General Director on Ortiz Mena’s influence and 
recommendation. Ortiz Mena is related to Salinas family as well. 
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 The second COECE’s internal organization followed the negotiations: 
chapter by chapter. “Each chapter was negotiated by a different group, and 
inside the group there was a private advisor group leaded by theme 
coordinators.” Rodriguez also played that role during the making of NAFTA’s 
sixth chapter related to energy and petrochemicals, and advised the 
government in relation to monopolies and public enterprises during the 
negotiation of the chapter. “Mexico was required to make a Law to regulate 
economic competition [Ley de competencia economica], thus creating the 
entire infrastructure to regulate on this subject” (Rodríguez, 2005).  
 In the context of these negotiations, the government accorded the 
reclassification of basic petrochemicals. For the first time since 1959, private 
and public actors defined together the 8 products considered as basic 
petrochemicals since then. From this reclassification, the government made 
clear which products were reserved to the state, liberating all the rest from 
legal restrictions in order to attract foreign and private investment (Kessel et 
al, 1994: 129-151). By extension, the discretion enjoyed by the petrochemical 
commission to define which were basic and secondary petrochemicals 
ceased with the suppression of the petrochemical permits in 1992. The 
commission was dissolved at the end of Salinas’ government.  
 The negotiation of NAFTA’s sixth chapter opened space for three 
things: the liberalization of secondary petrochemicals, the harmonized 
definition of basic petrochemicals, and the disappearance of the centralized 
administration of the petrochemical industry. “In a few words, we did an 
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extraordinary work for the negotiation of the external agenda, although we 
ignored the internal agenda” (Rodríguez, 2005).  
 
8.5 Failed privatization 
 Along with deregulation in different aspects that affected petrochemical 
policy, Salinas’s government tried to continue the disinvestment program for 
the petrochemical industry as it was originally planned in 1986. In spite of the 
measures his government took to deactivate the union’s blockage to the 
project, the efforts did not succeed: to reorganize PEMEX in order to create 
the conditions necessary for pushing the privatization plan, to deregulate FDI 
in order to create gaps accepting foreign investment, to diminish the 
petrochemical list to its minimal expression, and to deregulate the whole 
secondary sector. The government took four years to create the conditions 
necessary to privatize PEMEX’s secondary petrochemical sector. After 
announcing privatization, the government decided to postpone the 
privatization bid in order to avoid public resistance from the private sector. 
When the reorganization of PEMEX finished in July 1992, PEMEX 
announced the intention to sell 19 of the 61 petrochemical plants in October. 
Convinced that privatization would pass as easy as all other projects that 
announced during Salinas’ government had, the privatization plan revealed 
three surprises: first, it accepted foreigners to bid as a signal of good will and 
the permanence of the project for external investors; second, as the 
privatization was defined on a plant-by-plant basis, it gave place to small and 
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medium producers associations to participate for specific plants; third, the 
plan focused on chain integration.  
The privatization announcement differed from other processes. Taking 
its distance from previous operations, petrochemical privatization did not 
begin with an amendment of the constitution (MacLeod, 2005). However, this 
was not the only distinctive point of the petrochemical plan. The deregulation 
was accorded with private producers during NAFTA negotiations, thus 
creating expectations of domestic producers’ exclusive participation. Along 
with it, FDI participation stood on a presidential decree instead of standing on 
the reform of particular reforms on specific laws, making foreign participation 
vulnerable.  
For all this reasons, the contestation over the privatization process 
soon aroused. Taking advantage of the strategic position gained for being the 
only sector led almost exclusively by Mexicans, domestic producers opposed 
the opening of the public bid to foreign investors. As the negotiation of NAFTA 
developed at the same time, chapter 6 granted the first important privatization 
in the petrochemical sector to Mexicans exclusively and let foreign 
participation open to future sales (Ortiz Mena NL, 2005a and 2005b). 
The privatization project was abandoned in May 1994,132 when 
Francisco Rojas, PEMEX’s General Director, announced that the privatization 
plan would stand for about 20 months. As international prices were 
depressed, the low cycle made the cost of the 61 plants about 6 billion US 
                                                             
132 At the end of 1993, the trade deficit in petrochemicals increased 4.7 percent–about 390 
thousand tons–because the state stopped investing in the sector (Comision de Energéticos, 
Camara de Diputados, 1995: 6). 
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dollars. Due to the low cycle, no private bid would reach half of the official 
cost (García Reyes, 2005; ftnt. 10 chap 6 p. 375) with the government 
arguing that international market conditions were not favorable.  
Along with the low cycle in the industry, an approaching presidential 
election in the summer of 1994 made president Salinas avoid risking further 
internal opposition from the PRI, from the private sector, or from the oil union. 
These were all important support-base actors in the transition of power. The 
decision to postpone the privatization of secondary petrochemicals produced 
by PEMEX began to affect the competitiveness of the petrochemical industry. 
Private petrochemical producers did not only lose the low-priced materials, 
but they also lost important price differentials that a better integration as result 
of privatization would have provided. 
 The challenge of improving the basis of PEMEX’s association with the 
private sector began in 1994. PEMEX was looking to reactivate an aggressive 
investment policy agreement with the private sector. Since 1981, PEMEX had 
been unable to make any important investment in the petroleum sector. By 
1994 the level of production was 25 million tons, which did not drastically 
diverge from the 19.5 million tons reached by the whole industry in 1985. 
Waiting for the privatization to occur, both PEMEX and the private sector 
conducted no investment during the six years of Salinas’ government. The 
reform process was retarded enough that production abandoned by PEMEX 
began to be filled by imports. The disintegration of the industry was 
aggravated, thus urging the state to create a new investment policy and an 
import substitution practice in order to foster the competitiveness and 
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integration of the secondary industry. Private producers found a solution to 
the problem by importing secondary goods from abroad. Imports had been 
growing steadily since 1985, reaching 14 billion US dollars in 1995.  
 
8.6 Facing the Achilles heel of petroleum policy 
 As we have mentioned earlier, the paradigm shift that took place 
regarding the definition of the petrochemical policy, is not flawless. 
Petrochemical sector provides raw materials for more than 78 industries. 
Therefore, it is a strategic sector of the economy.133 Moreover, the 
consolidation of the Mexican petroleum sector goes hand in hand with three 
things: the consolidation of the revolutionary state, the developmental state’s 
foundation and the entire propaganda that sustained more than 70 years of 
PRI’s domination over Mexican politics.  
 Salinas’ privatization plan rested on the president’s authority in order to 
push the program ahead. Most of the deregulation policies did not change the 
fact that PEMEX controls production of basic petrochemicals, and that every 
investor depends on PEMEX’s production capacity in order to transform oil. 
This made it difficult to attract the inversion required in this sector. There is no 
technical justification for PEMEX’s control of the petroleum market, and there 
are no political conditions in order to change this framework for a long time. 
Being the only institution allowed to market oil and oil derivatives in the 
                                                             
 
133 The petroleum industry is classified as strategic in the United States and Canada as well. 
Both countries have special regulations and limitations for the development of the sector. 
United States forbid oil exports to American producers and Canada’s crown owns the mineral 
conceding private producers participation on state’s supervision. 
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country, there is no justification for the reduction of the demiurgic role in this 
sector either. The Mexican state is trapped by all the public, private, cultural 
and social interests created in the petroleum industry. 
 Along with it, new FDI regulations depended on Salinas’ authority. The 
presidential decree created a sort of legal maze in order to attract investment 
without assuring investors an open and accountable environment. Besides, 
private investors enjoyed enough veto capacity to avoid foreign investment in 
the sector. In a time of authoritarian rule, not even a high profile president 
would gain enough confidence to receive investment in the petrochemical 
sector. 
 Most importantly, the neoliberal paradigm in the base of the reforms 
made since 1986 collided with the revolutionary nationalism in the most 
nationalist sector of Mexican economy. Both policy frames co-existed, with 
the unintended consequence that they were paralyzing a strategic sector in 
the economy. The reforms did not eliminate the demiurgic role of the sector, 
yet they reduced it to its minimal expression. Along with it, the state was 
unable to push a husbandry role forward, given the fact that Salinas showed 
no interest in risking a constitutional amendment on this subject. The nation 
maintained control of the petroleum sector. The failure to find a functioning 
combination of promotional roles put the petrochemical industry on the road 
to a dead end.  
 The result was the policy blockage of the petrochemical industry, and 
along with it, the complete waste of a decade-long investment to create a 
world-scale petrochemical industry. Most of the blockage responded to 
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ideological reasons rather than technical ones that created political inertia. 
The demiurgic role was abandoned only because it had no place in the new 
policy paradigm. The husbandry role was not implemented because it had no 
place in the former policy paradigm. The old path was still legitimate. The new 
path was implemented even though it did not produce the expected results. 
There is no clarity on defining the regulation of the sector, even though all 
actors recognized the strategic role played by petrochemicals in the economy. 
State withdrawal –for ideological reasons- undermined decade-long efforts to 
foster the industry but the state was unable to provide a successful alternative 
policy frames to that of nationalism. The result was a deadlock for the 
industry. 
 
  
258 
Chapter 9. Consolidating the new policy: Losing the industry 
 
Petrochemical production was declining in the early 1990s. Production 
capacity grew from 19.5 million tons in 1985 to 25 million tons in 1994. This 
growth was not very impressive. Furthermore, petrochemical production was 
reduced by 6 percent in the 1991-1993 period. By 1994, the problems that 
PEMEX was facing were not resolved yet. Then the economy collapsed once 
again in 1995. This situation provoked the reinforcement of political groups 
contesting the reform and defending the need to return to the previous 
nationalist policy position. 
In March 1995, Ernesto Zedillo’s government (1994-2000) announced 
its intention to continue the petrochemical privatization plan as it was 
originally defined in 1986. The state would continue trying to overcome the 
main constraints for reaching international competitiveness, namely the 
integration of petrochemical chains. However, reaching this objective through 
the privatization of PEMEX’s plants resulted in a major political obstacle. 
Groups resisting privatization as a part of the neoliberal program, were more 
organized and legitimated due to the 1994 “December’s mistake” and the 
following economic collapse.  
In particular, the oil union acted mainly in two fronts (the PRI and the 
Congress) and succeeded in stopping the privatization that was intended for 
69 plants. The union forced Zedillo’s administration to completely change the 
original plan in 1996. The government was forced to ask for new 
congressional regulations that actually ended up restricting even the domestic 
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producers’ participation. This new measures also changed the original idea of 
privatizing on a plant-by-plant basis, to opt instead for selling the entire 10 
petrochemical complexes owned by PEMEX. This sale implied that private 
sector investment would increase dramatically without removing the union’s 
control over these 10 production centers. The result was paralysis of the 
state’s petrochemical policy in 1998. 
The intention in this chapter is to show that the state’s decision to 
continue the two goals of midwifery in the petrochemical program (increasing 
private investment and integrating the industry) became extremely expensive 
for the state due to its incapacity to manage the real problem of the plan: 
political control over the petroleum industry.  
 
9.1 Zedillo’s privatization plan 134 
 The incoming government of Ernesto Zedillo was able to launch a 
program that was meant to sell PEMEX’s petrochemical units. The 
government tried to face the disintegration of the petrochemical industry that 
was caused by the growing trade deficits that the industry had produced for a 
decade.135 It was becoming urgent, as NAFTA demanded the complete 
                                                             
134 I am grateful to the Energy Ministry’s Petrochemical Director, who kindly provided two 
documents elaborated by his office making a chronology of the basic petrochemical 
disincorporation process including press summaries. Most quotations herein came from those 
documents unless indicated otherwise. They are Secretaría de Energía (1997a) La 
desincorporación de la Industria Petroquímica No Básica. Cronología, y Secretaría de 
Energía (1997b) Nueva Estrategia para la Industria Petroquímica y la Constitución de 
Empresas Filiales de PEMEX-Petroquímica as appear in the bibliography. 
 
135 While exports of petrochemical derivatives have been growing steadily, reaching a peak of 
17 percent of national production in 1995, Mexico also became a net importer of 
petrochemical products, bringing in roughly 30 percent of the national petrochemical 
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liberalization and deregulation of the sector by 2004.136 Therefore, the 
government began to push for privatization and for the improvement of 
competitiveness, for it to be achieved in only 10 years.  
 As usual, the state’s intention to privatize secondary petrochemicals 
was announced during the ceremony marking oil nationalization on March 18, 
1995. President Zedillo and his principal cabinet ministers were present at the 
annual expropriation day ceremonies, PEMEX General Director, Adrian 
Lajous, set forth a frame of reference for the privatization of PEMEX’s 
petrochemical plants. His plan called for the privatization of 61 of PEMEX’s 
chemical plants located in 10 petrochemical complexes. The idea would be 
for PEMEX to take a minority position in each plant for several years, at least 
until labor conditions and contractual terms had been stabilized to the 
satisfaction of the new investors, the government, and the union. Lajous said 
that the main goal of the privatization process was the integration of chains 
and the consolidation of big private businesses that would be able to reach 
competitiveness in the international market (Lajous, 1995). 
 However, the leader of the oil union, Carlos Romero, who followed 
Lajous’ speech at the March 18th ceremony, immediately questioned the 
privatization initiative. Romero stridently argued that the moment had come 
not to privatize PEMEX petrochemical plants but instead to reinitiate the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
consumption from abroad. Moreover, the value of Mexican imports in this sector began to 
grow from 1985 onwards, representing 14 billion US dollars in 1995 alone. 
 
136 By the time the privatization program began, PEMEX provided 60 percent of total 
petrochemical production and 80 percent of secondary products demanded by the 
petrochemical chains in the sector. PEMEX bought 50 percent of the petrochemical imports 
and sold 14 percent of its production in the international market (Alvarez, 1997: 11). 
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aggressive state investment that had developed the petrochemical industry 
since its beginnings. It was the moment, he said, for PEMEX to use the 
loyalty of its workforce to upgrade the technology, and to operate plants’ 
efficiencies and profits once again. The underlined argument was that the 
new crisis had shown the inefficacy of the economic reform and the need to 
return to the promotional actions of previous years. In the succeeding months, 
the union’s opposition to privatization grew to include full-page ads in the 
Mexico City press, as well as rallies in a number of towns of Mexico’s 
petrochemical corridor in the states of Veracruz and Tabasco. Support for this 
opposition from PRI leadership, opposition parties and movements also rose. 
Along with the open opposition from the PRI sectors (whose 
government was proposing the reform), the wave of groups contesting the 
reform grew strengthening the most important opponents of the project.137 A 
good part of the opposition to the project came not only from the PRI and the 
oil union, but also from small and medium enterprises that were not even 
considered in this first stage of the reform (Morales, 1997). This was the case 
of almost the entire structural reform project. The new reforms only sought to 
increase the competition and integration of big businesses. Contrary to the 
historical passive attitude of Congress in facing Executive decisions during 
the years of PRI control of the country, this time Congress quickly organized a 
                                                             
137 In the 1997 mid-term election, the PRI lost its majority position in the Congress, and PRD 
leader, Cuauhtémoc Cardenas became the mayor of Mexico City. In addition, PAN won the 
most important states governorships that summer. These encroachments forced the 
government to share the custodial role with the Congress. No new regulations could pass 
through Congress without a coalition, forcing the PRI to cohabitate with opposition parties. 
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specialized commission that was meant to analyse the process of 
desincorporacion138 and oversee the government on this specific affair.  
Ignoring much of the formal and informal opposition, the government 
decided to continue its plan. The main formal part of the process took place 
when the Administrative Council of PEMEX asked the Inter-Ministerial 
Commission on Desincorporation lead by the Finance Ministry139 to define the 
rules for auctioning the first 19 (of 61) secondary petrochemical plants. Not 
surprisingly, the five union members in the council abstained in the vote. To 
reduce the effects of opposition propaganda, PEMEX and Energy officials 
began to emphasize that the privatization of secondary petrochemical did not 
spell the privatization of PEMEX. Officials argued that, “the difference 
between oil and petrochemical industries is crystal clear”. Therefore, the 
privatization process did not imply, as it was widely admonished by the union, 
the transgression of constitutional prescriptions, the abandonment of 
nationalism, or the submission of sovereignty to the United States. While the 
first plan considered no restrictions for foreign capital in buying the plants, 
foreign participation aroused negative public opinion in the plan of 1995.  
The general guidelines for privatizing the assets of PEMEX - 
petrochemicals and the specific guidelines for the sale of the Cosoleacaque 
petrochemical plants were issued in October 1995. The document argued, 
                                                             
138 As privatization became associated with policies going against national interests and 
imposed by international organizations, the government instead used desincorporacion in 
policy texts.  
 
139 On the privatization process followed during the Zedillo administration see MacLeod 
(2004). 
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once again, that the privatization of these facilities aimed to develop a 
globally competitive petrochemical industry, thus promoting investment in 
Mexico and raising the overall competitiveness of the country’s industrial 
plants. Private investors would provide the technology and the capital 
necessary to guarantee and sustain the growth of the industry. The Minister 
of Energy published the first open calling to offer the installations on 
November 14th, 1995 (five producers of ammoniac, one of hydrogen, one of 
xylenes, and other related plants). 140  
The oil union began a press campaign against the desincorporation. 
Regional mobilisations increased in the oil regions of the southeast. It is 
important to note that the leader of CTM141 (who had been ambivalent in 
facing the privatization plans in other moments) openly positioned himself and 
the unions under his control against the privatization. The consensus against 
privatization spread fast. The response came immediately from the 
revolutionary parties (the PRI and PRD) and from the small and medium 
chemical producers organized in Canacintra.142 Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas spoke 
widely about the antipatriotic policy followed by the government, and the 
submission of sovereignty due to foreign pressures. As expected, he warned 
                                                             
140 With the exception of polystyrene that was privatized in 1988, the reform gave full control 
of the polyester chain to Alfa (a private producer). This made Mexico self-reliant in producing 
synthetic fibres and consolidating international competitiveness. However, due to the lack of 
privatization in chains such as specialized products, this sector became the biggest importer 
of colors, explosives, pharmaceuticals, pesticides, plasticizers, and refrigerants (Morales, 
1997: 66).  
 
141 The labor sector of the PRI. 
 
142 Camara Nacional de la Industria de la Transformacion (National chamber of 
manufacturers). 
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the people of the risk that existed in giving the industry back to foreigners.143 
Cárdenas only continued to shore up support for his populist defense of the 
industry on March 18th, 1996, when he announced the creation of a national 
collection to buy the industry and keep it under national control.144 
The PRI acted on two fronts. First, Carlos Romero –union leader and 
distinguished member of the political council of the PRI– made the party 
assume the defense of the nationalized industry, arguing the risk of a 
complete privatization of the oil industry. The second front was in Congress 
where Senators representing oil regions demanded the publication of the 
figures, names, and companies participating in the sell-off, to assure that 
Mexico would retain control of the industry. The Deputies who were members 
of the oil union145 asked for a public consultation in order to delay the decision 
to privatize. As will be shown, the public consultation ended up questioning 
the constitutionality of privatization and actually discovered the Executive 
made some administrative mistakes, which would indeed invalidate the 
                                                             
143 The PRD sponsored the creation of a democratic studies center in order to provide 
research to support the party’s position against the current public policy. The center 
published a series of studies that countered the technical arguments of the petrochemical 
reform. The main thesis sustained was that there were no technical justifications to privatize 
the industry, and that the government was proposing this move under international pressure. 
Indeed, the main ‘technical’ references of those studies were to Cardenas discourses, 
quoting the studies as the evidence that Mexico was giving up its sovereignty. For example 
‘No a la venta de la petroquimica’, ‘una politica petrolera patriotica’, among others. 
 
144 This was a cynical manipulation of the use of national imagery. Generations and 
generations of Mexicans grew up seeing pictures of extremely poor people giving their 
belongings to President Cardenas and his wife (Cuauhtémoc Cardenas parents) in order to 
pay for the nationalization of oil in 1938. This has become part of the Mexican identity mainly 
due to PRI propaganda on the issue. 
 
145 The PRI has always granted five seats in Congress to the oil union, between 11 and 15 
municipal positions in the oil-producing corridor, and either one seat in Senate or one state 
governorship in the definition of its candidate list. 
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legality of the process. Six weeks after the decision to privatize was 
announced, the government was forced to renege and a new minister, Jesus 
Reyes Heroles, was named in the Energy Ministry.146 
 
9.2 The Congress regained its power 
On October 19th, 1995 (Lazaro Cardenas’ birthday), the Chamber of 
Deputies approved the formation of a petrochemical sub-commission, which 
would be represented by the three main parties in Congress.147 The 
commission’s first duty was to create a forum in order to analyse the various 
concerns about the privatization, before letting the Congress define its 
position. As such, the commission organized public and private hearings, 
visits to petrochemical complexes, and demanded public input about the 
situation of the industry. 
During the public hearings, the government’s position was that 
privatization would increase the global competitiveness of the industry, 
reactivate the sector by increasing investment, open access to the newest 
technologies, and assure a more rational management of PEMEX. As was 
expected, the private sector representatives supported privatization with the 
argument that this decision would ensure the integration of the industry, 
                                                             
146 As the son of the extremely nationalist PEMEX Director-General between 1964 and 1970, 
Reyes Heroles Jr. was perpetually called up to save the legacy of his father. 
 
147 This sub-commission was formed by the PRI: Jaime Arceo and Jorge Cortes, oil leaders 
and PRI members: Jorge Wade and Jesus Olvera; PRD: Amado Cruz; and PAN: Carlos 
Nuno. The commission was formed on October 26th and was presided over by Jaime Arceo. 
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increase operations, and eliminate production deficits, thereby reducing 
dependence upon imports.  
The oil union claimed that by selling the fertilizer plants, the state was 
putting national agricultural output in jeopardy. The union also reiterated the 
fact that foreigners would gain greater access and eventually control of the 
petroleum sector. To avoid the threat to national sovereignty that this issue 
would entail, the union demanded the complete abandonment of the 
privatization plan, because it violated the Constitution and the revision of the 
petrochemical policy established in 1986.  
In addition, the union accused the government of reclassifying 
secondary petrochemicals for political rather than for technical reasons, in 
order to benefit private producers. Paradoxically this argument was built upon 
the same premises that the private sector had already used in 1971.148 The 
union assured that PEMEX would be able to maintain its traditional and 
legitimate pre-eminence in organizing the entire petroleum industry. 
According to the union, if the government stopped charging inordinate taxes 
                                                             
148 The similarity of the private sector and the union’s logic (arguing for and against 
privatization respectively) may be the result of the ambiguous law defined in 1971, which 
effectively justified both state dominance and privatization. One must recall that at the 
beginning of the industry, the state’s goal was to induce private integration back through the 
industrial chain by assuring the offer of petrochemicals at any point. The 1959 law defined 
basic petrochemicals by “social and economic interest”, in which the demiurgic role 
complementing private production was justified.  However, the distinction between basic and 
secondary products mis-structured the industry as we have explained in chapter 5. As the 
state considered the abandonment of its historical role politically risky, it asserted that the 
production of basic petrochemicals would be reserved by the state via the constitution. 
Therefore, the state promoted the reclassification of basic petrochemicals between 1986 and 
1991 in order to induce some private investment.  In doing so, PEMEX adopted the technical 
standards of defining the eight basic petrochemicals rather than pushing state production into 
secondary goods. 
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on PEMEX revenue, the public producer would be able to reinstate 
investment in financing its development. 
The reappearance of former PEMEX General Director, Jorge Diaz 
Serrano (1976-1981), who lent support to privatization, was highly 
unexpected for two reasons. First, Diaz had defined the policy that structurally 
transformed PEMEX into an Export-Oriented industry during the oil boom, 
without questioning the overwhelming demiurgic role of the state in producing 
petrochemicals.  Second, he had just been released from prison after serving 
ten years for corruption charges. Upon his return to the political scene in 
1995, his new position was that the state should abandon the division 
between basic and secondary petrochemicals. Contrary to his previous 
contentions, he argued that this division prevented the private integration of 
the petrochemical industry, thus disallowing Mexican competitive advantages 
in the sector. 
The final report of this congressional commission149 treated the issue 
of privatization ambiguously, and by making it public on March 4, 1996 (PRI’s 
Anniversary), gave the government two weeks in order to prepare a response 
for the upcoming annual oil nationalization ceremony. Even if the 
congressional document recognized all the advantages offered by the 
petrochemical policy defined in 1986, which emphasized integration, 
investment and competitiveness for the sector, Congress also blocked 
                                                             
149 See Comision de Energeticos, Camara de Diputados, 1995. 
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privatization–going so far as to define the way the state would guide 
petrochemical policy in pursuing these goals. 
On one hand, the document assumed that even if basic raw materials 
for petrochemical production were derived from oil, oil and petrochemicals 
ought to be treated as separate industries, thereby debunking the nationalist 
attachment to petrochemicals. In making this argument, Congress discredited 
the nationalists’ foundational tenet that privatization of secondary 
petrochemical plants violated the constitution.  
The document also reminded that privatization had already improved 
the integration and competitiveness, and raised the level of investment in the 
sector. These objectives were reached with the sale of the most important 
producers of fertilizers (Tereftalatos Mexicanos, Fibras Nacionales de 
Acrilico, Poliestireno y Derivados, Cloro de Tehuantepec) that went almost 
unnoticed in 1988. The commission recognized the benefits of the resulting 
companies in their integration processes, higher investments, international 
competitiveness, and the creation of new jobs in the sector.150 Congress 
further highlighted the critical situation that the industry was facing in minimal 
investment and integration, in addition to the inability of the state to face its 
obligations in rectifying the problem. 
Therefore, the Deputies recognized that coordination between public 
and private investors was essential. In a sector demanding large capital 
investment yet representing only one percent of PEMEX’s revenue, the 
                                                             
150 The state was unable to emphasize this point, acknowledging the potential political 
pressures to renationalize these companies. 
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funding of secondary production by private actors would be an opportunity to 
reduce state expenditures while maintaining the production of basic 
petrochemicals. The commission also expressed concern over the growing 
deficit in the petrochemical trade, the obsolescence of technology and the 
encroachment of private monopolies and/or foreign interests on the sector. 
On the other hand, the congressional commission blocked privatization 
by questioning the legal foundations of the process.151 The major qualm of 
Congress was to ensure that the entire process of privatization would be 
conducted in an open and accountable manner. However, by assuming 
wrongdoing before it happened, Congress effectively stalled the process. 
Congress recommended the supervision of the Secretaria de la Contraloria y 
Procesos Adminisrativos (SECODAM, official auditor) of the process, based 
on article 134 of the constitution.152  
As mentioned, the Congress was given the responsibility of being the 
official auditor and therefore, it had to supervise the privatization process. 
Previously SECODAM had no participation in the process at all.153 According 
to Congress, this detail would have created a potential argument for 
                                                             
151 Since 1982, the state appealed for its right to regulate the functioning of the Mexican 
economy and justify the privatization of public owned enterprises on the basis of articles 25-
28 of the constitution. These articles granted the state its right to define basic petrochemicals 
and disband public participation in the newly defined secondary products.  
 
152 Article 134 of the constitution ensured the proper administrative responsibilities of the 
state. 
 
153 The participation of the auditor would be justified in case of improper conduct during the 
process. Since 1989, and in order to avoid corruption, the Ministry responsible of the sector 
had announced every privatization and the responsibility of following the process transferred 
to an ad-hoc inter-ministerial commission led by the Finance Minister, which supervised all 
the different stages of the privatization until the assignation of the company to a winner. Refer 
to section 9.1 for an overview of the process followed by PEMEX. 
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constitutional controversy that would likely jeopardize the clarity of 
petrochemical privatization. If the government rejected the congressional 
recommendation, that action would be used as evidence of foul-play. The 
concurrence on this proposition actually delayed the privatization another 
year.  
The Congress went even further as to dictate the basis of privatization, 
turning the government’s plan in its head. Congress established that the 
government ought to keep a majority of assets in any company that would be 
privatized, and that PEMEX would participate in the companies formed with 
private investors. As we have seen, the Energy Ministry had proposed a five-
year period of minimal public participation in the privatized companies in order 
to smooth the transition of private integration. Congress held that PEMEX 
should hold onto a permanent majority (51 percent) of the assets in order to 
ensure the long-term participation of the state in fostering growth in this 
sector, which in practice meant keeping the status quo almost untouched. 
This practice would make the private sector perform the midwifery and 
husbandry roles for publicly owned companies, as well as finance them. 
Keeping the pattern of petrochemical development constant, Congress 
recommended: a majority of Mexican control over the new companies, the 
obligation of private investors to present long-term strategies for expansion 
and technological innovation, and finally, the guarantee of closed-shop 
representation and the protection of workers’ rights and prerogatives by the 
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oil union.154 The only new issue they demanded was that the government 
offered special regional development plans for oil-producing corridors (Arceo 
Castro, 1996: 59; Comision de Energeticos, Camara de Diputados, 1995: 36-
38). 
By June 1996, the government cancelled the entire privatization 
process and opted to follow the recommendations advanced by Congress. 
That meant the inclusion of new ministries to overcome possible 
administrative wrongdoings.  
 
9.3 New alliances against privatization 
By March 1996 –one year after the announcement to privatize 19 
petrochemical plants– electricians, teachers, telecom workers, social security 
officers, and university staff unions supported the movement against this 
agenda. Unions representing the teachers and the electricians, along with the 
oil union and the CTM, were the biggest and strongest unions in the country. 
Together, they were the core of the labour branch of PRI. Most of the 
dissident unions in these sectors, such as the CNTE for teachers and SME 
for electricians, were mobilized against the reform by the PRD.  
The leader of the oil union used the Political Council of the PRI to 
demand support from the party, Deputies, Senators, other PRI sectors, and 
the entire executive committee in order to support the opposition against 
privatizing the plants. In the development of the XVII Convention of the PRI in 
                                                             
154 The first two issues were part of the Petrochemical Commission regulatory duties since its 
organization in 1959. 
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1997, all attention was placed on the definition of rules for selecting the next 
Presidential candidate.155 Nevertheless, the convention finished by approving 
a new set of principles declaring unlimited support for the oil industry, keeping 
article 27 of the constitution intact, and maintaining the nationalist policy that 
had historically guided the PRI. The PRI convention announced its opposition 
to the privatization of the petrochemical industry as well. The PRI considered 
its defense a matter of national pride. The party also defined its electoral 
platform, establishing no further privatization, especially in the petroleum 
industry (SE, Chronology, 1997). 
As result of this mobilization against privatization, the state was forced 
to play an even more restrictive custodial role than it had done previously in 
1958. This time however, the decision was imposed by the PRI and Congress 
over the President and his government, instead of authoritarian presidential 
decisions with no dissent allowed, which existed 40 years before.  
The immediate result of the oil union’s defence of the industry through 
Congress increased the problems of the industry and paralyzed the state, 
reducing its ability to define an adequate blending of promotional roles. 
Congressional recommendations supported the widening of demiurgic roles 
financed by private producers, yet the state was ideologically unable to do 
this even with its own resources. The industry also needed wider protection 
                                                             
155 The convention also altered the rules for choosing the presidential candidate, closing the 
door to the technocracy that they felt had controlled the party since 1987. Since 1970, the 
government became the first source of political socialization of presidential candidates who 
were nominated without having a career in party politics or previous electoral experience. 
They decided that henceforth, the presidential candidate must have had a career in the party 
and have been elected at least once for a position in any level of government. 
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barriers to enhance integration, which implied a policy defined on ISI basis. 
Instead of doing this, the state insisted on the creation of midwifery and 
husbandry roles, only seeking to increase private investment and privatization 
in the sector, these being the only possible means to increase the integration 
and competitiveness of the petrochemical industry. 
 
9.4 The shared custodial role: domestic constrains 
During the summer of 1996, the government announced it would 
abandon this attempt at privatization, and in line with the congressional 
recommendations, President Zedillo ordered a complete review of the legal 
procedures in order to avoid new disagreements over privatization. The 
government maintained the decision to privatize PEMEX’s secondary 
petrochemical sector in order to integrate petrochemical chains in the hands 
of private producers and increase competitiveness. The most important fact 
was that PEMEX had nothing to do with this second stage. It was the new 
Energy Minister, Reyes Heroles, who would take control of the situation. 
Though Reyes Heroles left the government in 1997, and then his successor 
Luis Tellez tried to define different models in order to attract investment and 
privatize the sector even harder. 
The first stage of defining the new policy was a complete supervision 
initiated by the SECODAM (the official auditor) as recommended by the 
Congress. The SECODAM recommended a complete revision of the juridical 
status of the regulations. The auditor argued that he found problems in the 
first appeal that the government announced in 1995. The legality of the 
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administrative procedure that reduced the long-term security for the potential 
investors was particularly problematic, for there were no specific legal 
definitions in which products could be categorized as basic petrochemicals. 
Finally, SECODAM recommended a complete revision of the legal structures, 
which in fact meant the clarification of the custodial role of the state. 
As a result of this policy move, the state initiated a further revision of 
the strategy to privatize the sector in October 1996. Generally speaking, the 
President asked Congress to approve a new Law regulating production of oil 
and its by-products.156 These amendments clearly outlined the role that the 
state would play in producing eight petrochemicals (plus black carbon) 
deemed ‘basic’ by international standards.157 PEMEX received a clear and 
legally binding mandate to produce basic petrochemicals, defined by 
international standards for the first time. 158 
During the process of validating the Presidential initiative to redefine 
petrochemicals, Congress introduced new restrictions that affected the 
                                                             
156 The new Ley Reglamentaria del Articulo 27 Constitutional en el ramo del Petroleo was 
published in the Diario Oficial on November 13th, 1996. That day, the Executive also 
published the abrogation of the previous regulations, eliminating the petrochemical permits 
that would allow the private sector access to the production of petrochemicals, and defined 
clearly the nine products that would be considered basic petrochemicals exclusive production 
of the state in order to reach the constraints established by article 28 of the constitution.  
 
157 Arsenio Farell, SECODAM minister at the time, asked Leopoldo Rodriguez, to write a 
memo explaining all technicalities to justify why those 8 products are deemed as basic 
petrochemicals by international standards, and according to the last list published in 1991 
during NAFTA negotiations between private sector and government as seen in the last 
chapter (Rodríguez, 2005). 
 
158 It is worth remembering that the same regulations in which Echeverria had increased the 
number of products considered as basic petrochemicals in the 1970s were used by De la 
Madrid and Salinas for reducing the list from 77 to 8 products 15 years later. The oil union 
and its allies inside the PRI and PRD passionately opposed the discretion of this decision, 
arguing there were no technical reasons for doing this. On the other hand, the private sector 
argued that the current regulations offered no long-term assurance to investors. 
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domestic private sector.159 The Deputies accepted the definition of the nine 
products as proposed by the Executive, but they modified the final document 
before voting on it, adding that basic petrochemicals products were those 
derived both from oil and natural gas. Rather than being defined as ‘any 
product with a social-economic interest,’ the legal definition of basic 
petrochemicals became, ‘goods produced in big quantities by PEMEX 
resulting from the first chemical transformation of oil, which are the basic 
building blocks for all petrochemical chains. For these three reasons, they are 
considered as strategic raw materials for the state.’160 No private producer 
would be allowed to produce the nine products. If they developed them during 
normal operation, they were forced to sell them back to PEMEX. 
Deputies also ruled that PEMEX would have to keep 51 percent of all 
existing petrochemical plants, and that domestic private investors would be 
able to acquire up to 49 percent of the companies. The Deputies also 
established that Mexican or foreign private investors would be allowed to 
maintain 100 percent property only in the construction of new plants, but 
would remain dependent upon PEMEX for basic petrochemicals and raw 
materials required for producing more advanced products. In the new law, 
                                                             
159 For a more detailed discussion, refer to Camara de Diputados, ‘Diario de los Debates, 
session del 23 de octubre, 1996,’ ‘Camara de Senadores,’ version estenografica de la sesion 
del 29 de octubre de 1996. 
 
160 For the untranslated definition, see Reyes Heroles (1996), ‘Version estenografica del 
discurso presentado en la inauguracion del XXVIII foro de la Asociacion Nacional de la 
Industria Quimica,’ 24 de octubre. For a Comparative analysis between the presidential 
initiative and that approved by Congress, see PEMEX Lex, 1996, or refer to the original 
version from the Congressional Energy Commission and documents sent to Congress by the 
President. 
 
  
276 
Congress also obliged PEMEX to maintain control of the ducts inside the 
complexes. The idea was that PEMEX should associate with the private 
sector in order to attract private capital to the public-owned monopoly.161  
The content of the debate in the Senate was also tumultuous with the 
PRD continually questioning the technical validity of the new law and the PRI 
reluctant to give up sovereignty in the oil industry. A staunch supporter of oil 
nationalization, Senator Heberto Castillo,162 argued that the division of basic 
and secondary petrochemicals was still based on political, rather than 
technical foundations. Castillo also alerted the nation that the government 
was also opening the door to foreign and private capital, by granting the 
opportunity to own 100 percent of new ventures (Senado de la Republica, 
October, 1996).  
As a result of the restrictions imposed by Congress, the Energy 
Ministry abandoned the decision to sell the secondary petrochemicals on a 
plant-by-plant basis and the new Energy Ministry, Luis Tellez, decided that 
the new plan should offer the sale of complete petrochemical complexes. In 
this second plan, the Ministry was following Congressional restrictions that 
                                                             
161 In 1997, the Energy Ministry offered warrants WARNINGS? to possible bidders that 
private petrochemical companies would enjoy a majority position in the administrative council 
in order to appropriate its management–even if they owned 49 percent of the company 
assets. This was a way to attract investment in the second privatization attempt. 
 
162 Senator Heberto Castillo was an eternal defendant of the conservative policy in managing 
the oil industry. He vehemently contested Lopez Portillo’s Export-Oriented oil policy during 
the 1970s, accusing the government of risking sovereignty and being antipatriotic. He was 
also a member of the Liberation National Front organized by Lazaro Cardenas in the 1960s; 
a member of the 1968 student uprising (and for this reason was taken prisoner until an 
amnesty law was passed in the mid 1976); organized several leftist parties, which let him won 
seats in Congress in 1979; in 1988 he allied with Cuauhtemoc Cardenas; and in 1989, he 
participated in the foundation of PRD. For the complete collection of articles written against 
the oil policies, see Heberto y el Petroleo, (Proceso, 1998). 
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would allow private Mexican companies the acquisition of no more than 49 
percent of PEMEX’s secondary petrochemical complexes, assuring that the 
state would hold majority control.163 The decision to sell complete complexes 
broke consensus with the private sector because it became impossible not 
only for small and medium firms to purchase complete complexes,164 but also 
difficult for larger corporate entities. However, both the domestic and the 
foreign private sector would be allowed to own 100 percent of the equity in 
any new plant constructed for the production of secondary petrochemicals.  
The permission for complete private ownership in any new plant 
prompted critics to question the real intentions of the private sector. As it 
could own 100 percent of the new ventures, the anti-privatization movement 
argued that the private sector was not investing in new plants.  Instead, the 
critics lamented, the private sector intended to take advantage of the 
circumstances to acquire productive capabilities without assuming any risks. 
In response, the private sector argued that there were inadequate conditions 
for a competitive environment so as to justify new investment. Since the state 
was unable to provide the raw materials that this new investment would 
require, both Congress and PEMEX would have to allow them to produce the 
basic materials as well.  
                                                             
163 Even if the complexes produced basic and secondary petrochemicals, the state was 
already planning the privatization of specialized streams (abandoning the idea of integrating 
the chains) that would result in an even greater monopoly of the few dominant producers in 
ten sectors. (See Secretaria de Energia, Nueva estrategia para la indutria petroquimia y la 
constituticion de empresas filiales de PEMEX-petroquimica, enero de 1997).  
 
164 One may recall that in the old scheme, producers were permitted to associate amongst 
themselves and acquire assets formerly held by PEMEX. 
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The congressional autonomy in defining the law restricting President 
Zedillo’s plans for privatization was a novelty. By 1995, the custodial role was 
no longer limited to the Executive–as it had been in the past–and was now 
shared with Congress, who freely began to determine the policy frames. The 
open opposition of PRI members in Congress implied that Congress had 
finally recuperated its political capacity to restrain the President, and in doing 
so, they acted in defense of the patrimony of the nation.165 As an expression 
of the lack of consensus between the PRI and the government, the reform 
was paralyzed because the lost legitimacy caused by the 1995 crisis 
reinforced the opposition. The custodial role–that used to restrain foreign 
participation in the petrochemical industry–was now even restrictive for 
domestic producers.  
The oil union happily received the new regulations. For instance the oil 
union leader, Carlos Romero said that President Zedillo’s decision to continue 
ensuring the nation’s control of PEMEX was the finest expression of his 
nationalism. For Romero, with this decision only Mexico won. However, the 
private sector was not content with the new law. As such, they held that the 
government would not succeed in attracting private investment of the 
magnitude required without assuring private control of the companies. A 
                                                             
165 Another important issue in 1997 was the mid-term election in which the Deputies Chamber 
had to be totally renewed as the PRI lost majority control of Congress. With its majority in 
Congress, the PRI withheld information about commissions that had been setup to supervise 
and validate bills and laws made by the executive. The demise of the PRI in Congress 
prompted critics to question the accountability of this validation process. The so called 
‘opposition block’ passed an accord in November 3rd, 1998 requiring all commission debates 
to be open to public scrutiny.  However, it is impossible to monitor the work of commissions 
before 1997 because no records exist. 
  
  
279 
manager of Cydsa–one of the most important national chemical groups–
claimed that “being allowed to own only 49 percent of the plants, we will have 
to think of it twice” (SE, Chronology, 1997). Foreign investors also considered 
the investment in enterprises with mixed ownership to be unviable.  As 
specifically defined by the law, private investors would only be allowed to buy 
PEMEX assets, but would not be able to acquire the facilities nor to gain 
management capacities.166 Despite this obstruction to private participation, 
Grupo Alfa–the most important national chemical producer–assured that they 
were still interested in the option. 
The new law effectively cancelled any possibility in which the state 
performed a midwifery role. The aim of the state was to allow the spaces that 
they abandoned to be gained by the private sector in order to midwife the 
consolidation of national champions. In contrast, the law assured that the 
association between PEMEX and the private sector would finance the 
demiurgic role. Difficulties in applying the husbandry role also arose because 
PEMEX had to increase the production of basic petrochemicals in order to 
assure the functioning of the industry. Otherwise, private producers would be 
unable to increase their competitive participation in international circuits. 
Without the necessary legal faculties, Congress was unable to replace the 
government in articulating the new policy. Nevertheless, congressional 
participation in the custodial role, which assured the continuity of the 
demiurgic role, created a maze for future policy planning for the 
                                                             
166 For a complete analysis of any actor possible, see Secretaria de Energia 1997, La 
Desicorporacion de la Petroquimica No Basica, Cronologia, México, 1997. 
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petrochemical industry. The government was unable to impose its will on 
Congress–as it had done in the past–and neither could avoid the 
congressional constraints.  
 
9.5 The shared custodial role and supranational restrictions 
The inability of the government to monopolize the state’s regulatory 
capacity–custodial role–was due to the fact that the government was forced to 
share the content of regulations with Congress. This fact opened different 
spaces for interest groups to limit state’s capacity, and to block the reach of 
its influence. In order to protect the national petrochemical industry while 
ensuring the complete consolidation of national champions under these 
circumstances, Salinas’ government negotiated a period of 10 years before 
completely opening the petrochemical sector to North American competition 
in NAFTA. However, time passed by, and no reform succeeded to update the 
industry into the new context.  
In order to protect its national interests, Mexico imposed limits on 
foreign involvement in specific oil and petrochemical sectors. In chapter 6 of 
NAFTA, Mexicans reserved for themselves: the exploration, exploitation, 
refining, and processing of crude oil and natural gas; the production of 
artificial gas, basic petrochemicals and pipes. The agreement also protected 
all the activities related to export such as the transportation, storage and 
distribution of crude oil, natural and artificial gas, and raw materials obtained 
by refining or processing oil, natural gas, and basic petrochemicals (Ortiz 
Mena LN, 2005a; 2005b).  
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To reassure domestic producers’ support, as seen in the previous 
chapter, Mexico also negotiated a proviso allowing it to restrict the first 
privatization of secondary petrochemical enterprises and assets on state 
property since January 1992167 in favour of Mexican enterprises. The proviso 
granted Canadians and Americans equal treatment and priority with domestic 
producers in subsequent sales of PEMEX secondary petrochemical plants. 
In 1997, the first privatization under the new law was initiated. In order 
to ensure that at least one Mexican producer would retain at least one 
petrochemical complex, Mexican officials offered to sell the Morelos 
Complex–the newest, biggest and best integrated PEMEX facility. Once 
again, Mexican officials were trying to protect national over foreigner 
producers in the privatization process by offering the jewel of the crown to 
reinforce a national champion. Energy officials were not sure they could 
continue protecting Mexican interests in the future for they were restrained by 
the NAFTA proviso ensuring equal participation to other North American 
producers.  
However, as the state was forced to cancel the first privatization 
experiment (for diverse reasons that will be discussed in the next section), the 
interpretation of whether this was the first or second privatization could create 
conflicts with Americans and Canadians in the eventual attempt to privatize 
public assets once again. Mexicans argue that since no privatization had 
occurred yet, they still have the right to apply the proviso. Americans and 
                                                             
167 One may remember that the reclassification of petrochemical products ended in October 
1991 during NAFTA negotiations. 
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Canadians may equally argue that because the first privatization had already 
been essayed–even if it failed–they had the right to apply the proviso in future 
privatizations, in their favour. The reality is that plants got old and obsolete, 
because the lack of new investment since 1980s, and private producers may 
not express interest on bid for future privatizations (Bucay, 2005). 
Another state engagement was the total liberalization of Mexican 
petrochemical commerce by 2004. Without succeeding in implementing the 
integration of the industry as it had been planned since 1986, this 
engagement would dramatically affect national producers. Furthermore, it is 
not clear whether the private producers would join the nationalist position in 
order to protect their interests.  
As the regulations resulting from the 1996 petrochemical legal reform 
seemed to assure that the private sector would be nurturing PEMEX–by the 
establishment of public/private mixed-ownership–, the possibility of attracting 
Canadian or American investment in the sector would be jeopardized. If this 
was absurd for domestic private producers, the reaction of Canadians or 
Americans might have been similar. 
Since the new reform, the custodial role has been was so restricted 
that it can hardly be called promotional anymore. Under the conditions 
established by the new law, the private sector would: finance majority-owned 
public companies without having associated control; maintain the extremely 
high social advantages granted in conventions to oil workers; and deal with 
the union that is powerful not only in managing the industry, but also 
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influential of Congress and PRI structures. So the idea of attracting fresh 
investment in petroleum facilities became less and less effective. 
The obvious predicament became: how midwifery and husbandry 
would be reached and by whom. The state lost its ability to regulate and was 
stubbornly looking for solutions to continue withdrawing its demiurgic actions, 
while custodial still justify it. As we will see in the next section, the 
government changed its strategy without recognizing these constraints. 
 
9.6 The new plan for the petrochemical sector in 1997 
The Executive power was forced to make a new plan for the 
petrochemical sector that was published in 1997 and was valid for the rest of 
the administration (Secretaría de Energía, 1997). The new program continued 
to announce the state’s main aim to nurture the expansion, integration, 
modernization and competitiveness of the petrochemical industry with both 
public and private investment through the gradual withdrawal of its demiurgic 
role. In the 1970s Mexico was focusing on the creation of two petrochemical 
poles on the Gulf of Mexico. By 1997, taking into account the new commercial 
opportunities derived from NAFTA, Mexico announced its intention to 
integrate supranational petrochemical chains and join the American 
petrochemical poles also installed on the Gulf.  
The domestic market was divided in specialities controlled by six 
national chemical groups (Alpek–Alfa’s subsidiary, Celanese Mexicana, 
Grupo Desc, Grupo Cydsa, Grupo Primex, and Grupo IDESA). Even if the 8 
complexes owned by PEMEX produced almost all the basic petrochemicals, 
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the state was already planning their integration through the six national 
champions in order to shift PEMEX’s production towards the specialization of 
the private actors, reinforcing the groups’ positions instead of improving the 
petrochemical chains. 
The new midwife role would then focus on specializing complete 
complexes to the stream in which the private associate was already 
dominant. The state was forced to establish ventures in conjunction with the 
private sector. These sought to reinforce the private interests.168 This new 
context reinforced the initial hypothesis of this thesis, which stated that during 
the restructuring of the state, the state itself was still looking to protect large 
domestic companies in order to transform them into national champions and 
competitive players in the international arena. Once again, the state 
reinterpreted the regulations achieved in the newly shared custodial role to 
reach its goal. 
The new petrochemical policy promoted a cooperative attitude on the 
part of the state. Unlike in the past, when the policy forced the complete 
withdrawal of PEMEX, the new plan made a balance of both private and 
public industries in order to continue the integration of the sector. The plan 
assumed that the principal business groups, which were the best clients of 
PEMEX-petrochemical, would be the most interested in associating with 
PEMEX. The plan also considered the integration from oil or gas production 
to the final stage of the private sector niche (Anonymous interview, 2000). 
                                                             
168 Secretaria de Energia, 1997 Nueva estrategia para la indutria petroquimia y la 
constituticion de empresas filiales de PEMEX-petroquimica, enero de 1997. 
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The plan’s major objective was to focus on specialization and to 
capitalize on Mexico’s petrochemical structural advantage, transforming it into 
a competitive advantage. For example, the high content of ethane in natural 
gas could let Mexico double the production of ethylene and all the related 
chains of production from: fibres, plastics, resins, textiles, polyester and 
bottles, thereby maximizing return. Promoting the specialization of the 
Mexican petrochemicals on the ethane content in natural gas would also 
avoid that most of it continued to be burnt as combustible. 
Instead of privatizing plant-by-plant and midwifing private integration, 
the state was forced to foster specialization and to define the competitive 
advantages of each complex–and in accordance with the private sector–in 
order to encourage the national champions. Under the assumption that 
private and public interests could be one and the same. The new plan 
identified the long-term possibilities of specializing the association between 
new public companies and the private counterparts. The definition of future 
production streams for public conglomerates became a way of increasing the 
integration of the sector. This decision validated the most feared possibility of 
medium and small businesses: that the state was not considering them at all 
(Morales, 1997). Being these companies PEMEX’s main clients, the new plan 
assured opposition as soon as it was advanced to private producers, making 
CANACINTRA join the opposing coalition. 
A second important problem to overcome was inadequate investment 
and technology. The most important investment in the sector was made in 
1981 and the mean life of a petrochemical plant was between 20 to 25 years. 
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Public investment was kept to a minimum in order to keep the market running 
while private investment continued to grow. The problem was exacerbated by 
the arrested investment of both private and public sectors that were 
anticipating the privatization plan at the beginning of the 1990s.  
Despite the fact that the situation was becoming critical by the end of 
the decade, this did not mean that public petrochemicals were obsolete or 
uncompetitive in general. Rather, they were facing some bottlenecks related 
to lacking investment and required the renovation of some technologies. The 
plants belonging to the state had reduced the acceleration of their growth 
since 1992. At the same time, the North American petrochemical industry had 
grown at a mean rate of 2.2 percent yearly, while Mexican production grew by 
1.2 percent. This information is related only to the production of PEMEX, even 
though the private sector kept growing at the expense of increasing Mexican 
imports. 
A third problem was that the crises biased the industry to the 
production of generic products, abandoning the production of specialties. The 
lack of production affected the integration of the chains in the secondary 
level. As the demand for final products grew, the industry increased imports 
(in the 1980s were only secondary products), which since the 1990s has 
reached final products. This situation continues to affect the production of 
resins for plastics, colorants, rubbers, pesticides, lubricants, additives, and 
pharmaceuticals, all in which the industry is lacking the active ingredients or 
precursors of the final products. This situation  caused Mexico to import final 
products in almost all the petrochemical chains, increasing the dependency of 
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the industry on imports. The exception to this pattern is the production of 
chemical fibres, polymers and fertilizers–the production plants of these 
products were privatized in the first stages of the process in 1988. 
As imports of petrochemicals have been completely liberated since the 
1980s, the situation was becoming dangerous to the industry. Only a few 
products were subject to import tariffs, i.e. ethylene, propylene, polypropylene 
and ethyleneglycole (at 10 percent of value); as well as benzene and 
ammoniac anhydride (at 5 percent). These products will loose all trade 
protections by 2004 in accordance with NAFTA’s rules. For example, there 
are products such as propylene, of which 25 percent of the installed capacity 
for producing it is not used, while the imports represent almost 30 percent of 
that capacity. This inefficiency is due to the lack of profitability of domestic 
production (Secretaria de Energia, 1997: 140-141). 
Taking these problems into account, the new plan defined different 
goals for petrochemical policy in the years to come. The most important 
objective for Mexico since the 1990s has been to take advantage of its 
geographical location and commercial agreements in order to create a 
petrochemical pole in the Gulf of Mexico integrating it with the North-
American market and increasing exchanges with the European Union. For 
this, it became fundamental to attract new investment (public, private, 
domestic and international) in the sector, and to foster the integration of the 
chains as fast as possible.  
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As in the past, the new Energy Minister169 was looking to reactivate the 
petrochemical industry in order to make it grow at higher rates than the rest of 
the economy. The difference between this and previous state actions was that 
it would not only create a domestic market but it would also reach 
international circuits. This implied the consolidation of domestic chains and 
conditions like substituting imports, in as much as it implied becoming a 
reliable supplier of international chains located in the Gulf of Mexico as well. 
How then, was this combination of midwifery and husbandry role 
applied? Ministerial officials intensified contact with private producers in order 
to identify the most important problems. As the levels of investment had been 
particularly low since 1992, they began to foster capital growth. As in the past, 
they began to negotiate lines of credit in order to foster the investment of the 
industry with domestic and international development banks. They exchanged 
information and supported particular programs seeking to increase the 
integration of chains. They also recommended the formalization and 
presentation of those projects to national and international financing 
institutions. The Energy Ministry also explored the options in associating 
private and international companies in order to attract investment and gain 
access to new technologies.  
The Energy Ministry decided to initiate the privatization of the 
secondary petrochemicals, at the level of complexes in 1997. They began this 
                                                             
 
169 The third Energy minister of Zedillo’s Government, Luis Tellez, was appointed at the end 
of 1997. 
 
  
289 
endeavour by transforming the ten complexes into subsidiaries in order to 
privatize part of their stock. They integrated assets with two different kinds of 
stocks, namely: series A–representing 51 percent of capital, owned 
exclusively by the state; and series B–representing 49 percent of capital with 
the possibility of having free subscription with private investors. The free-
subscription stock would be sold among private investors in order to attract 
fresh resources (Secretaria de Energia, 1997: 175). During the reorganization 
of PEMEX - petrochemicals,170 future streams were identified by the Energy 
Ministry (Secretaría de Energía, 1997: 175ss): 
• La Cangrejera is one of the world’s biggest petrochemical 
complexes and it is specialized in the production of the basic 
petrochemical building blocks derived from aromatics (benzene, 
toluene and xylenes), olefins, and polymer compounds. It is 
possible to identify at least 3 lines of business (ventures with 
private groups) from the secondary petrochemical products 
manufactured in this complex. 
• Morelos Complex, as big and as important as La Cangrejera. It 
produced derivatives of olefins and it would be extremely 
competitive in the production of ethylene (a source of many organic 
compounds, in welding and cutting metals, to color citrus fruits, fibre 
                                                             
170 It worth noting that this new context does not consider small and medium producers at all 
as Canacintra had also denounced (Morales 1997). In the plant-by-plant privatization 
scheme, the possibility for a collective of medium producers to buy one plant was a 
possibility. The privatization of complete complexes automatically left out the possibility of 
small players acting this way. This is another unattended consequence of the role played by 
Congress during the transformation of the chemical regulations. 
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production, and anaesthetics) and its derivatives, in addition to 
propylene and its derivatives. 
• The Pajaritos Complex is specialized in the production of vinyl 
chloride. Relative to its size, it adequately provides raw materials 
for the production of synthetic resins and plastics to the national 
market only. 
• The Cosoloacaque complex is specialized in the production of 
ammoniac. It concentrates 83 percent of national production of this 
good used to manufacture fertilizers and a wide variety of nitrogen-
containing organic and inorganic chemicals. 
• Salamanca is a small producer of ammoniac situated in 
Guanajuato that supplies only urea (synthesized from ammonia and 
carbon dioxide and used as fertilizer and in animal feed and in 
plastics) producing client in the region. 
• Camargo is a single plant that produces ammonia. It is also 
situated in the Northeast, and like Salamanca, it has only one client 
in the region. 
• Tula is the single plant that produces acrylonitrile used in the 
manufacture of rubber and fibres. 
• Independencia produces acrylonitrile, dodecylbenzene (used in or 
to manufacture a wide variety of chemical products, including DDT, 
detergents, insecticides, and motor fuels), methanol (used as an 
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antifreeze, a general solvent, a fuel, and a denaturant for ethyl 
alcohol), and specialized goods that are produced in the central 
region of the country. 
• Escolin produces derivates of ethane, ethylene and polystyrene 
(thermoplastic polymer that can be moulded into objects or made 
into a foam that is used to insulate refrigerators). Its main 
characteristic is the already localized integration of private and 
public producers.  
• Reynosa is the oldest complex in the country and it produces 
ethylene and polystyrene of low density. Reynosa is located in the 
Northeast of the country.171 
The second stage of the plan was to integrate production streams and 
to associate them with their principal private clients. The legislation allowed 
the Energy Ministry to sell 49 percent of the stocks to domestic or 
international private investors. However, the government chose to first sell the 
biggest complexes to domestic investors and identified the nine private 
groups to which these complexes provided raw materials. As the price of 
privatizing complex-by-complex increased, part of the strategy was to foster 
joint ventures between the biggest private domestic producers. The first stage 
                                                             
171 The complexes changed their legal status transiting from the public property regime into 
independent enterprises with public participation by Presidential Decrees which were 
published in el Diario Oficial de la Federacion (the official gazette)–Cosoleacaque, Escolin, 
Tula and Camargo on 31 January; 28 February, 1997 for Cangrejera and Morelos; 25 june 
1997 for Pajaritos. The Independencia and Salamanca Complexes were integrated to 
PEMEX-Refinacion and Reynosa was fused with Escolin. 
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of privatization was devoted to find a way to reach only domestic business 
groups.172  
It took almost a year to reorganize the property of the complexes in 
order to call for capitalization bids on the new petrochemical enterprises 
formed during the first semester of 1997. The Ministry of Energy announced 
in April 1997 that the first call for privatizing the new enterprises would be 
held in August. However, the Ministry created a committee in June 1998 that 
would be responsible for stipulating the rules that would facilitate the sale of 
49 percent of the new enterprises’ stock. The committee was integrated by 
the Energy Minister, PEMEX’s General Director, the PEMEX-petrochemical 
General Director, the Deputy Ministers of Energy, representatives of the 
Finance Minister, and the SECODAM (official auditor). Rather than acting as 
participants, the last two only supervised the process. The committee was 
managed by an Executive Director named José Merino (Secretaria de 
Energia, 1998, 108/98 BIS; and B-062-98). 
Merino’s first activity was to meet with members of Congress in July. 
The intention of this meeting was to explain the conditions in which they 
would attract private capital for the secondary enterprises created a year ago. 
This concern was important because the PRI lost its majority control of the 
Chamber of Deputies in the mid-term election of 1997, thus placing the most 
important commissions in the Congress into the hands of the opposition. This 
                                                             
172 An advisor of the process said that the state considered reserving this stage of 
privatization for domestic groups. The intention was to favor domestic integration and the 
consolidation of the largest business groups of the country. The advisor added: “We 
represent the Mexican state, and of course, we look forward to protecting domestic interests 
first. We govern for Mexicans” (Anonymous interviews with the author March, 2000). 
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included the Energy Commission, which was conducted by a PRD deputy, 
Sergio Osorio. The most important statement made by Merino was that the 
government had every intention to continue the privatization program without 
delay (Secretaria de Energia, 1998 B-077-98). 
The second privatization process began in September 1997. The rules 
for the public bid in acquiring 49 percent of Morelos Complex were published 
on September 14th. The rules limited access to postulants holding assets 
above 2.7 billion US dollars and those specialized in the production of fibres 
and polymers, excepting the association of a capitalist partner. Of the three 
qualified companies, only Grupo Desc and Grupo Alfa173 expressed an 
interest in participating with PEMEX. However, Desc failed to find an 
associate that would let it reach the asset value required and was thus 
disqualified from the process, leaving the position to Alfa. Beyond specifying 
the publicized rules, the state tailored the privatization to favour one principal 
player beforehand, as Alfa was the only producer of fibres and polymers that 
met the requirements of holding value. Effectively, this strategy would result in 
the consolidation of a national champion. This fact lend credence to our 
second hypothesis that the state was sustaining the historical pattern of 
protecting entrenched national interests while advancing on the economic 
liberalization. This was done by granting monopoly control of the market to 
                                                             
173 It is worth remembering that Leopoldo Rodríguez, Grupo Desc’s vice-president, acting as 
ANIQ’s president had been an important actor in the definition of the petroleum policy with 
the state since the 1973 world crisis. Grupo Alfa, on their side, had been an important allied 
of Lopez Portillo government and Salinas’ Coalition before he arrived to the presidency in 
1988. 
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big business and reduce international competition in the Mexican 
petrochemical industry.174 
By law, PEMEX was to keep 51 percent of the stock of the complexes. 
However, in order to facilitate the control of the new conglomerates in private 
hands, the Energy Minister ruled that the company resulting from this 
association would be controlled and managed by the private participant. The 
Convenio de Desempeno (Performance Accord)175 granted autonomy and 
flexibility to the management of Morelos Complex operations. In the accord, 
the Energy Ministry changed the ‘control through process’ for a ‘control 
through results’.  The ministry also granted managing faculties in the 
definition of goals, productivity, competitively and profitability to any possible 
buyer–even if the buyer held a minority position. 
As it was mentioned before, only three companies in the market would 
be technically able to participate in the bid: Grupo Alfa (through its subsidiary 
Alpek), Grupo Desc, and Grupo Idesa. However, only Alfa enjoyed the capital 
composition able to bid for the company, once Idesa failed in forming a 
collective that would let them participate in the bid. In a last minute 
manoeuvre, Grupo Idesa appealed for the intervention of the Federal 
                                                             
174 The other Mexican group specialized in fibers and polymers–Grupo Idesa–was unable to 
participate due to its difficulty in reaching the size requirement. The rules considered the 
possibility that ‘medium’-sized groups would be able to venture with other national or 
international producers (only if Mexicans controlled more than 50 percent of the capital). In 
fact, even if the public call for bids was open, privatization was directed to consolidate the 
Alfa subsidiary Alpek in making it the national champion in the production of fibers–one of the 
only areas, in which the American petrochemical market is not completely integrated 
domestically. 
 
175 The Performance Accord involved the participation of three ministries: PEMEX, PEMEX-
petroquimica and PEMEX-Petroquimica Morelos that were published in the Diario Oficial de 
la Federacion on February 16, 1999. 
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Commission Regulating the Economic Competitiveness, arguing that even if 
both Idesa and Alfa had established a long-term contract with PEMEX176 to 
buy raw materials at special prices, the fact that Alfa would also own the 
Morelos Complex, which was producing the raw materials, would give Alfa an 
unfair advantage over other producers.177 
The Regulatory Commission asked for a renegotiation of those 
contracts a day before the Alfa’s attribution of the company. The commission 
found that Alfa would enjoy a privileged situation as both owner and client of 
the same company. Alfa rejected the ruling because it would affect their 
revenues, announcing no economic offer in the public bidding ceremony. It 
argued that the 51/49-percentile division of ownership did not give enough 
grants to spur a world-class company due to the privileged position that the 
Morelos Complex would continue to enjoy as a parastatal company. If Alfa 
had bought the Morelos Complex, it would have been able to consolidate its 
positions in the North American Markets of fibres and chemical textiles as well 
as packing materials. In addition, Alfa would have created new markets for 
bottles, electro-domestic appliances and construction goods in which they 
produce.  
 
                                                             
176 These contracts were established during the 1980s in order to guarantee the private 
sector raw materials on a long-term basis at stable prices in order to let them make strategic 
plans for the future. 
 
177 Those contracts were established in 1983, when PEMEX began to increase prices to 
reach international standards. PEMEX established those contracts to assure private 
producers the long-term price and provision of raw materials to them. Those contracts were 
negotiated on a case-by-case basis and would be untouched during the privatization 
process–even if the possible buyers enjoyed advantages from them. 
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9.7 Privatization is dead: long live protective liberalization 
During the 1982 crisis, the state maintained its protectionism in order to 
protect private producers through a reform that would improve petrochemical 
competitiveness. However, the state failed to consolidate the reform after 15 
years of trying to implement what was in essence protective liberalization. 
Once the government cancelled the first bid due to unsuitable offers, it kept 
going about business as usual, granting low-prized and long-term contracts to 
private producers.  In the 1986 privatization plan, businesses would gain 
integration on a plant-by-plant basis without risking important amounts of 
investment. However, the complex-by-complex plan of 1997 implied the 
investment of an excessive sum of money without reducing the risks of losing 
control of the plants as PEMEX ceded the management of the complexes to 
the private sector. As it was a discretionary decision of the state, the risk 
became too high for the private sector.178 
In 1999, annual imports of petrochemicals reached 14 billion US 
dollars–about 30 percent of the national revenue of crude oil exports the 
same year. In 2000, the PRI lost the presidential election for the first time in 
70 years. The new government documented that PEMEX deviated 150 million 
US dollars illegally to finance the PRI campaign through the oil union. While 
the PRI received 60 million US dollars, it was forced to pay 100 million in fines 
in 2002. The union put its share of corrupt money in American bank accounts 
                                                             
178 As the privatization implied the constitution of new companies, it was established in a very 
confused clause of the privatization rules, that the oil union would receive an important 
amount of money (almost 50 million US dollars) after a new privatization.   
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valued at 90 million dollars, arguing that they were external expenses. As the 
union eventually accepted culpability on the affair, it was required to pay 
PEMEX the entire 150 million dollars unpaid loan by relinquishing union fees 
until the amount was reached, and by doing so, effectively avoided the 
prosecution of union leaders responsible for the wrongdoing (Granados 
Chapa, 04-02-23 Reforma editorial pages “PEMEX satisfecho”). 
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Chapter 10. Conclusions 
 
 When field research for this work was conducted in the summer 2000, 
Mexico was in the middle of an electoral process that concluded with the end 
of 71 years of the PRI in power. Officials in the Energy Ministry were 
extremely disappointed. They had to spent the previous five years developing 
that would allow the troubled petrochemical industry to regain the impressive 
growth rates of the previous years, albeit in a new economic context. The 
Energy Ministry was very cooperative when officials explained the problems 
of the industry and the evolution of the petrochemical policies made by three 
different Ministers during Zedillo’s government to me. Every time the state 
tried took the step of implementing a structural reform in the sector, it was 
unable to continue fostering integration and competitiveness. Most 
importantly, it failed to create the conditions needed in order to induce private 
investment in a sector that had been reducing its production for 15 years. 
 Why was the state failing to improve the conditions of the 
petrochemical industry? What happened to the strong state structures that 
almost always set up the initiative to transform Mexico’s industrial landscape? 
 This thesis has documented the existing Mexican developmental 
structure, which connected the state with business and union actors efficiently 
in order to pursue collective ends effectively. At the same time, we have 
described the lack of capacity that the structure faced in managing the new 
necessities created by its own success in withdrawing state participation and 
in transforming Mexican petrochemical mainly into a private managed sector.  
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 In addition, we have offered ample evidence to show that the patterns 
of exchange between the state and the society were successful in a context 
of a closed-market economy and in an authoritarian political climate. 
However, the more the state succeeded in promoting developmental goals, 
the more it became incapable of dealing with the domestic and international 
pressures for economic liberalization and political reform.179 As in other 
developmental states, the Mexican state was “calling forth its own 
gravedigger” (Evans, 1995: 228). The formulae that had been proven to be 
efficient for decades were actually creating paralysis instead of development. 
 While this work is based on a single case analysis, leaving little space 
for generalizations, the evolution of the Mexican petrochemical industry 
shows that the strategy of embedded autonomy works well when it includes a 
tripartite connection among the state, businesses and labour organizations; 
this association pursues a transformative agenda. In a more or less 
autonomous context, the Mexican developmental structure was able to define 
policy goals that would consolidate an industry led mainly by domestic 
producers, without too much labour contestation. This tripartite exchange will 
be illustrated as follows: 
 
                                                             
179 Here, it is worth remembering that authoritarianism is familiar to developmental states: 
authoritarian governments have ruled South Korea, and the same party has ruled Japan for 
more than 50 years. 
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According to this image, each sphere represents one sector. This 
diagram lets us describe how labour, businesses and the state enjoy a good 
deal of autonomy. However, the connection capacity to pursue collective 
goals empowers each actor. More importantly, this synergy is necessary for 
managing–if not actually for creating–the affinities that the state and civil 
society share, when it comes to transform the country.  
State 
Society. 
Business 
Society. 
Unions 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However, just as Evans (1995: 228-234) predicted, the embedded 
autonomous state would become unable to deal with its own success. Evans 
has posed this challenge to illustrate the Korean case; the state was unable 
to deal with growing labour discontentment, and it used repression as a 
solution. In Mexico, the state opted for a gradual liberalization of politics and 
economics, which eventually led the country into paralysis. The first 
expression of the paralysis was economic; it happened when the decision of 
structural reform was taken in 1986. President Miguel de la Madrid 
succeeded in implementing the fist stages of the reform in the petrochemical 
industry, by increasing integration, competitiveness and new investment in 
particular chains. Presidents Salinas and Zedillo’s governments were less 
fortunate. 
The second face of the paralysis was political. The Mexican embedded 
autonomous state had serious difficulties dealing with pluralism. The more the 
Mexican state was forced to recognize social diversity and to promote political 
liberalization, the less efficient it seemed to be in keeping policy definition 
coherent and flexible in its application. The growing plurality of Mexican 
society affects the definition and application of the state promotional roles, 
especially since the paradigm shift of the 1980s, for several reasons: 
• The custodial role is now shared nationally with Congress and 
internationally with commercial agreements. The state lost its ability to 
continue inducing the gradual backward integration of the private 
petrochemical industry–even if it was done for historical and nationalist 
reasons, and even if the petrochemical law of 1971 settled the basis 
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for an extremely discretionary state action. Being unable to form a 
majority in Congress since 1997, political parties are more preoccupied 
of passing regulations that have major impact on public opinion than of 
engaging in a national consensus that would facilitate the solution of 
the major reforms needed in order to increase national 
competitiveness. 
• There is not a convincing justification either for a significant demiurgic 
role or a minimalist one level. Therefore, the state lost its ability to 
induce competitiveness in the petrochemical production efficiently. This 
loss was caused by old-fashioned nationalism or by too optimistic 
assumptions of the neo-liberal policies. 
• As a consequence, midwifery and husbandry roles by themselves 
cannot sustain an adequately defined policy if the bases for these roles 
do not exist. 
 The problem in Mexico today is that the main lines of the paradigm 
shift took hold and that structural reform triggered party competition mainly 
because displaced old officials with clientelistic-corportist bases reorganized 
to contest the reform (first inside PRI, then pushing democratization). Since 
the mid-1990s state capacity to finish it was blocked because, among other 
reasons, no party has formed a majority government since 1997 and 
neoliberal policies have become an evil words. So no one has the capacity to 
risk pushing a new reform agenda or to adjust old ones even if they know 
Mexico needs such. This is it, because even if since the mid 1980’s and 
particularly since Salinas government (1988-1994) the political personnel 
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changed, or at least Mexico’s top bureaucracy lived a generational shift when 
younger people educated at Ivy League universities arrived in the 
government. The result was something of a mismatch between the PRI 
apparatus and the government apparatus. For the first time the PRI and the 
government were following different visions for the country and no national 
project took hold to appeal the future.  
 All this became exacerbated with democratization. Contrary to what 
Kohli, Evans and Hall observed in the cases they studied, Mexican party 
politics has in fact blocked reform in the petroleum industry. This was first 
because old officials organized on the left considered oil as an icon of 
nationalism and used it to mobilize their clienteles.  Second, even if state 
officials were able to imagine policy scenarios appropriate to the new 
paradigm, they had to do so without altering the old legal structure sustaining 
the petroleum industry and the petrochemical sector. None has been able to 
push a constitutional reform that would sustain neoliberal policies in 
petrochemicals, allowing private investment to replace public investment or 
increasing public investment to relaunch a petrochemicals push. 
Finally, Evans assumed that embedded autonomy was useful to 
explain state and business’ exchanges meant to pursue collective goals. 
However, this thesis has shown that it is also possible to include labour 
organizations in the analysis. The unions of the most strategic sectors of the 
economy have always been present in the developmental institutions and in 
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the networks that connect the state and society. However, this was sort of a 
mixed blessing. 
From the end of World War II until 1970, the state was able to surpass 
the expectations of both labour and business groups. The Mexican state was 
able to offer profits and good salaries to both social groups. However, 
problems with the model began to unravel when major reforms were 
implemented. The private sector was unable to deal with the higher 
regulations and the increased demiurgic role; and on the other hand, labour 
was unable to accept the liberalization of the industry and the withdrawal of 
the state. The first situation mentioned above began in 1971; the private 
sector envisioned a problem: encouraging state production was turning into 
unfair competition. In the second situation, which began in 1986, it is clear 
that the unions would lose the political and economic advantages of 
controlling the monopoly of labour representation and that the union’s 
interests would be weakened.  
However, the most important reason for the failed reforms is the lack of 
state’s capacities to induce social transformation and development in an 
efficient way. In the 1970s, the state exaggerated its presence in the 
economy, thus jeopardizing both the project and the relationship with the 
private sector. Since 1986, the state reduced its demiurgic action and 
redefined the role that the promotional bureaucracies of both the Bank of 
Mexico and the Finance Ministry would play in the future.180 This made the 
                                                             
180 The Bank of Mexico gained autonomy to define monetarist policies concentrating its 
efforts to reduce inflation, control indebting, etc. in 1994, while the Finance ministry was in 
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state unable to play any promotional role or to blend midwifery, husbandry 
and custodial roles adequately. 
With the reform that was initiated in 1986, the society–now confined to 
private producers–would increase competitiveness by replacing the state. 
During the gradual implementation of this policy reform in the petrochemical 
industry, businesspeople–big groups at first, but also medium sized 
producers–would be able to enjoy the consolidation of domestically controlled 
productive chains. This way, the state continued to protect the domestic 
trajectory of transformation. Businesses would reduce risks by integrating 
themselves domestically through the privatization on a plant-by-plant basis. 
They would also increase international competitiveness in order to act in the 
newly liberalized context. When the project was first delayed, the space 
abandoned by the state began to be filled through imports. This fact 
increased disintegration in the sector.  
With the final privatization attempt in 1996, the plan changes in order 
to privatize complete petrochemical complexes. Prices increased tenfold and 
the possible participation of medium producers was automatically excluded. 
As smaller private producers were unable to participate, only big business 
tried to continue with the agenda. This continued happening until 1999, when 
Grupo Alfa opted to protect the special prices it was receiving by long-term 
contracts it had already signed with PEMEX, instead of assuming the political 
and economical risks of integrating the sector with a public monopoly. Both 
                                                                                                                                                                             
charge of increasing tax revenues and regulatory policies, since the early 1990s. Both 
institutions abandoned the promotional role they have played since the 1960s. 
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businesses and unions then opted for staying in the comfortable situation that 
the reform had created for both groups. The state then lost its capacity to 
push the reform. Every time a new stage was initiated, the best organized 
opposition contested it.  
Then, embedded autonomy is useful to explain the affinities between 
the state conspiracies in attracting related social actors in order to pursue the 
development of the petroleum industry in Mexico. Embedded autonomy is 
also functional to explain why the state ended up trapped by its own success. 
The society had developed such entrenched interests in the petrochemical 
industry, that even if tripartite relations were useful for pursuing collective 
goals in the past, they ended up digging the grave of the Revolutionary-
state’s authority, thus blocking the reform. As a more serious or preoccupying 
conclusion, some state actors have lost sight of the importance that this 
strategic sector has on the Mexican economy. They have also failed in 
creating the conditions to work together with the private sector in order to 
define collective goals. 
Even if the state pursued a major transformation from Import 
Substitution Industrialization (ISI) to Export-Oriented Industrialization (EOI), it 
is also possible to identify that the state was interested in keeping its 
traditional protective attitude towards private domestic business groups in a 
liberalizing context. The state was also overly dependent on the patterns of 
exchange with society in order to succeed in pushing this transformation. 
Mexican business groups reinforced their monopolies in the market, but only 
very few sectors became internationally competitive players. In hindsight, we 
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can uncover the fact that while there were important changes in the Mexican 
political economy; the patterns of the relationship between the state and the 
society did not change as much as it seemed at the beginning of the 1990s. 
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EPILOGUE 
 
In 2000, PAN’s presidential candidate Vicente Fox won the election. 
President Fox first decided to appoint the five most important businessmen 
into the government seats of the PEMEX’s Administration Council. Since the 
decision was taken with rapid opposition, Fox retired its proposition and 
renamed the traditional (Finance, Economy, Energy, Commerce and Bank of 
Mexico) government institutions to those seats.  
During 2001, Fox also reformed the organizational structure of 
PEMEX. With this measure, the division of a holding and subsidiaries was 
abandoned, thus rationalizing PEMEX resources. PEMEX administrative 
structure went back to the integration scheme that the company had before 
1992, in order to reduce the administrative costs of managing a divided 
company. This action erased the possibility of any future privatization as it 
has been planned before. To induce new investment in the sector, President 
Fox tried to make Congress pass new regulations that would allow private 
investment in the whole petroleum and energy sectors for five years without 
success.  
In August 2003 a new Energy Minister, Felipe Calderon, was 
appointed. Calderon has been leader of the PAN and of the party’s 
congressional caucus. His duty was to build consensus in order to reform the 
energy sector in Mexico. Therefore, in October 2003, President Fox 
announced his intentions to associate PEMEX with private producers in order 
to construct petrochemical mega-complexes that worked under the existing 
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rules. Calderon left the government and the project fail because the Finance 
Ministry denied authorization to any long-term contract that would warrant 
private investors with flat-subsidized prices for 20 years. 
Since the beginning of his government, President Fox succeeded in re-
establishing a career civil-service that would reinforce the autonomy of the 
bureaucracy. Even if the implementation of this measure will undermine the 
basis of the Popular Sector of the PRI, which has controlled the bureaucratic 
unions since 1938, it is not clear whether the state has been paying enough 
attention to connecting this new bureaucracy with social networks–other than 
corporatist ones–to embed its new structures with society. This is so, because 
since 1986 and as result of neo-liberal reforms, the state’s bureaucracy in key 
agencies has lost autonomy and along with it, it has lost the promotional role 
it used to play. 
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